Embodied narratives of recovery: a phenomenology of cardiac rehabilitation by Buckle, Joseph S.








Buckle, Joseph S. (2005) Embodied narratives of recovery: a 











Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
Embodied Narratives of Recovery: 
A Phenomenology of Cardiac Rehabilitation 
By 
Joseph S. Buckle 
Thesis Submitted for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
at the 
University of Glasgow 
in the 
Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Applied Social 
Sciences 
September 2005 
© Joseph S. Buckle. 2005 
Acknowledgements 
I acknowledge and thank my supervisor, Professor Harvie Ferguson. Always 
gracious and accessible, and never anything less than astonishing. 
Thanks also to Dr. Trish McCafferty, a friend for life who, even by telephone, 
managed to administer the occasionally necessary smack round the back of the 
head. 
My 'respects' to Dr. Lorraine 'Happy' Cook, Violet, and Biccy. We must now 
resume our drinking and dancing. 
Finally, love and affection to Evelyn for providing a sense of stillness to calm my 
anxious moments. 
The author acknowledges the financial and technical support of the 
Economic and Social Research Council. 
Contents 
Page number 
Introduction . ........................................................................ . 1 
Part One 
First Narrative: The Past Inside the Present ............................. ........... 17 
Chapter One: On Experience ........................................................ 19 
Second Narrative: The Boy with Blue Lips . ........................................ .46 
Chapter Two: In Illness ............................................................... .48 
Third Narrative: Going to the Theatre .. ............................................. 89 
Chapter Three: From the Heart ...................................................... 91 
Part Two 
Three Narratives: 
1. The Red Balloon ........... ................................................... 126 
ii. Ein Heldenleben .............................................................. 127 
iii. 'The fire which in the heart resides' ....................................... 128 
Chapter Four: For Narrative ........................................................ 130 
Seventh Narrative: The Loneliness o/the Long Distance Runner .............. 163 
Chapter Five: Toward Interpretation .............................................. 164 
Conclusion . ............................................................................ 181 
Final Narrative: There's Something About Mary . ................................ 187 
References . ............................................................................ 188 
Abstract 
Heart disease is increasingly common throughout the world today. It is the 
principal cause of death both in the west and, more recently, in the developing 
countries. The experience of heart disease can be physically and emotionally 
devastating, and, socially disruptive. Yet, little sociological research has been 
conducted in this field. Adopting a phenomenologically inflected approach, 
which recognizes the role of the body in the constitution of experience, this 
thesis examines the experience of heart disease and the process of 
'narrativization' of the illness experience. The body, as the locus of 
intentionality, is given in experience, yet at the same time it is constructed as 
an object of medicine. The body of experience, it is argued, exists in tension 
with the textual body of medical science. This thesis traces a brief history of 
the medicalisation of the body, from the anatomy theatres of early modem 
Europe, to the clinical encounter in its various forms; from the doctor-patient 
relationship to the nurse-patient interaction in the cardiac rehabilitation clinics 
of today. It is argued that 'illness narratives' represent more than a lay response 
to objectifying medical discourses and practices. Such narratives are in fact 
constitutive of experience and, as such, are exemplifying practices. It is also 
argued that the body is possessed of a memory and, to illustrate this further, I 
present research conducted among people who have experience of heart 
disease, surgery, and cardiac rehabilitation. This 'memory of the body' is that 
which, to some extent, is lost in the dehumanising spaces of medical science, 
but I assert that it is by way of the body's remembered capacities that selfhood 
is re-established. An issue that drives this thesis is the question of whether 
remaking the body, during the difficult process of recovery and cardiac 
rehabilitation, entails a remaking of the self. Illness, as a medicalised 
phenomenon, disrupts the biographical trajectory of the sick person, severing 
affective ties to family, friends, and community. It effectively dislocates the 
experience of the embodied person. This thesis is concerned principally with 
the means by which the person relocates himself or herself. 
Introduction 
[T]he life of consciousness - cognitive life, the life of desire or perceptual life 
- is subtended by an 'intentional arc' which projects round about us our past, 
our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological and moral situation, or 
rather which results in our being situated in all these respects. It is this 
intentional arc which brings about the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of 
sensibility and motility. And it is this which 'goes limp' in illness. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2000: 136) 
It has been noted (Claessens et aI., 2005: 8) that empirical evidence regarding 
the experience of heart disease, particularly among adult populations, is rare. 
This deficiency seems rather odd, given that cardiovascular disease is the 
leading cause of death in the world (Lukkarinen and Kyngas, 2003). This 
thesis addresses that deficiency by asking: what is the experience of heart 
disease, surgery and rehabilitation? To answer this question I assert that: 
'remaking' the body, as a response to the 'unmaking' of the body by medical 
science, entails a remaking ofthe self; narrative construction (narrativization) 
is an important means by which experience is constituted comprehensibly; the 
body, as a 'walking memory', is a key element in the social activity of 
narrativization. 
I employ a phenomenologically inflected research method because it entails an 
attentive awareness to the things of the world as we live them as well as how 
we conceptualise them and, thus, offers a comprehensive, context-sensitive 
approach to the subjects ofthe body, experience, and health and illness: 
Phenomenology is meant to enrich our understanding of health in adding to 
the disease-level analysis a level of analysis that addresses the question of 
how physiological states are lived as meaningful in an environment. 
[my emphasis] 
(Svenaeus, 2001: 87) 
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The body possesses a certain epistemological resistance, which is to say that it 
eludes consciousness while, paradoxically, it is the very ground of perceptual 
experience. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that the fundamental 
experience of the body is that of proprioception; that is, the sense of being in a 
body that is spatially located. In our 'normal', healthy, daily activities, 
however, we are never fully aware of the functioning of our bodies. We may 
have a sense of where we are, yet not know what we are and what our bodies 
are really doing. Quite simply, the body is largely taken for granted; 
thematically absent from experience. Yet, it is the very stuff of our sociability. 
As a thing of (social) substance, as the substance of the social, the body has a 
representational property and, as such, is a 'readable text' (Csordas, 2000: 12). 
For example, the body is the most readily available indicator of gender, 'race', 
age, class, and health. Bodies are thus differentiated and socially 'inscribed': 
bodies are nameable. We can say that this body is old, that body is sick, and so 
on. Our bodies say something about us as persons yet, to a great extent, we 
remain existentially detached from them, which is in part an effect of a 
pervasive dualism that privileges mind over body, but which is also an 
essential feature of our embodied intentionality. To explain this further, in the 
body ofthe thesis, I utilise Leder's (1990) conception ofthe 'absent body'. 
When I stated that the body might be 'read' as a social indicator of sorts I mean 
also that the health of the body is, in quite specific ways, readable. Indeed, it is 
difficult to separate the health of the body from its social status. We may read 
an 'old' person as such by their stooped posture, the presence of glaucoma, 
and/or by the inflamed and distorted fingers that are indicative of arthritis. 
Thus the body is already a text; a text that identifies who and what we are. My 
contention is that the text of the body is, to a great extent, a medical(ised) text. 
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The body has been taken up anew, within the human sciences and, in everyday 
life. Existentially, the body is that which endures through time and space and, 
as embodied beings, we identify ourselves with our bodies, while at the same 
time comprehending little, if nothing, about them. In its representational 
capacity, the body has increasingly come to be associated with self-identity 
(Giddens, 1991; Shilling, 1996). In contemporary society the body is 
something that we 'go to work' on. Body projects such as post-surgical 
rehabilitation effectively 'bring the body back in' to medicine (which would go 
some way to explain why cardiologists show little interest in cardiac 
rehabilitation). This form of 'body work' reminds us that we are bodies, or 
rather, that we are embodied beings. But, prior to rehabilitation, the experience 
of illness 'brings the body to mind' (Svenaeus, 2001) in a unique way, a point 
which I shall elaborate in the body of the thesis . 
., ., ., 
[T]here is no such thing as one phenomenology, and if there could be such a 
thing it would never become anything like a philosophical technique. 
(Heidegger, 1982: 328) 
Phenomenology, particularly as it has been taken up by sociology, focuses on 
'lived experience'. (Could there be any other kind of experience?) According 
to Van Manen (2001: 460), lived experience is 'the name for that which 
presents itself directly, unmediated by thought or language'. Yet, lived 
experience, while 'felt' pre-reflexively, is already mediated by thought and 
language, and accessed largely through thought and language. The purpose of 
phenomenological research is to challenge the assumptions oflanguage, to 
gather vividly descriptive accounts of experience, and to uncover the (always 
social) strategies that people, situated within already existing social structures, 
employ to make their lives meaningful. By attending to the manner, or form, 
in which experience is described, the researcher is able to grasp how life is 
experienced as 'meaningful in an environment'. 
As Merleau-Ponty (2000: viii) notes, phenomenological method is an attitude, 
'a manner and style of thinking'. As a manner of thinking, it is 'more useful to 
become self-consciously aware of the differences in frames of reference 
between traditions so that the transformations of meaning become explicit' 
(Holzner, 1974: 286). To that end, I set the everyday experience and 
understanding of the heart and heart disease against the medical 
conceptualisation of the body and disease. 
[S]ometimes the best way to study a pathological phenomenon is not to 
approach it from the point of view of its abnormality but as part of 'normal' 
recognizable reality. 
(Van Manen, 2001: 467) 
In chapter one, 'On Experience', I explicate the phenomenological view of 
experience, which situates the body as the 'structuring principle' (Merle au-
Ponty, 2000: 146) of the world, and I assert that the phenomenological 
conception of experience challenges the dualism inherent in both empiricism 
and idealism. 
While illness is a normal experience in some respects, the experience of heart 
disease and the prospect and aftermath of life-saving yet physically and 
emotionally devastating surgery brings the body to mind in a particular way. 
Utilising Leder's (1990) conception of the 'absent body', I argue that illness 
opens up a world of experience, while at the same time the sick person falls 
away from the familiar things of his or her 'normal' world. Serious illness 
disrupts the biographical trajectory, effectively unsettling the person's 
4 
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relationships with family and friends, and rendering more difficult the person's 
'normal' activities. The individualising effect of illness (Leder, 1990: 74) is 
such that it is felt as social dislocation and alienation. This I describe in terms 
of an 'ontological shift'. The experiential field is organized inwards and 
disrupts the outward intentionality or 'world-openness' that is the most 
distinctive characteristic of embodiment. The sick person is drawn toward his 
or her body while at the same time unsettled by its sudden eruption into the 
perceptual foreground. To be ill is to be alone with one's body. It is when the 
body is most keenly felt. The alienation attendant to serious illness emphasises 
the sense of both being and having a body and, thus, by way of a telic 
imperative to rectify the dis-locating experience of serious illness, offers the 
emancipatory prospect of re-establishing bodily coherence. 
I next discuss the body image as that which establishes us in our social setting. 
The body senses its world and itself in-the-world by way of the body image, 
which is, as I will make clear, only in part a mental representation. Consequent 
to this I discuss recent debate within sociology regarding the 'importation' of 
phenomenological concepts such as the body image. I suggest that the body 
has thus far been 'taken up' by sociology largely as a figure of social action or, 
as a cultural, semiotic, form - that is, a bearer of signs. The body has not, 
within sociology at least, been addressed for what it is, in and for itself. 
The development of imaging technologies permits a new experience of the 
body, particularly ofthe body interior. This is an image of the body, rather 
than a body image, yet by way of such imagery we experience our bodies in a 
new way. However, that these images are produced by medical science only 
serves to further objectify the body. The body that we see, reduced to a thing of 
parts, is not 'our' body. It is instead the body of medicine. 
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In chapter two, 'In Illness', I discuss the clinical encounter, from the 
doctor/patient to the nurse/patient relationship. The clinical encounter is 
significant because it is here, within this medicalised setting, that questions of 
health and illness are formalised. This is not to say that the sick person is not 
already subject to medicalising discourses. Quite the contrary, because 
everyday experience is, as Starobinski (1983) points out, already suffused with 
the language of medicine. But, the clinical encounter marks the site where the 
ontological shift that begins in illness is made more explicit. Medical science 
objectifies its subject, 'the patient', focusing on and treating the nomothetic 
condition - the disease - and largely ignores the experiential dimension of 
illness. 
Sociological critiques of the clinical encounter emphasise the silencing and 
objectification ofthe patient. To support this, I outline the trajectory of 
medical practice, from the hermeneutic interaction of 'Bedside Medicine', to 
the ocularcentric practice of 'Laboratory Medicine', which analyses the body at 
the cellular level, effectively unmaking it, reducing it to a thing of ever smaller 
parts. Thus, I trace a history of the methods by which the body is both 'read' by 
medicine and, constructed as a medical text. 
It is in the clinical setting that 'illness narratives' begin to take on a distinctive 
form. The objectifying practice of medicine evokes a response from the 
patient. The patient is compelled to tell his or her own story. I suggest that the 
illness narrative meets the telic demand of illness for 'interpretation and repair' 
(Leder, 1990). The illness narrative is thus a lay response to the experience of 
medicalisation. 
Further to this, I discuss the 'therapeutic turn' (Annstrong, 1995) in medicine, 
by which the patient is produced as a 'psychosocial entity'. Western medicine 
is currently witness to an emergent rhetoric regarding the doctor/patient and 
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nurse/patient relationship. The patient-centred model and 'new nursing' 
practices conceptualise and 'manage' the patient as a psychosocial entity, 
thereby neglecting the body, abandoning it to the biologistic discourses of 
'Laboratory Medicine'. This new model of care is accompanied by the 
phenomenon of the 'informed patient', a figure that may be considered a 
reflexive consumer and, an active, knowledgeable, participant in self-
regulating activities. Referring to phenomenological literature on the clinical 
encounter, it is suggested that the success of this new model is dependent upon 
the willingness or ability of doctors and nurses to give their charges more time 
and, to be open to an intersubjective engagement that emphasises listening to 
the patient's own interpretations of the illness experience. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion ofthe history and utility of cardiac rehabilitation. 
A drama oflife and death [in] the temple of anatomy. 
(Sawday, 1996: 71) 
In chapter three, 'From the Heart', I contend that the heart is possessed of a 
symbolic potency, so that the experience of the heart is coloured by 
emotionally resonant metaphorical associations. The chapter begins with a 
short history of anatomical dissection, in which I elaborate the argument that 
knowledge of the body transforms the subject of medical science into a body of 
knowledge. In the anatomy theatres ofthe Renaissance the body is perceived 
in terms of its metaphorical correspondence with the universe. The tropic body 
represents the larger world. Medical metaphors are ways of understanding the 
body and society and, importantly, are historically conditioned. From the 
organicist associations of the early modem period to the machine metaphors of 
the nineteenth century, the body is made to represent something other than 
itself. This chapter section, which offers a critique of objectivist science, 
illustrates the significance of historically conditioned language to the 
construction of meaning. 
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Next, I discuss the value of metaphor as a way of understanding experience. 
Lakoff and Johnson (2003) argue that there is no core of immediate experience 
that is intelligible, therefore we must employ language as a means of 
explication. This is achieved in part by use of the metaphors we live by. 
This chapter underlines the connection between body and language. 
Metaphors constitute experience in particular ways. 
This chapter concludes by engaging with Emily Martin's (1992) discussion of 
'the end ofthe body', in which she asserts that our bodily dispositions are 
'altered' by productive forces. Developing the idea that the body is made to 
stand for something other than itself, Martin (1992) presents an image of the 
body that is a reflection of the post-Fordist mode ofproduction. The machine-
metaphor no longer applies to the post-industrial body. This move signifies a 
further differentiation and fragmentation of bodies and is a consequence of the 
technological refinement of the medical gaze. 
Chapter four, 'For Narrative', examines the role of the body in the process of 
narrativization. The body is a 'walking memory' (Turner, 1995a: 250) and thus 
provides the foundation for the assertion of self-identity. Does remaking the 
body, in the setting of the cardiac rehabilitation unit and, in other social 
settings where people take their exercise, entail a remaking of the self? I 
suggest that illness narratives have transformative and emancipatory qualities 
and, as such, are characteristic of the classical narratives of modernity. Illness 
narratives evoke a world and exemplify a mode of being; a way ofliving. 
Illness narratives also present the possibility of mutuality, particularly if we 
consider that narratives are necessarily co-authored. 
Regarding the question of the underlying unity of the self, it is argued that 
identity is forged in the process of narrativization. The 'quest' for narrative 
identity is a response to the fragmentation that is consequent to both illness and 
the process of medical is at ion. If illness disrupts the biographical trajectory, 
effectively creating a 'hole in experience' (Sacks, 1991), does narrativization 
help to fill that hole? I conclude this discussion by positing the idea that 
narratives are actualised through the body. 
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In chapter five, 'Toward Interpretation', I ask why sociology is interested in 
'illness narratives'. Are narratives privileged as hyperauthentic expressions of 
the self of the narrator? Are the (extra)ordinary stories of (extra) ordinary 
people suitable - that is, reliable - data sources for the social researcher? 
Atkinson (1997) is sceptical about the validity of illness narratives, stating that, 
as social constructions, they should be treated as 'social facts' and, as such, 
must be subjected to rigorous sociological scrutiny. Interestingly, Atkinson 
and Silverman (1997) suggest that the turn to narrative is a consequence of 
what they refer to as the 'interview society', that is, a culture that increasingly 
privileges the revelation of individual, interior or psychic, experience. 
However, my position on this matter is that while illness narratives should not 
be taken at face value, they do provide a means by which people order and 
make sense of experience. They serve to bring some sense of coherence to the 
inchoate. I suggest that the fictional quality of illness narratives is not 
necessarily problematic inasmuch as experience is already informed by and 
articulated through references to the literary; that our modes of understanding 
draw upon the same resources as aesthetic artefacts, whether in the form of 
television drama or works of 'high art'. In short, reality is already 'storied'. To 
ignore the illness narrative is to deny the very means by which people actualise 
themselves in (sometimes critical) response to the larger narratives of the 
power structure that is medical science. 
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Admittedly, there is a certain amount of nursing research on various aspects of 
heart disease, and although much of the literature is at least sociologically 
informed, it is more often brief and quite insubstantial. Nursing research, even 
when it is avowedly qualitative, inevitably tends toward the quantitative, such 
is the dominant paradigm in medical thought. Nursing literature also shares an 
interest in phenomenology; yet in general such research tends to conflate 
'subj ective' experience with the so-called 'essence' of the experienced 
phenomenon. The essence of the experience is taken to be that which each 
individual 'feels'. However, the very notion of subjectivity is problematic 
inasmuch as experience is necessarily social- there is no experience of the self 
without experience of and reference to another - and is thus always 
intersubjective. Intersubjectivity is an existential given or, to put it another 
way, SUbjectivity belongs to the world (Butler, 1998: x). 
Aside from nursing research, sociologists have indeed provided analyses of the 
experience of heart disease, albeit limited to single aspects of experience: 
among others, for example, gendered beliefs about heart disease (Emslie et aI., 
2001); medical expertise and the communication of information to patients 
undergoing bypass surgery (Radley, 1996); and therapeutic, holistic responses 
to those living with heart disease (Winters, 1997). While these studies, 
particularly Radley's (1996), are of some interest, they do not take account of 
the assumptions that inform everyday and scientific knowledge and, are 
therefore somewhat limited in their approach to the subject, although it should 
be noted that they are all fairly short essays. 
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To acknowledge the locatedness of subjects is to reject what we might call an 
'unconditioned subject', that is, a knower guided only by context-independent 
and value-neutral methodological rules. 
(Longino,2002: 107) 
Why the heart? The heart is a liminal thing. It is a natural and cultural object, 
and is therefore possessed of a symbolic potency that subtends the emotional 
and socio-politicallife of human beings. Metaphors of the heart have a 
considerable history, thus the heart has been made to 'stand for' many different 
things and, is therefore a complex object. 
The symptoms associated with coronary artery and heart-valve disease are 
similar in many respects: breathlessness, bronchial spasm, fatigue, dizziness, 
pain (if angina is present), anxiety, and excitability. Furthermore, the heart 
tends to beat irregularly and sometimes quite violently, to the extent that it can 
be clearly felt as an erratic pounding in the chest. Here the body is quite 
clearly experienced in an unusual way. It is thus the cultural and material 
intensity of the experience that makes heart disease an interesting research 
topic. 
For coronary artery bypass and for valve surgery the surgical procedure is 
initially identical. The patient is put on a bypass machine and the chest is 
opened. The surgical procedure is physically devastating (traumatic in the true 
sense), and yet the survival rates are very high. Heart surgery takes the patient 
to the brink of death and brings her back to life again. I suggest that the bodily, 
emotional, impact of such experience engenders a particular sensitivity to the 
world on the part of the patient. Quite simply, they know that they have 
survived a traumatic experience and, in attending to the repair of their bodies 
they reassert their sense of being embodied. Therefore, as informants, cardiac 
patients present the researcher with the means oftalking about acutely felt 
expenence. 
" " " 
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Initially I requested permission to interview cardiac outpatients, who were, or, 
had recently been, engaged in cardiac rehabilitation programmes at three city 
hospitals. I began to conduct interviews, both in rooms in the hospitals, set 
aside for that purpose and, if invited, at informants' homes. While the home 
interviews were successful- intimate and revealing - the hospital interviews 
were rather less so. At that point I decided to abandon hospital-based 
interviews altogether and concentrate on home interviews. I set about finding 
more informants, largely by 'snowballing', which proved a very useful method. 
Later, I took to walking in a local park with informants, who introduced me to 
friends who had undergone heart surgery and cardiac rehabilitation. In all, I 
successfully interviewed twenty-three people who had experience of heart 
disease, surgery, and rehabilitation. In addition I interviewed four cardiac 
rehabilitation nurses. I have only used extracts from one nurse interview in this 
thesis. 
Interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. All recordings have since been 
erased, for reasons of confidentiality. Field notes were taken during and after 
interviews, particularly those conducted in an outdoor setting. 
I began interviewing informants in Spring 2002. I continued interviewing until 
Autumn 2004. I conducted one interview in Summer 2005, but that is not 
included among the extracts presented here. 
My research proposal was approved by Ethics Committees at each of the 
hospitals. The interviews were conducted in accordance with ethical 
guidelines established by the British Sociological Association. All informants 
are given pseudonyms. All infonnants signed consent fonns and gave their 
pennission to reproduce and publish interview extracts . 
., ., ., 
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Within this thesis I present interview extracts from seventeen infonnants; ten 
women and seven men. I believe that the number of infonnants in this type of 
study is unimportant. I could just as easily have interviewed two or one 
hundred people. The extracts are presented in the usual manner; that is, the 
infonnants are given pseudonyms and the extracts are indented. However, 
there is one addition. I have set each interview extract within quotation marks. 
This is to highlight the spoken quality of the extracts, and to set them apart 
from other indented quotes. The extracts represent the voice of lay experience, 
while other quotes generally represent that of scientifically infonned opinion. 
I interviewed some infonnants twice, largely to detennine whether they felt 
that their state of health had improved, ifthey had maintained an exercise 
regime, and to find out how they felt about their experience, including that of 
talking with me, in retrospect. I wanted to detennine if the infonnants had 
reflected further on the experience after the first interview. For the second 
interview I chose infonnants who had been particularly communicative during 
our first meeting. I shared some of my thoughts on the process of interviewing, 
writing, and reflecting on the research. This is in keeping with the method of 
'interactive interviewing' espoused by Ellis et al. (1997: 119-149), who 
advocate an openly intersubjective approach to sensitive research topics. 
[A ]ffective notions are part of the researcher's equipment; to discount them in 
the name of objectivity is to allow them to proliferate furiously but in secret, 
to the detriment of the 'scientific' approach ... [thus] ... a self-aware subjectivity 
is a most useful tool. 
(Pouchelle, 1999: 198) 
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As the research subject is socially located, so too is the researcher. I wanted to 
make it clear to my informants that I have a voice other than the seemingly 
objective voice of science. In hospital, most patients are obliged to answer 
questionnaires concerning health, social circumstances, mental acuity, and so 
on. In a sense, I wanted to give my informants the opportunity to ask 
questions, and to respond to mine freely. In keeping with my position that 
medical science objectifies the patient, I was reluctant to compound this 
alienating practice. Contrary to the figure of the naIve interloper of classic 
ethnographic texts such as that of, for example, Foot-Whyte (1943), I 
present( ed) myself as an informed researcher inasmuch as I have some 
knowledge of the effects of heart disease. I do not intend to suggest that this is 
the best or only way to conduct this type of research and, neither do I claim 
that only someone such as I can, but I believe that this knowledge facilitated an 
easy intimacy between my informants and myself. 
Regarding the content of the interviews, I set my questions within general 
thematic frames. For example, I wanted to talk about anxiety, fatigue, social 
dislocation, and the work that is involved in rehabilitating the body. To this 
end I asked informants about: their relationships with family and friends; the 
emotional content of their experience; the illness 'process', from the initial 
awareness that 'something was wrong' to their interactions with doctors, 
cardiologists, technicians, and nurses; and, their more obviously embodied 
activities such as exercise, both in the rehabilitation unit and in other places . 
., ., ., 
The narratives that are interspersed throughout this thesis are presented in a 
similar manner to fiction. They are italicised to distinguish them from the rest 
of the text, to emphasise that our everyday life is (or can be) 'storied'. The 
titles of the narratives are suggestive in that they allude to poetry, film, music, 
and drama. The purpose of this is to illustrate the narrative memory or, 
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narrative competence ofthe reader. My intention in presenting these narratives 
is to emphasise the aesthetic quality of experience and the aestheticising nature 
of writing. All writing is writing from and with a history, which is to say that 
the writer is always historically located and possessed of a cultured memory. 





First Narrative: The Past Inside the Present 
My body is older than my oldest possession. I've had it for as long as I can 
remember. And prior to any recollection I know that, in a sense, it already 
existed: that it possessed me before I took possession of it. To say that I have a 
body suggests possession of something by someone, but this notion of 
possession is of a different quality to that ideology of ownership which is 
dominant in the current mode of production: it is rather the 'simple mineness of 
one's own body' (Ricoeur, 1994: 320). Perhaps I should say that I have a 
sense that my body is my oldest possession because it is the first thing that I 
remember, or more precisely, it is the thing from which I remember: it is the 
source of my memory, the very necessary ground upon which my memory takes 
shape. My first memory, if indeed it is a memory, for it might only be the 
memory of a dream or the dream of a memory, is of lying on my back (although 
I do not know that I am lying, or indeed, on my back). I am looking at 
something above; there is a sense of nearness and of distance, of darkness and 
light, and of movement on the periphery. Afigure, a shape which I am able to 
differentiate from the general background, looms close and almost fills my field 
of vision, and then something is in my mouth (although of course I do not yet 
know it as my mouth), while other figures, much smaller, much further away, 
make dark flickering movements. That first memory is now vague, a slight 
awareness of something that might have happened, but since then I've 
developed a considerable stock of memories, and they are all memories of 
something, that is, they are memories of a sense of place and my relation to 
and within it. Thus memory is a spatialised awareness, a cognition of a 
substantive relation to something, determined by the position of my body in 
relation to the 'stuff' around it. Of course, I forget my body when I remember 
something, some experience, unless I recall the feeling of pain or pleasure that 
accompanied and coloured the original experience. Experience itself is 
organized, given form, in memory,· it is made more tangible, more definite, in 
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an act of ' spec tat oria I decomposition' (Todes, 2001: 53) in which I learn to 
remember what the things of the world are. Lying there (probably in my 
pram), watching gulls overhead against a steel-grey sky (possibly close to 
water), beingfed something by someone (almost certainly my mother), my 
being becomes aware of itself and an 'I' is formed for the purpose of 
understanding and knowing the living text that is the world. The world thus 
becomes known and presents itself to me as always and already determinate -
the gulls were always gulls, the sky was always the sky. And thus I learn also 
to take the world for granted by way of this shift from perception to conception, 
from an initial undifferentiated apprehension of the world to a discriminatory 
and anticipatory knowledge of it. Experience, then, is the contextual 
interaction between embodied subjects and others (people and things). Thus, I 
'come to' in the midst of things, always 'encircled by others' (Schilder, 1950: 
705). 
Chapter One: On Experience. 
Our own body is in the world as the heart is in the organism: it keeps the 
visible spectacle constantly alive, it breathes life into it and sustains it 
inwardly, and with it forms a system. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2000: 203) 
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The qualities of material things as aestheta, such as they present themselves to 
me intuitively, prove to be dependent on my qualities, the make-up of the 
experiencing subject, and to be related to my Body and my "normal 
sensibility". [emphasis in original] 
(Husserl, 1999: 163) 
Since something cannot be normal without being a normal something, the 
application of the term "normal" to people presupposes that they are normal in 
some respect. [ ... ] Thus the concept "normal" becomes a metaconcept. 
(Misztal, 2001: 313) 
Matters of the Heart 
Any discussion of experience necessarily invokes the presence ofthe body, for, 
as Ferguson (1997a: 1) notes, there is no experience that is not bodily. And, as 
all experience is experience of something, it is vital from the outset - not least 
in order to avoid idealisation or abstraction, such that, for example, the body 
becomes merely the idea of a body - to address what that something is. 
This chapter is guided by, and toward the phenomenological view of 
experience and, thereby, seeks to avoid the twin methodological failings of 
reductive empiricism and abstract idealism. The point is to circumvent the 
fallacies in which experience is conceived as either the registration of sense-
data (an atomism which neglects the meaningful dialectic between the 
embodied subject and his/her environment), or as the product of a constituting 
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yet detached (that is, existing independently of its world) consciousness. In 
both methods - empiricism and idealism (or intellectualism) - the world is 
essentially meaningless, comprised of barely differentiated objects, which, in 
the former, appear as stimuli, and in the latter, as 'aspects of the object[s] 
corresponding to different perspectives' (Merleau-Ponty, 2000: x). Either way, 
the subject, or subjectivity at work is 'impregnable ... untouched by being and 
time' (Merleau-Ponty, 2000: x), and is thus disconnected from its world, 
unconditioned by history, and devoid of any sense of the social. It is therefore 
vital that a social theory, and methodology, ofthe body, while attending to the 
question of experience - which in this study is the experience of illness -
address also the different modes of sociability that are constituted by the 
embodied subject. 
The body, as the 'core of human existence' (Marcel, in Spiegelberg, 1976: 439), 
the 'lynchpin of subjectivity' (Rothfield, 1997: 33), the 'zero-point and centre of 
our world' (Ferguson, 1997a: 1-2), and the 'structuring principle' of that world 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1978: 146), is no simple possession (Mackenzie, 2001: 418-
421). Nor is it, in a Cartesian sense, an extension of mind (McWhinney, 2001: 
331, among others). Being is incarnated in the body and, thus, both being and 
having a body actualise our intimate participation in the world. Yet, despite its 
centrality, its essential position as the very ground of experience, the body is 
characterised by existential indeterminacy (Csordas, 2000: 5). The experience 
of illness, or being ill, as Buytendijk (in Svenaeus, 2001: 87) observes, 'is 
above all alienation from the world'. 
As an experience illness is, initially at least, abnormal. First, serious illness 
brings a sense of social dislocation, psychic disturbance, and fragmentation of 
self-identity to the experiencing subject. Second, illness pushes the body to the 
perceptual foreground. Illness brings the body to mind, for if, as Gadamer has 
it, to be in good health is to be 'forgetful of ourselves' (in Svenaeus, 2001: 89), 
then to experience 'bad' health is to be mindful of ourselves by virtue of a 
heightened awareness of the body, particularly of its potentialities and 
limitations - in short, its indeterminacy_ 
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This notion of the indeterminacy ofthe body is, I believe, supported by 
Ferguson (1997b: 7) when he observes that 'the contemporary experience ofthe 
body is a vast accumulation of body images drawn from the past'. The body is, 
therefore, no simple object. The experience of the body, at this or any given 
moment, is no less than the sum of embodied experience, and as such, the body 
is an historically conditioned and continuously changing source and subject of 
experience. It could then be said that the past (history) remains inside the 
present (spatially situated body) and, that the body is thus possessed of a 
residual memory: indeed, '[e]ach individual enters the world with the forms of 
movement that are constitutive of thought embodied in the environment 
surrounding him or her' (Bakhurst, in Burkitt, 1999: 78). Citing Ilyenkov 
(1977), Burkitt (1999: 78-80), observes that, as we are born into a world that 
history has made cognizable, thought does not emerge of its own accord; it 
does not spring from the mind. Thought originates somewhere in history, and 
is directed toward some thing. In short, all action and thought relies upon (but 
is irreducible to) a history of action and thought: 
[T]he sole thinking body with which we are acquainted, does not consist of 
two Cartesian halves - 'thought lacking a body' and a 'body lacking thought'. 
[ ... ] [B]oth the one and the other are equally fallacious abstractions. [ ... ] 
Between body and thought there is no relation of cause and effect, but the 
relation of an organ (i.e. of a spatially determinate body) to the mode of its 
own action. 
(TIyenkov, in Burkitt: 1999: 79) 
The 'sole body' may, however, lack wholeness or consistency, for as Leder 
(1990: 1) argues, it is during illness that the body 'dys-appears', which is to say 
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that the body 'surface[ s] as an absence, a being-away within experience' 
[emphasis in original]. So, while illness represents a disruption of the 
biographical trajectory, dissociating the subject from the familiar world of 
work, family and friends, and from previously held notions of self-identity, it is 
also when the body, or at least part of it, is most keenly felt. During illness one 
is, in a sense, alone with one's body, drawn to its absolute facticity as a 
biological, natural, and therefore troublesome entity. The opposition of culture 
and nature is at its most obvious in this situation: culture, as a human 
construction, is deemed to be malleable, whereas the natural is considered 
uncultured, and thus dangerous - 'at best base and unruly [and] at 
worst ... deeply disruptive and uncontrollable' (Shildrick, 2002: 11). 
In suggesting that, in illness, the body's pressing immanence impinges upon 
our sensibility, I do not mean to imply that the body is not otherwise strongly 
'felt', as, for example, in moments of pleasure or distress. I wish to emphasise, 
as does Leder (1990), that the body more often, and necessarily, effaces itself, 
so that bodily disappearance seems normal. Leder (1990: 25) does not assert 
that the body disappears altogether. Rather, that bodily sensations are 
'relegate[d] to the status of neutral background', according to the focus of 
perception: '[a]s such, the body itself is not a point but an organized field in 
which certain organs and abilities come to a prominence while others recede' 
(Leder, 1990: 24). Zaner (1981: 45) describes the body as a 'contexture'; that 
is, 'a system organized by a unifying principle or agency beyond its constituent 
parts, wherein each part gains its functional significance only by virtue of its 
place in the overall structure' (Zaner, 1981: 77). For example, at this moment 
of writing I am (obviously) seated at my computer, typing; my attention, or 
rather, my intentionality, focused upon the keyboard and the screen. I am 
aware of an itch on my right hand and a dull pain and sense of stiffness across 
my shoulders. I am not, however, aware of the other parts of my body that 
enable me to sit and type, although my perception is supplemented by the smell 
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of my wooden desk and the barely discernible sounds of suburbia - birdsong, 
cars in the distance, children playing - all of which provide a perceptual 
background and thus make my experience feel whole. And by noticing this 
background and describing it I bring it more clearly into focus and begin to 
notice many of its previously overlooked aspects. I have just scratched the itch 
and it has disappeared (along with the hand that itched), and I am left only with 
a vague awareness of my shoulders. All other possible bodily sensations have 
momentarily receded into the 'corporeal background' (Leder, 1990: 25) of 
inattention. No. Now I have an itch on the right side of my face. This could 
go on forever, but I merely wish to illustrate the point that the body's awareness 
of itself flickers in and out of perception, surfacing to the perceptual 
foreground at particular times and under specific conditions. Equally, I do not 
imply that bodily experience in illness is constant; rather, feelings of pain, 
fatigue, or dysfunction may recede from the foreground of perception. For 
example, if the pain of angina surfaces during exertion, then it will quickly 
retreat once activity has ceased or if medication is taken. Nevertheless, I 
contend that the experience of heart disease, even when it is not strongly felt, 
elicits a specific response in the sick person, and as such, I assert that heart 
disease, for reasons which will be fully explained in due course, is felt in a 
particular way. 
Here, I must draw a distinction between the terms 'disappearance' and 'dys-
appearance' (Leder, 1990). 'Disappearance' quite simply refers to the absence 
of the body from the perceptual foreground, while 'dys-appearance' refers to 
the presence of the body 'at times of dysfunction or problematic operation' 
(Leder, 1990: 85). 
The body, as the locus of perception, 'is the most abiding and inescapable 
presence in our lives', yet paradoxically, it is 'rarely the thematic object of 
experience' (Leder, 1990: 1). Whether immersed in thought or engaged in 
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physical activity, the body itself is seldom the object of our attention (Leder, 
1990: 1), and even when it is, attention is more likely to be directed toward 
specific body parts, for example, my fingers on the keyboard as I write this, or 
more problematically, an itching hand or a muscular pain. Disappearance thus 
refers to the necessarily self-effacing character of embodiment. To expand 
upon this point I must restate that all experience is experience of something. 
The world already exists for us - it is 'ready-made' (Merleau-Ponty, 2000: xvii) 
- but it does not exist as a thing apart, because, as we are already in the world 
we have an intimate relationship with it. The experiencing subj ect is thus 
'bound up with and directed toward' (Leder, 1998: 123) the experienced world 
in projective activity; that is, he or she is possessed of intentionality, an in-
tending toward the things of the world. Experience is not merely an 
'incoherent bombardment of the senses' (Throop, 2003: 221), as empiricism 
would have it, and neither, in the manner of intellectualism, do we stand, by 
way of a detached, ethereal consciousness, at a remove from the world, to 
conceive of it as something that exists outside consciousness. Discussing 
intentionality, and citing Husserl's critique of Descartes, Crossley (1996: 2) 
asserts that 'for us, the world can never be anything other than the world of our 
conscious experience, [that] we can never know ifthere is a world beyond our 
conscious experience, [and] ifthere is, we can never know what it is like'. In 
short, there are not two worlds, one physical and the other 'in the mind'. There 
is not, somehow, beside the intentional object, a representation - an image in 
consciousness - 'which serves as substitute for the thing itself which is outside 
consciousness' (Sallis, 1995: 65), for to believe that would necessitate a return 
to the constitutive consciousness of intellectualism. It is precisely because we 
find ourselves immersed in the world, forever intending - moving out - toward 
the things that we are already intertwined with, that we cannot 'see' ourselves, 
as it were. Leder (1990: 20) puts this more succinctly when he states that the 
body 'is a lacuna in its actional field [and that] we ordinarily focus upon the 
goal of activity, not our corporeal means of accomplishment'. In grasping that 
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which we intend toward, the 'goal of activity', the body moves away from 
itself, but this away-ness, or 'being away' (Leder, 1990: 22), implies a presence 
also - the 'from-structure' (Leder, 1990: 15 et passim) ofthe intentional body. 
The body could not be away, stand outside, unless it had a being and stance to 
begin with. It is never thus fully eradicated from the experiential world. 
Otherwise I would not even know I had a body. [my emphasis] 
(Leder, 1990: 22) 
Thus the body is both absent and present. The term 'dys-appearance' is 
employed to signify the appearance, or presence of the body (or body parts), in 
a problematic way. Leder (1990: 84) cites the etymology of the prefix dys, 
meaning bad, hard, or ill, stating that 'dys-appearance' indicates a felt effect of 
vital, affective, or motor disturbance. The body normally disappears; it is 
necessarily self-effacing, and absent from experience. This may be described 
as a 'primary absence' and is that which 'allows the body to open out onto a 
world' (Leder, 1990: 90). But, dys-appearance is a 'secondary absence [ ... ] 
born from the absence of an absence' (Leder, 1990: 90-91): it is thus the 
absence of a normal absence, felt, in dys-appearance, as a presence. The 
following interview extract illustrates a moment of bodily dys-appearance, 
which, according to the informant, marked the onset of his heart condition: 
"The light bulb in the garage had gone and I went to change it, something I'd 
done many times before. No problem! But this time, when I climbed up the 
stepladder, I had to stand at the top and catch my breath. I felt dizzy, and 
heavy ... my legs were so heavy, and my arms too .. J had no energy at all. I 
thought for a second that I was going to be stuck there. I couldn't reach up to 
the bulb to change it, but after a minute the feeling passed, I changed the bulb 
and I felt okay. I was a bit shocked at the strength of the feeling, but I thought 
that I was just feeling my age." 
(Robert, 59 years old) 
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The difficulty in accomplishing this simple, generally taken-for-granted act-
"something I'd done many times before" - points to a disunity of the senses (for 
example, touch and spatial awareness) and a concomitant 'dis-ability' (Leder, 
1990: 81) to fulfil certain 'normal' functions. The informant had to 'catch' his 
breath, his arms and legs dys-appeared in that they were strongly felt, and he 
was 'shocked at the strength of the feeling'. Momentarily, the feeling passed, 
but further experiences of similar intensity unsettled this informant enough for 
him to seek the advice of his doctor. 
It should be stressed that bodily dys-appearance does not always prefigure 
serious illness, that it is possible to be uncomfortably aware of a body part - for 
example, a stubbed toe, a roll of flesh around the waist - without being ill, and 
thus it could be said that the body shifts from dys-appearance to disappearance 
much of the time. Equally, it is possible to be unaware of a serious condition. 
For example, diseases of the heart valves may go unnoticed for years because 
the heart can, to an extent, compensate for any 'disturbances' in its structure 
(Lewis, 1944: 194-200). It is the effect of dys-appearance that is significant: 
"I had this terrible, dry cough. That was the first thing, really. I thought it 
was a chest infection at first, but it wouldn't clear up. But it was my heart. 
There was fluid building up in my lungs all the time and that was what was 
causing the cough. Even with the pills they gave me it didn't stop. It was one 
of those coughs that really shakes you. I'd feel exhausted all the time with the 
coughing." 
(Alice, 64) 
The sensations that accompany illness - for example, pain and fatigue -
'reorganize the experiential field inward' (Leder, 1990: 73), which is to say that 
while one remains aware of other sensations, unpleasant feelings dominate all 
others and engender an inwardly reflective focus of one's thoughts and 
attentions, just as toothache seems to blot out all other sensation and thought so 
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that all attention is directed toward the tooth. Indeed, 'pain is the very 
concretisation of the unpleasant, the aversive' (Leder, 1990: 73). The body, as 
the point from which we attend to the world, is a 'from' structure - we interact 
with the world 'from' our body. But, the 'affective call' (Leder, 1990: 73) of 
illness reverses this position so that the body becomes a 'to' structure; it is that 
which we attend 'to': 
"My heart would beat really fast. First it was just if I climbed stairs, or 
walked too fast. But then it happened during the night. I couldn't get to sleep. 
I'd hold my hand against my chest to feel the heartbeat. It was too fast. I was 
doing it all the time. People started to notice. They'd ask why I was holding 
my chest. I'd get really worried if it was beating fast when I wasn't doing 
anything. I was really obsessed about it." 
(Jane, 62) 
Good health is taken to be normal; the seemingly effortless workings of the 
body are invisible and therefore beyond immediate perception (although, 
referring to the idea of the body as a machine, Sawday (1996: 37) notes that the 
wonder of the body, in its complexity, is that it works at all). To suggest, as I 
have, that illness 'pushes the body to the perceptual foreground' and 'brings it to 
mind' is to imply that illness has an objective quality, that it exists somehow 
outwith our everyday experience of ourselves. This is not so, for this 
perception refers not to a quality inherent in illness, but is instead a quality of 
embodiment which serves to 'confirm one's identity with one's own body in a 
radical, inescapable way' (Leder, 1984-85: 262), which is to say that bodily 
malfunction is felt to a degree that normal bodily functioning is not. (That 
normal bodily functioning is taken to be normal may say more about the power 
of the metaconceptual nature of the notion of normality.) Thus, we are 
reminded, in illness, of our mortality and materiality: the threat to the integrity 
of the body and hence, the self, heralds a social dis-integration which 
confounds any attempt at transcendence. Much as the sick person might wish 
it, there is no way to rise above the body. Illness reminds us that we are 
embodied. To paraphrase Nietzsche (1980), our chains run with us. 
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"I'd been feeling unwell for a while ... oh, about two months. [ ... ] Dizzy 
spells, headaches. I tired very easily, and normally I'm very active. I knew 
something was wrong when I found myself lying on the floor that night. I 
came to on the floor in the hall. We'd been at a dinner dance and C. 
[informant's husband] went to bed and I was tidying away in the kitchen for a 
little while ... and then Ijust came to on the floor in the hall. I don't remember 
going into the hall. I must have collapsed. I lay there, looking at the ceiling. 
I felt fme, and I wasn't worried. No, I didn't call for C. I waited for a little 
while, then got myself up and went to bed. Yes, I told him [informant's 
husband] the next morning, and he called the doctor out. He thought it was 
the medication I was on for the blood pressure, but it got worse .. .I fainted 
twice more, so he sent me to the hospital for tests. I was scared to go out in 
case I fainted in public. I became quite ill. It got to the point where I couldn't 
do anything ... the dizzy spells and that terrible feeling in my neck. .. yes, the 
pulsing. [ ... ] Yes, looking back it was funny how I didn't call upstairs. I 
don't know why. I didn't want to worry him. I didn't want the fuss. I think it 
made me a bit daft at times. You know, when I had dizzy spells I'd feel 
awfully confused, but I didn't feel like that then. I remember lying on the 
floor thinking, 'this isn't right .. .I must be dreaming'. I was quite calm. [ ... ] 
No, I didn't think it was my heart. If anything, I was worried it was the cancer 
coming back." 
(Kate, 75) 
The world ofthe sick person is constricted (Leder, 1990: 80-83), and, focused 
inward upon herself, and faced with the prospect of leading a more limited life, 
the above informant may not have wished to admit her perceived weakness to 
her spouse. Believing that her fainting experience could be connected to a 
previous illness, she experienced 'dis-ease' (Leder, 1990: 81), that is, the sense 
of a lack of control of the inner workings of her body, a disruption of bodily 
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intentionality, and a concomitant disturbance to her perceived 'normal' abilities. 
At this point it may be said that this informant is 'dis-abled' (Leder, 1990: 81). 
Leder does not distinguish clearly between pain, exhaustion, disability, and the 
sense of approaching death, and the specific manner in which each constitute a 
'phenomenological shift' (Leder, 1984-85: 262) toward psycho-social 
fragmentation and inevitably, a dualism which effectively separates the 
experiencing subject from a sense of being embodied in-the-world; a shift 
which ultimately stresses the objectivity of having a body over the subjectivity 
of being embodied. The most general form (or formlessness) of this 
phenomenological, or more accurately, ontological shift is the experience of 
pain. Even though, in heart disease, pain is generally only experienced if 
angina is present, it is appropriate to discuss the variety of its dislocating 
manifestations in the context of a discourse of pain. Certainly, it would be 
difficult to discuss heart disease without reference to exhaustion, disability and 
the sense of approaching death. 
"I felt let down .. .let down by my heart. It just wasn't working. There were so 
many things I couldn't do any more, and I felt very, very tired most of the 
time." 
(Alice, 64) 
"It took me so long to climb the stairs, and I'd have to rest on the landing 
before I could go on. I was so weak. .. not like feeling tired ... much worse, as 
if I had absolutely no energy at all. I thought I couldn't live like this ... 
couldn't go on." 
(Richard, 69) 
"I really thought I'd had it. That was it, you know, I'd get weaker and weaker, 
and then my heart would give out." 
(Robert, 59) 
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As an experience, illness is perhaps, for the social researcher at least, easier to 
grasp than good health (Svenaeus, 2001: 95), for illness represents a 'problem' 
- meaninglessness, helplessness, an absence (of good, normal health) - a 
falling away from things toward a state of isolation and alienation. Indeed, it 
could be said that good health cannot effectively be studied because, as a 
taken-for-granted, relational (to bad health) phenomenon, it is a 'non-apparent 
attunement ... a balancing mood that supports our understanding in a homelike 
way without calling for our attention' (Svenaeus, 2001: 95). However, in 
suggesting that feelings of good health are distinct from, for example, 'other 
positive moods like well-being or happiness', Svenaeus (2001: 95) appears to 
separate the life of sickness and health from another, everyday world, 
particularly when he states that 'such [positive] moods colour our 
understanding .. .in a much more obvious and manifest way than health' (2001: 
95). In doing so, Svenaeus (2001) apparently posits two worlds: one of 
sickness and health, in which the struggle to restore equilibrium characterises 
experience; and another, which somehow exists outside the sphere of health 
altogether, characterised merely by a sense of well-being. This is erroneous, 
for while the experience of serious illness is certainly characterised by 
alienation, the alienated subject yet remains firmly in the world, for to be 
alienated is to be in the world yet simultaneously detached (or distanced) from 
it. And while good health may be taken for granted, it is nevertheless possible 
to 'feel' healthy, as the following extract indicates: 
"It's not until you've felt that bad that you appreciate your health. Some days I 
get up and I just think, 'oh, I feel really good today. Tip-top.' You feel 
yourself again ... better than that, in fact. It's just the way it is, though. You 
take your health for granted most of the time. You have good days and bad 
days, but the bad days before the operation were the worst. I didn't have any 
good days then." 
(Robert, 59) 
31 
Noting an interesting asymmetry: it is possible to feel healthy without actually 
being so, butfeeling ill is to be ill. The sick (or formerly sick) person doubtless 
feels a heightened awareness of his or her bodily disposition and its relation to 
the world, but it is the struggle for health that is of greater significance, both to 
the researcher and to the experiencing subject. In the example of coronary 
artery or valve disease, the 'alienation' (Buytendijk, in Svenaeus, 2001: 87) that 
is felt often begins with a fateful moment, an incident that, in its intensity or 
strangeness, disturbs the equilibrium and taken-for-grantedness of everyday 
life: 
"We were driving to the [golf] club for dinner with friends. I'd been feeling a 
bit run down. I thought it was just a cold and didn't think anything of it, but 
the [steering] wheel felt so heavy and stiff, and then it felt like it was ... the 
stiffness moved to my arms and then my chest. It was odd, really. I had this 
feeling of resistance from the car, but then it was as if! was the resistance, and 
I felt I couldn't control the car. For a moment the car was driving me. I had to 
pull over - a bit of a struggle - and sit for a while. I thought I was going to 
black out, but I was all right after about ten minutes and we went on to dinner. 
It shook me but I put it to the back of my mind. I still thought it was a cold, or 
maybe a virus, or maybe I was going senile [laughs] but that was the start of it 
forme." 
(Andrew, 66) 
Put simply, the sick person feels different. From this point, this fateful 
moment, when disease makes itself felt, the person engages in a struggle to be 
normal again and, importantly, to be considered normal by others (Claessens et 
aI., 2005: 5). Arguably, older people are less likely to take good health for 
granted (Lawton, 2002), but the 'radical truncat[ion] of physical capabilities' 
(Leder, 1990: 81) is, whatever one's age, felt as a lack, or, as Toombs (2001: 7) 
puts it: 'the disruption of bodily capacities inevitably disrupt the experience of 
surrounding space'. In the above extract it could be said that the body, in its 
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malfunctionial relation to the car, is now experienced as beyond control, as 
'other than me' (Straus, in Toombs, 2001: 7). Suddenly, it is as ifthere is a gap 
in the sick person's life and he/she is no longer in full possession ofhislher 
body. The following extract illustrates this sense of being dispossessed, of 
feeling at a remove from one's own body: 
"It didn't feel right. 1 didn't fee11ike myself sometimes. It's as if 1 was 
standing outside myself, looking at this sick person who wasn't really me. 1 
remember one night in particular, sitting on the edge of my bed. 1 was having 
difficulty breathing, just couldn't get to the bottom ... to fill my lungs .. .! was 
gasping for breath, and 1 felt 1 was standing over myself. .. 1 had this picture of 
me sitting there, out of breath, gasping. It was terrible. 1 tried and tried to 
take a deep breath and 1 just couldn't. 1 started panicking ... 1 was making 
myself worse trying to breathe deeply ... you know, getting light-headed. 1 
kept thinking I'd have to go on oxygen to breathe. That happened a lot, 
especially at night, so the doctor told me to use more pillows, but it didn't help 
much." 
(Frank, 68) 
As the drarnaturge, Jan Kott (1992), in his essay, 'The Heart Attack', observes, 
to leave childhood is to experience a shrinkage of the world, but to enter old 
age is to feel the world expand vertically, so that '[ w ] hat was level is no longer 
level. Flat suddenly becomes steep. Houses without elevators suddenly 
acquire stories they never had' (Kott, 1992: 99). Similarly, in The Smoking 
Diaries, the playwright Simon Gray (2005: 3) ruefully notes that the 
combination of age and cigarettes - sixty-five years old, and smoking 
'something like sixty-five a day' - brings about a certain breathlessness. He 
describes the effort involved in wheezing up and down stairs, and the labour 
required in completing two simple acts, such as pulling on one's socks and 
tying one's shoelaces, which actually become 'four very distinct acts, each 
separated by an interval longer than the acts themselves' (Gray, 2005: 3-4). 
The world of spaces and objects is thus, breathlessly, experienced anew, as 
distances to be crossed and obstacles to be negotiated: 
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"There are so many things I did without thinking, and that changed. Okay, I 
was never what you could call really fit, and I am getting on I suppose, but 
there's this little stretch of pavement between my house and my friend's ... just 
the tiniest slope ... you'd hardly notice it, but just walking those few yards 
would really take it out of me. I'd feel the strain at the back of my knees, the 
tightness in my chest, my arms even felt heavy. And no matter how slowly I 
took it, that stretch always .. .I really laboured and felt very strange, out of 
kilter [ ... ] kind of disappointed with myself. It's hard to describe, but that 
always upset me ... no ... annoyed me more than anything else. It was like a 
test. I'd try it to see how I felt, you know, test myself to see if I was getting 
worse. It's amazing how much a tiny wee slope can take so much out of you." 
(Helen, 72) 
Kott's (1992) essay has an exhausting, dreamlike quality: he describes the 
sense of leaving himself, of parts of his body becoming detached, of time 
slowing, and of 'feeling different inside' (1992: 101). Weeks after his heart 
attack, in recovery, he slips into the nurses' observation room to watch the 
other patients' hearts beat out their rhythms in luminous signals on the 
monitors, and he is disturbed by the erotic quality ofthe experience, 'as though 
the heart's pulse during those hospital nights had become the pulse of sex' 
(Kott, 1992: 105). The urgent intensity ofKott's (1992) narrative seems to 
mirror the activity of the heart and, more significantly, points to its symbolic 
character as the seat of emotion and the centre of our being. The troughs and 
peaks displayed on the monitors reveal the presence of lesions, and indicate 
that the heart has a memory inscribed upon and within it. It might be said that 
Kott (1992) has 'suddenly acquired' a story he never had before. 
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The heart attack severs time so that the 'before' is quite distinct from the 'after'. 
The effortless continuity, or apparent sequentiality of existence is 'violated, if 
not destroyed ... the diachrony of events is broken ... the pre-attack is contained 
within synchronic memory while the entire future is a projection ofthe past' 
(Kott, 1992: 106). Kott's story echoes Merleau-Ponty's (2000: 136 et passim) 
statements on the 'intentional are', that any deficiency in the content of 
experience affects the whole system - the interconnectedness of things - thus, 
in illness, the temporal and spatial perception of the world, and of one's own 
body in it, is altered. The familiar world is fragmented by that which Leder 
(1990: 74) describes as 'the individualising effect of suffering'. As a 
supplement to this point, I cite Kott's (1992) essay, 'The Memory of the Body', 
in which he writes that 'there are experiences where the alienation from the self 
is impossible. It is then that the soma and the anima are one. When you can 
no longer extricate yourself from yourself, the experience is no longer someone 
else's' (Kott, 1992: 117). This 'individualising effect' (Leder, 1990: 74) is felt 
as an affective disconnection from other people and objects, and characterised 
as a drawing inward upon oneself - an observation that is supported by much 
ofthe cardiovascular nursing literature, albeit generally addressed in terms of 
depression (for example, Goodman et aI., 2003; Lukkarinen and Kyngas, 
2003). Quoting from Updike's poem, 'Pain', in which the comforting human 
world recedes such that 'these kind things slide away', Leder (1990: 74) states 
that while the 'individual' does indeed feel alone, spatially constricted and 
focused inwardly upon specific, though mysterious body parts, there is yet a 
felt need to re-establish the 'intentional are' (Merleau-Ponty, 2000: 136 et 
passim), and with it, the intimate relations that are essential to being human: 
"I became quite depressed. Everyone said 1 was different, and 1 felt it 
sometimes. The angina gave me a real fright. 1 kept worrying about it, even 
when 1 had the pills for it. Every pain ... no matter where it was, I'd think, 'this 
is it, I'm having a heart attack'. 1 felt so bad-tempered all the time, moping 
around the house. 1 drove the wife crazy, complaining about everything. She 
said I was really cynical about everything ... couldn't see the good side. She 
was right. After a while I tried to make an effort. I still felt bad, but I tried 
not to show it. I kept my mouth shut. .. [laughs] ... tried to smile more often." 
(David,63) 
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To be ill, then, is to fall way from the 'normal' world, while simultaneously to 
be drawn to one's body, to be alone with one's body, and alone in oneself. This 
change of direction, felt as an inner-directedness, suggests that to be alone is to 
visit oneself in memory. Kott (1985: 80) writes: [d]uring our healthy life we 
move through time like passengers on an escalator. While we remain 
stationary, everything around us imperceptibly shifts into what has been. [ ... ] 
During healthy life, time is continuous'. The body, as a repository of past 
experience, is a 'walking memory' (Turner, 1995a: 250). As our experience of 
the world is at first, and in its immediacy, intangible, it is left to memory to 
render life meaningful. Visiting the past in memory, thinking of the future, the 
constant in this is the heart, always present, inside and yet 'a thing apart' (Kott, 
1992: 111), seemingly belonging to someone else, yet very much 'my heart', a 
suddenly treacherous possession, now fetishised so that it takes on a new 
significance. For my informants, their future development is now clearly tied 
to an attempt to retrieve and understand their past. 
"You know, I thought I had a healthy lifestyle before. Plenty of exercise, 
good food, and I gave up smoking a long time ago. I just couldn't understand 
why I should have blocked arteries. I kept thinking about what I might have 
done to deserve this ... no, what I could have done to avoid this." 
(Anne, 65) 
"I realised that I had a very bad lifestyle previously, although I'd never been 
seriously ill. I ate huge meals, very fatty, and usually with wine. I didn't 
exercise, apart from playing golf every now and then. I wasn't what you'd call 
an active person. I suppose it had to happen, but I never thought it would." 
(Richard, 69) 
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Body Image and Body Images 
The physical thread of the body through time provides an important sense of 
continuity for self-conceptions and externally imputed identities. 
(Kelly and Field, 1997: 364) 
The biological body has proved to be something of a bere noire for sociology 
which has, more traditionally, devoted its efforts to studies of the cultural, 
political, and economic spheres of human activity. Although bodies are often 
implied - for example, in Marx, as a productive force, and as the material 
foundation of consciousness - the various divisions of sociology have, in the 
past, and in general, avoided the body because the 'biological conditions of 
action were [considered] relatively unimportant in the construction of a science 
of action' (Turner, 1996a: 7). 
The body entered the orbit of sociological investigation only 'once it had been 
translated into an organic system' [my emphasis] (Turner, 1996a: 9) that could 
then be analogised with other, more obviously social systems in the manner of, 
for example, Spencerian functionalism. Subsequently, theories of homeostasis 
adhered to the body, identifying it as detenninate and therefore inconsequential 
to theoretical considerations of the social agent in society (Turner, 1996b: 62). 
Indeed, feminism, for example, long resisted the 'turn to the body' in the social 
sciences, precisely because of reductionist associations of the feminine with the 
biological/natural (see, for example, Birke, 1999; Connell, 2002; Wijngaard, 
1991). More recently, however, interest in gendered bodies, sexualities, 
environmental issues, and health and illness has 'impel[led] and facilitate[ d] 
new ways of thinking about the relationship between biology and the human 
sciences' (Williams, 1996: 701). These 'new ways' present a challenge to 
established binary classifications such as mindlbody, society/nature, and 
reason/emotion, and critically question 'assumptions about what, precisely, 
biology is' (Williams, 1996: 700-701). This is not to imply that the body is 
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now immune to reductive association - far from it, as I will show in the 
following chapter - but for the remainder of this chapter I turn my attention to 
the phenomenologically inflected conception of the body image, and discuss its 
utility and value for sociological studies of health and illness. 
I must begin, however, on a note of caution, by acknowledging that, subsumed 
under 'sociological orthodoxies [the body is] assimilated to a tradition of 
describing and analysing aspects of social differentiation [and as such], as an 
extension ofthe critique of the Enlightenment, [the body] is not ... simply ... 
reclaim[ed] for itself (Ferguson, 1997a: 2-3). A sociology ofthe body is thus, 
in its infancy, already a sociology of signs attached to (or circulating around) 
the body, for example, those of 'race', gender, and disability, and more 
superficially - that is, in an inscriptive sense - concerned with issues such as 
body adornment, body modification, and fashion. This semiotic approach to 
the body is, in itself, not without merit in that it redresses any purely 
biologistic accounts ofthe experienced body by affirming the power of social 
forces in the shaping (or fabrication) of bodies and identities. But, as Ferguson 
(1997a: 4) notes, the question of the body-for-itselfremains, in sociology at 
least, as yet unanswered. It could be ventured that this sociology of signs is 
more concerned with images of the body - or with the body as a 'billboard' 
(Ferguson, 1997a: 3) - than it is with the living body image. 
It is an interesting and much-noted point (Foucault, 1980a, 2003; Gallagher, 
2001; Toombs, 2001; Turner, 1996b) that 'the emergence of social science was 
closely connected with the growth of rationalised medicine' (Turner, 1996b: 
60), for example, in the collection of health statistics relating to the 
'demographic upswing' (Foucault, 1980a: 171) of industrial populations of the 
eighteenth and (more significantly) nineteenth centuries, yet sociology has 
consistently and vigorously set itself in opposition to medicine. This is 
precisely because the limitations of the 'clinical gaze' are such that the person is 
38 
effectively abstracted from illness and is thus 'disembodied and dehumanised' 
(Toombs, 2001: 8), treated as 'a disease entity, or a piece of meat' (Leder, 1998: 
122). In a statement so transparent, so banal that it borders on profundity, 
Gallagher (2001: 147) notes that 'the most general and most obvious fact about 
medicine is that it concerns the body. If one eliminates the body one 
eliminates the subject and object of medical science and practice'. That the 
sociology of the body is still largely associated with medicine is quite apparent. 
Indeed, at the beginning of interviews I used to tell my informants that I was 
interested in the sociology ofthe body. As the mists of incomprehension 
descended upon them they would say, for example, "oh, is that about medical 
stuff? " , and I would reply, "um, not necessarily ... sometimes", and then 
proceed to ask them about 'medical stuff. It would appear, then, that the body, 
at this moment in history, is so intimately associated with medicine, so 
thoroughly medicalised, that it is virtually impossible to think of our bodies 
without considering them in (quasi-) medical terms, so it could be said that the 
image we have of our own bodies is, to some degree, informed by the imagery 
of medical science. As Armstrong (1983: 2), referring to the medical-scientific 
'mapping' of the body, observes, '[t]he reality of the body is only established by 
the observing eye that reads it'. By this, Armstrong (1983) means that the 
medical 'atlas' is not a representation ofthe body, but rather, the body is a 
representation ofthe 'atlas'. I will address this point in greater detail in chapter 
three, where I outline a brief history of the development of anatomical 
knowledge, but for the moment I tum to a different but not unrelated image of 
the body. 
As the body is central to a discussion of experience, so the body image is 
indispensable to an understanding of the body in its social being. The body is a 
liminal being, occupying both a personal and a social space. It might be argued 
that the idea of a 'personal' or individualised body - a body belonging to 
oneself, 'a carrier of values and legally enforceable rights' (Ferguson, 1997b: 1) 
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- is but a recent development that owes much to a persistent dualism that can 
be traced back to Descartes, and which, in addition, is supported by the current 
mode of production (the latter being a point to which I will return in chapter 
three). 
Merleau-Ponty's (2000: 203) statement, that the body 'forms a system' with the 
world, and Husserl's (1999: 163), that the qualities ofthe world are dependent 
upon the 'normal sensibility' of the body, imply the rather obvious point that 
the body is actively 'in-the-world'. As such, the embodied subject (as if there 
could be any other kind of subject) organizes his or her world in an act of self-
recognition - that is, a recognition of situatedness, of spatio-temporallocation 
and attitude, directed toward 'certain or existing possible task[ s]' (Merleau-
Ponty, 2000: 100) - by way of the body image. The body image is not only a 
mental representation of what the body looks like and how it is constituted, but 
is also a sense of being embodied, of being and having a body, in a situation. 
The body image is, thus, the mysteriously localised sense of being oneself; 
self-presence. There is, therefore, a recursive interplay between body and 
world, through the medium of the body image. 
Gallagher (2001: 150) offers a rather simplified definition of the body image as 
'the subject's perceptual experience of his or her own body; the subject's 
conceptual understanding (including folk and/or scientific knowledge) of the 
body in general; and the subject's emotional attitude toward hislher own body' 
[emphasis in original]. This combination, or, more accurately, the gestalt of 
the perceptual, the conceptual and the emotional is that which gives the body 
image its sociological value in that it provides a link between body, mind and 
social space (Williams, 1996: 706). Summarising Schilder (1950), Breakey 
(1997: 108-109) states that the body image is 'the picture of our body we form 
in our minds as tridimensional units, including interpersonal, environmental 
and temporal factors'. While it is a picture, a mental representation of sorts, the 
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body image is also more than that inasmuch as it is a 'feeling' of and for the 
body as it extends itself into its environment. More precisely, the body image 
IS: 
[T]he picture of our own body which we form in our mind, that is to say, the 
way in which the body appears to ourselves. These sensations are given to us. 
We see parts of the body-surface. We have tactile, thermal, pain impressions. 
There are sensations which come from the muscles ... and sensations coming 
from the viscera. Beyond that there is the immediate experience that there is a 
unity of the body. This unity is perceived, yet it is more than a perception. 
We call it a schema of our body or bodily schema... [ ... ] We may call it 
'body image'. The term indicates that we are not dealing with a mere 
sensation or imagination. There is a self-appearance of the body. It indicates 
also that, although it has come through the senses, it is not mere perception. 
There are mental pictures and representations involved in it but it is not mere 
representation. 
(Schilder, 1950: 11) 
Citing HUghlings Jackson (1931), that the body image is not an idea of the 
body, that in fact we have no ideas of any parts of our bodies, Ferguson 
(l997b: 20) notes that the body image is 'but a living form through which the 
self, organic processes, sensations, emotional life and the world are 
experienced in their immediacy and continuous transformation' [my emphasis]. 
The description of the body image as a 'living form' is of significance, for, as 
Merleau-Ponty (2000: 100) notes, '[i]t is inadequate to say that [the] body is a 
form, [a] phenomenon in which the totality takes precedence over the parts'. 
Better then to consider the body image as an experience in itself, as a dynamic 
and 'complex interrelation of the body sensing the world, and the body sensing 
itself through sensing the world' (Ferguson, 1997b: 21). 
Recent debate (Kelly and Field, 1996, 1997; Williams, 1996) concerning the 
lineage of the body image and its value to sociological theory and investigation 
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has focused largely upon the tennIs origin and usage in psychoanalysis and 
philosophy. Critical of Williams' (1996) assertions that the concept of the body 
image provides 'a way out of the problem of the understatement of the body in 
sociology', Kelly and Field (1997: 359) contend that, as a non-sociological 
idea, the concept of the body image adds nothing to analyses of fundamental 
sociological issues regarding the body in illness, and that 'theoretical 
mechanism[ s]' (Kelly and Field, 1997: 360) such as self and identity are 
already adequate to the task of analysing and explaining the problems inherent 
to the illness experience - problems such as the 'pragmatic and practical 
difficulties [ faced by] sufferers and significant others, as well as [ their] links to 
social structure' (Kelly and Field, 1997: 364). 
Kelly and Field's (1997) statements are similar in tenor to that of Howson and 
Inglis (2001: 298), who argue against: the 'importation of philosophical 
solutions to the 'problem' ofthe body in sociology' and, the use of conceptual 
tools that are distinctly non-sociological. While sympathetic to Kelly and 
Field's (1997: 360) interactionist position, specifically when they speak out 
against the biological imperialism of medical science, I believe that theirs is a 
misreading of Williams (1996), particularly as they state that he has conflated 
'pop-psychology', or common-sense notions of 'body image', and the 
psychoanalytic concept of the body image (Kelly and Field, 1997: 360). In 
addition, I believe that Kelly and Field's (1996) position is supplemented by 
Williams' (1996) reading of the body image by virtue of his situating ofthe 
body at the centre of his analysis, and thus their positions, while different in 
parts, are not mutually exclusive. 
In summary, Kelly and Field (1996; 1997) argue that the interaction between 
self and identity provides a theoretical connection to manage the relations 
between biological and social facts. In this view, the self is not a 'biologistic 
thing having a real substance underlying or based on the physiology of the 
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person' (Kelly and Field, 1997: 364). Furthennore, identity, as the link to 
social structure, exists in tension with notions of self, which is to say that the 
body/self is subject to external 'labelling'. And finally, the body, in its 
obduracy, provides a sense of continuity, (despite bodily changes resulting 
from illness); the body is the point where 'the self is in touch with itself' (Kelly 
and Field, 1996: 251). 
Williams (1996) points out that Kelly and Field (1996) devote 'greater attention 
to the social construction of the selfthan to the body itself' (Williams, 1996: 
702). Indeed, by situating matters of self and identity within a 'general 
linguistic process', Kelly and Field (1997: 364) appear, initially, to subsume 
bodily experience under language, but they maintain that 'feelings of self and 
identity are founded upon our ideas about the body [and] of how others see us'. 
Arguing that the body image concept 'readily lends itselfto socio-historical and 
cultural analysis of the body', Williams (1996: 705) observes that the body 
image always 'involves relations between the body and its surrounding spaces, 
including other objects and other bodies, organized according to such 
fundamental bodily co-ordinates as "vertical" and "horizontal"'. I would add 
that this suggests that we not only make the world, in our image, as it were, but 
also that certain postural models are privileged over others: for example, 'up' is 
more while 'down' is less (Leder, 1990). 'Up' is good while 'down' is bad. 
(Although, how would we evaluate someone who has her head in the clouds or 
her feet finnly on the ground?) Consider the infonnant lying on the floor in 
her hallway while her husband lies in bed upstairs. The body abed is coherent 
while the body on the floor is disturbing, out of place. Or, the patient in a 
hospital bed, or on the operating table, while apparently healthy, intentional 
people scurry around. The first indicator of recovery is the ability to get up out 
of bed. Vigarello (1989: 149) writes that ,[f]rom the Middle Ages on, every 
failure of physical uprightness has been attributed to two main categories: the 
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stigma of deformity, sanctioned by the attention given to strength and aesthetic 
qualities, and the lack of the proper deportment prescribed mainly by socialised 
ethics'. In a more complex manner Elias (1996) also has described a history of 
the differentiation and sequestration of bodily activities. The informant who 
fainted stated that she worried about doing so in public. Perhaps fainting is 
best 'experienced' in the safety of one's own home. 
Williams (1996: 706) states that the body image is not a map of the body, or 
rather, that it is not mapped onto the body, but that body and body image are 
'interconsistent', and that the relationship between both attests to: 
[T]he radical inseparability of [the] biological and psychical elements of 
social being, [and that] not only is the body image ... of fundamental 
importance to our sense of bodily integration, co-ordination and being-in-the-
world [but] as a mediatory term between the biological, psychological and 
sociological levels of analysis, [it is] crucial to our understanding of the 
processes involved in chronic illness as a biographically disruptive 
expenence. 
(Williams, 1996: 707) 
I will take up this issue up again, albeit briefly, in chapter four, in a discussion 
of the ageing body, but I conclude here with the observation that, as an 
historically contingent and socially conditioned phenomenon, the content and 
integrity of the body image is subject to revision. For example, the heart may 
now be seen (and heard) in many different ways - by x-ray, nuclear 
angiography, electrocardiography, echo cardiography, and magnetic resonance 
imaging - which, altering the conception of the heart as a medical object, 
affects the quality of the subject's perception of his or her own heart. The heart 
is already possessed of a symbolic potency, as the source of feeling, the seat of 
emotion and, more recently, the very engine of our vital forces, but seeing and 
hearing a faulty valve regurgitate blood in an echo cardiograph could perhaps 
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undennine any taken-for-granted notions regarding the heart's integrity and 
durability. Oddly, ultrasound technicians often apologise to patients when they 
adjust the volume to better hear the heart valves (mal)functioning. My 
informants had mixed feelings about this experience: 
"The girl [the ultrasound technician] said she was going to tum the sound on 
and it would be loud, and she said she was sorry but it had to be done and it 
wouldn't last long. Well, it didn't bother me, but it was really loud .. . like a 
machine, but muffled too. You know what it reminded me of? A wobble-
board. Ijust thought of that. We used to play with them when we were 
children, you know, a bit of board and you just kind of flex it. But this was 
more regular. Actually, there were quite a few different sounds there, but I 
didn't like to ask the girl because she was talking to the young doctor. I 
couldn't see what was on the screen all the time because she'd have me turned 
away, on my side, but when I was lying flat I could see the screen. It's hard to 
tell what you're looking at. It looks almost like flesh, it's kind of. .. [laughs] 
... wobbly-looking, but there's this mechanical sound and when you see the 
valves they're like machines too." 
(Alice, 64) 
"The technician turned the screen away so I couldn't see the picture of my 
heart, but I asked to see it and it was vague at first, but then I saw what she 
was looking at. It wasn't the sight of it that bothered me, though. It was the 
noise ... that gurgling, wet, whooshing sound. It wasn't what I expected. And 
then the doctor pointed to the jet of blood gushing back into the heart .. .1 
couldn't make it out at all, but I must say, it upset me. I knew it was my heart 
they were looking at, but it didn't feel like mine." 
(Eleanor, 67) 
Thus, the 'anonymous visceral domain' (Leder, 1990: 150) in which the heart 
resides is exposed, and to some extent, demystified. Or perhaps made more 
mysterious, for just as the prospect of heart disease and surgery is difficult to 
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countenance, so it is unsettling to see the living heart perform its mundane 
functions (particularly, in this instance, badly). This suggests that the image of 
the body informs the body image and is indeed central to the formation of self-
identity. It might also be ventured that this new experience - which is a new 
perspective - of the heart, with its 'gurgling, wet, whooshing' quality, forces 
one to admit, like Nietzsche, that 'body I am entirely, and nothing else' (in 
Diprose, 2002: 21). The dys-appearance ofthe body, the absence felt as 
presence within experience (Leder, 1990: 91), demands attention if a state of 
personal and social equilibrium is to be achieved. This breach of bodily 
integrity is addressed, so I shall argue, by way of a narrative construction of 
experience, and central to this narrative is the establishment of a coherent sense 
of body and self. 
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Second Narrative: The Boy with Blue Lips. 
If, as Parsons (1952) states, illness is a socially legitimate form of withdrawal 
from the expectations and obligations of the larger social system, then it is 
unsurprising that the sick person withdraws from many 'normal'forms of 
interaction; for example, conversation. Eavesdropping (perhaps the oldest 
social research method of all) in the waiting rooms of cardiology clinics, I 
notice that new patients (whose first lesson is to learn to wait) rarely discuss 
their medical condition with others. I am at first surprised, but that is the way 
of it, for illness is, initially at least, and despite its public aspects, a very 
private matter that is difficult to articulate. Radley (1996) notes that, faced 
with the barely conceivable prospect of heart surgery, patients rarely wish to 
discuss what is yet to come. Confronted by the 'double prospect' (Radley, 
1996: 124) that surgery will either kill or (partially) cure them, patients may 
choose to wait in silence; although waiting is hardly a matter of choice. 
In a waiting room I sit opposite a young man. We are the only people in the 
room - as if in a drama, wherein all the supernumeraries have been written out 
in order to enhance the effect of isolation - but we do not speak, this young 
man and I He is possibly no older than nineteen. His lips are blue. His skin 
is bluish and almost transparent, and his fingers are extremely long and 
clubbed (that is, enlarged, shiny and darker than is normal - often an 
indication of congenital lesions in the heart). His fingernails are blue also and 
marked with splinter haemorrhages, indicative perhaps of a bacterial infection 
of the heart. We are both there to see our respective consultants, waiting 
together in silence to find out if we are 'good' candidates for surgery. He looks 
worse than I feel, and I wonder what words might issue from his blue lips; and 
what words in response could comfort him, could possibly make him less blue. 
Transfixed by his blue lips, I imagine that his mouth speaks without moving, 
and in a sense it does, because his lips can be 'read'. I wonder if the consultant 
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will give more attention to the appearance of his lips than to that which issues 
from them. This boy seems too young to have yet seriously abused his own 
body to the extent that his heart is failing. I suspect that, like mine, his 
condition was visited upon him by the sheer 'tyranny of chance' (Zaner, 2001: 
132). I wonder if, again like me, his doctor had asked him if he did not curse 
God or cruel fate for giving him a life-threatening disease. I am reminded of 
the story of the great-great-great nephew of Gregor Mendel, Benedict Lambert, 
a dwarf, who insisted that he did not 'have' a medical condition -
achondoplasia - preferring instead to state that 'it is me ... there is no other' 
(Zaner, 2001: 132). It is this difference that intrigues me. For the consultant, I 
have a heart disease, but for myself I am a person with a heart disease, which 
is to say that my 'condition' is an integral part of my being. My heart, which is 
in me and very much part of me, is diseased. Thus, no matter which self, or 
sense of self that realises itself in the world, I am always, inescapably, someone 
whose heart is flawed. While my condition is not as visible as the blue boy's -
my red cheeks are rarely commented upon, and the slight ('early~ clubbing of 
my fingers is noticeable only to my cardiologist and myself - and while I am 
not as obvious as, for example, a dwarf, nevertheless, my disease is not 
something that is felt as external to me. My body is given; it is always 'here' 
for me, thus the problems of the body are always present also. 
Years later, a rehabilitation nurse tells me that cardiologists often assure 
patients that surgery is a cure, but she insists that it is not, and that although 
one's quality of life may be greatly improved by surgery and attention to the 
details of lifestyle, there is really no 'cure', no treatment that will fully restore 
normality. Indeed, normality in the medical example is always someone else's 
idea of what is normal. 
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Chapter Two: In Illness 
[T]here is no health as such. Deciding what is health even for your body 
depends on your goal, your horizon, your powers, your impulses, your 
mistakes and above all the ideals and phantasms of your soul. Thus there are 
innumerable healths of the body; and the more one allows the particular and 
incomparable to rear its head again, the more one unlearns the dogma of the 
'equality of men', the more the concept of a normal health, along with those of 
a normal diet and normal course of an illness, must be abandoned by our 
medical men. [emphasis in original] 
(Nietzsche, 2001: 116-117) 
[T]he sick man must follow his illness to the place where it is treated, in the 
specialised enterprises where it is immediately transformed into a scientific 
and linguistic object foreign to everyday life and language. [ ... ] Captured at 
that point, he becomes unknown to his own people. He no longer lives in 
their homes or in their speech. Perhaps the exile will return from the foreign 
land whose language his people do not know, a land which can only be 
forgotten. 
(De Certeau, 1988: 191) 
The patient, whose burden it is to wait in this 'foreign land', has, so it is claimed 
(Armstrong, 1993: passim), crossed from one space to another; from the 
healthful, communicative space of everyday, ordinary existence, to the silent 
space of disease and sickness, wherein the only voices heard are those of 
specialists. It is perhaps unhelpful to think of illness as a foreign land 
(although 'foreign bodies' may cause disease): rather, it should be considered as 
somewhere we claim (or reclaim) as native. Illness is an experience which 
others translate for us, by which I mean to suggest that we are not properly ill 
until someone, preferably a doctor, says we are (Mackenzie, 2001: 419). '[T]o 
have any illness is the effect of diagnostic processes and professional 
judgements, which are in turn the outcome of historical and social 
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determinations' (Turner, 1996b: 179). Thus, while illness may be experienced 
directly, it is a socially mediated phenomenon. It is, in the correct use of the 
term, a 'medicalised' condition, that is, an aspect of everyday life that 'come[ s] 
under medical dominion, influence and supervision' (Conrad, 1992: 210). 
HealthlUnhealth 
In this chapter I selectively examine the literature on the clinical encounter -
from the doctor-patient, to the nurse-patient relationship - the purpose of which 
review is to provide a general description of the arena in which questions of 
health and illness are formalised. Examination of clinical interaction is 
necessary because the ontological shift (and the attendant alienation and 
objectification) that begins in illness, is 'consummated in the modem medical 
encounter' (Leder 1984-85: 262-263). 
In chapter one I stated that illness is experienced, at first, as abnormal. This is 
an over-simplification, for as Herzlich (1973: 53) observes, neither health nor 
illness are 'unitary and clearly defined entities'. Rather, there are degrees of 
health and illness. One can feel ill, yet be in good health, and the opposite is 
true also, therefore health and illness, as both experience and concept, are 
complex, multi-layered, and 'not simple unities' (Herzlich, 1973: 53). Herzlich 
(1973: 55-58) identifies three 'healths', or rather, a 'hierarchy oftypes of 
health': 'health-in-a-vacuum', the 'reserve of health', and 'equilibrium'. 
First, 'health-in-a-vacuum' refers to the 'absence of illness', which is to say that 
health is not something positive, but rather, that it is 'simply not being ill' 
(Herzlich, 1973: 56). Similar to Leder's (1990) concept of bodily 
disappearance, 'health-in-a-vacuum' is the lack of awareness of one's body, 
which is 'correlated with the absence of illness' (Herzlich, 1973: 56). 
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Second, the 'reserve of health' is quite simply a capacity, a form of bodily 
capital, a sense of physical robustness and resistance to illness. 'Health-in-a-
vacuum' is deemed to be something that is 'independent of the person', but the 
'reserve of health' is considered to be an 'organic-biological characteristic of the 
individual', a congenital constitution and temperament (Herzlich, 1973: 56-57), 
and, as such, it is a capacity that remains with the person until death. 
Third, 'equilibrium' is an idealised state of health conceived as 'an abundance 
of energy and bodily potential' (Herzlich, 1973: 60). 
Just by reference to equilibrium, personal aspirations and the specific and as it 
were indescribable quality of experience are relatively clearly communicated. 
Beyond merely indicating a state or symptoms, equilibrium is the key which 
opens the world of health, the symbol which transports us there. 
(Herzlich, 1973: 60) 
'Health-in-a-vacuum' is a fact, the 'reserve of health' is a value (implied by the 
term 'reserve'), and 'equilibrium' is a value also; it is a state that people wish to 
attain - 'when the body functions like a well-oiled machine' (Herzlich, 1973: 
58) - yet which is most elusive. Thus it can be said that ifthere is a norm of 
health, it is the desired norm of equilibrium that is in actuality quite 
unattainable, or at least unsustainable. Herzlich (1973: 59-60) admits that 
'equilibrium' is the most difficult to define 'health'. It is characterised by the 
absence of fatigue, evenness of temper, and the felt presence of the body as a 
physical well-being. 
Herzlich (1973: 60) cites Canguilhem when she states that 'equilibrium carries 
the possibility of excess and abuse', and that 'it is the possible abuse of health 
which lies behind the value which is accorded to health'. 'Equilibrium' is thus 
the actualisation of the 'reserve of health'. One must have a reserve in order to 
draw upon it, and the drawing upon depletes the reserve, therefore equilibrium 
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is, for the existentially indetenninate body, unsustainable. While 'health-in-a-
vacuum' is a fonn of being, and the 'reserve of health' is a fonn of having, 
'equilibrium' is a fonn of doing, that is, a movement toward a desired state of 
healthfulness. It is, in short, a dream of full health, a fantasy of effortless 
control, and speaks of a longing to be free. As such, equilibrium is nonnative, 
rather than the nonn (Canguilliem, in Herzlich, 1973: 62). It is worth noting 
that the 'energetic' experience of health, where health is considered an energy, 
is specifically modem and related to the development of industrial machinery 
(Asendorf, 1993; Rabinbach, 1992). Rabinbach (1992: 38) points out that 
fatigue, ifit existed in the pre-modem era, did not emerge as a subject of 
medical discourse until the 1870's. In the medical literature of the period 
'fatigue appears - much like idleness - as an obstacle to work, as the horizon of 
forces or energies within the body [ ... ] the head is weighty, the spirit becomes 
lazy, memory and the will all languish' (Rabinbach, 1992: 39-40). 
I should add that the experience of illness is partial because none ever 
experience all illnesses: to have a cold is different to having a heart disease, 
which, in turn, is different to cancer. However, this is not to suggest that each 
fonn of illness is unique, and that there is no underlying identity of illness 
experience. Rather, illness can be conceived as a patterned behaviour: in a 
Schiitzian sense, there exists a 'social recipe' by way of which illness is 
interpreted and at least partially comprehended. To employ a more familiar 
sociological- that is, Parsonian - tenninology, there are socially prescribed 
techniques for coping with illness. But, such 'coping' is not a simple matter. 
The 'telic demand' of serious illness is both an 'attentional [and] existential 
demand', a response to bodily dys-appearance that is at once an 'affective and 
metaphysical wrestling with embodiment' (Leder, 1990: 92). In chapter one I 
stated that bodily dys-appearance is not always problematic. For example, a 
muscular pain that demands some attention, but which subsides either 
seemingly of its own accord or because of minor adjustments to posture, is an 
example of dys-appearance, yet it could hardly be described as an illness, let 
alone serious. For bodily dys-appearance to be regarded as serious it must 
provoke a powerful, and to some extent debilitating, affective response: it 
must, initially at least, be regarded as abnormal. 
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Significantly, Herzlich (1973: 54) notes that in reality the norm - of 'normal' 
everyday experience - is actually an 'intermediate state', somewhere between 
health and illness. The everyday experience of headaches, fatigue, hangover 
and such like are not exactly manifestations of illness, but neither are they 
representative of full health, thus it can be argued that there are only degrees of 
health and illness. Perhaps it is more productive to consider the sick not in the 
Parsonian sense, as an ideal type, abstracted in terms of their (dys )functionality 
within a larger social system: better to think of illness in terms of an 'impaired 
role' (Gordon, 1966, cited in Gerhardt, 1987: 112-113). This notion of 
impairment suggests that everyday experience is informed by a certain 
tolerance of difference, or as Zola (1991: 8) puts it, 'differentness'. 
Furthermore, a distinction may be drawn between being ill and having an 
illness (Turner, 1995b: 247): it is the 'having' that is more problematic in that 
illness appears as something that is external to a sense of self and, as such, a 
burden. However, the distinction, between being and having may not be easy 
to discern for the person caught up in the initially mysterious and sometimes 
frightening sensations attendant to heart disease: 
"When I found out it was my heart it was a shock. .. and a reljef in a way, I 
suppose. At least they knew what was wrong with me. As I said, the 
symptoms got much worse, with the [ dizzy] turns, and being confused a lot of 
the time. I had to sleep with lots of pillows, but I didn't get much sleep really, 
except dozing off during the day. They [cardiologists] knew it was my heart, 
but they didn't seem to know what they wanted to do. At first they gave me 
tablets to slow my heart down ... digitalis, but that made me feel worse, and I 
read about it and it's really dangerous, so my G.P. took me off it. I was taking 
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water pills [diuretics] too .. .I lost so much weight on them, but I think they 
helped. Then when I got the letter to see the consultant, and he suggested 
surgery, a new valve ... well, to be honest, that terrified me, but by that time I 
was so ill I thought it'd be for the best. But I think they still weren't sure about 
it, about what to do. They mentioned an artificial valve at first, then a pig's 
valve, and then they talked about keeping me going on pills. I asked the 
consultant in should go for a second opinion. I thought of going private. 
You know, we could just about afford a private consultation, but not surgery 
or anything like that. But the consultant said he didn't think that was 
necessary, and he said he thought surgery was probably the best way for me, 
and because of my condition I probably wouldn't have to wait too long." 
(Kate, 75) 
Regarding the 'nonnality' of health and the 'differentness' of illness, most of my 
infonnants are over sixty years old, and as such, expressed a certain resignation 
when discussing the everyday experience of the bodily sensations of, for 
example, fatigue and pain: 
"You get used to aches and pains, and feeling tired. Although some days you 
feel something new - a new pain, a dizzy turn, something you don't remember 
having before - and you just think, 'what next?' but you get used to that too, 
really." 
(Eleanor, 67) 
Yet, the same infonnants would go on to say, for example: 
" ... but I generally felt quite good ... no real problems other than the angina." 
(Margaret, 65) 
Aside from the differences in experience of heart disease, which for some is 
quite debilitating, the tolerance or acceptance of the feeling of 'differentness' in 
illness is an 'acceptance of an inevitable part of oneself (Zola, 1991: 8). This 
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resignation to illness suggests that, for some at least, being ill is not necessarily 
as problematic as having an illness. Health, or the lack of it, is experienced 
anew each day; it is renewed daily. This act of renewal is rather 
unimaginatively expressed in the cliche, 'one day at a time,' a phrase which was 
employed many times during interviews, describing the attitude of informants 
to their daily struggle for 'normal' (un)healthiness. So, daily experience, 
particularly for the elderly, involves the acceptance of a degree of discomfort, 
their current position marked on a continuum of health. In short, people 'get 
by' on a daily basis according to their needs, thus to function normally is not 
necessarily to be in perfect health; rather, it is to be able to do what one wants 
and needs to do: 
"I had to watch what I did. I couldn't do that much housework, and I didn't go 
out much ... just short walks. The doctor told me I'd be better after the 
operation, so I just had to wait, and be careful. [ ... ] It annoyed me, yes, 
especially letting the housework go, but if I forgot and ended up doing too 
much I'd feel terrible or I'd just have to stop because I didn't have the energy. 
I'd get out of breath and dizzy, and I'd have to go for a lie-down. I slept quite 
a lot during the day, but not much at night, though. It turned my life upside-
down, but I got by. It's amazing how you always do." 
(Anne, 65) 
In the previous chapter I cited Jan Kott's (1992) essay, in which he expressed 
'feeling different inside' (1992: 101). Unless the 'fateful moment' that heralds 
the visible surfacing of heart disease is also a potentially fatal moment - for 
example, a heart attack - it is more often an awareness of 'feeling different' that 
drives people to visit their doctor: 
"It was the fact that I couldn't climb the stairs without coughing and stopping 
every few steps." 
(Marie, 64) 
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"Oh, it was the pain. I'd be walking and I'd get this terrible tightness, like a 
strap tied round my chest, and then it would spread to my arms and up my 
neck. I'd feel it in my teeth. It was really powerful and it got worse, so that's 
what made me go to the doctor." 
(Dave, 63) 
The Clinical Encounter: Taking Your Illness for a Walk, from Confession 
to Consultation 
The clinical encounter is a curious event. Through it our body and our life, 
that which is most intimate and private, is given to a stranger. It involves an 
offering that we would more usually reserve for a lover, a mother, or a friend. 
And through this encounter, a corporeal itinerary that is specific to us 
becomes generalised, subsumed under a medical discourse known better for 
its promotion of a universal objective body than for its sensitivity to different 
ways of being. 
(Diprose, 2002: 107) 
The clinical encounter is described variously as 'highly volatile and ambivalent' 
(Komesaroff, 2001), 'disinterested' and 'obj ectively judgmental' (Gothill and 
Armstrong, 1999; Rudebeck, 2001), and, 'a one-sided matter' (Diprose, 2002). 
In general, the sociological literature tends to be critical ofthe doctor-patient 
relationship, more often stressing the silencing and objectification of the 
patient (Connolly, 2001) at the hands of a disinterested clinician who is but a 
mere representative of a humane yet dehumanising science. 
But why does the clinical encounter further alienate and objectify the patient? 
Just as Herzlich (1973) claims that illness is not a unitary experience, so Mol 
and Berg (1998: 3) note that 'medicine is not a coherent whole ... not a 
unity ... rather an amalgam of thoughts, a mixture of habits, an assemblage of 
techniques ... a heterogeneous coalition of ways of handling bodies, studying 
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pictures, making numbers, conducting conversations'. Yet medicine remains a 
powerful, determining force: 'people's bodies and lives are shaped by the 
activities of doctors, nurses, technicians, and technologies, [all of which are 
constituents of] the work involved in making textbooks come true' (Mol and 
Berg: 1998: 3): 
The clinical method practiced by physicians is always the practical expression 
of a theory of medicine - a theory which embraces such concepts as the nature 
of health and disease, the relation of mind and body, the meaning of diagnosis, 
the role of the physician, and the conduct of the patient-physician relationship. 
[my emphasis]. 
(11cVVhinney,2001: 331) 
Synott (1993: 28) provides a clue to the question of objectification when he 
notes that medicine turned from an art into a science in the eighteenth century. 
Medicine, at this point, became more certain of itself and of its relationship to 
its subject. Amundsen and Ferngren (1983) provide an outline ofthe gradual 
formalisation of clinical relationships, although they identify the Middle Ages 
as the point at which medical practice was accorded the status of a regulated 
profession. However, this transformation that Synott (1993) refers to has been 
discussed by, among others, Foucault (1980a; 2003), Jewson (1976), 
McWhinney (2001), and Porter (1985, 1997). McWhinney (2001: 331) 
observes that '[i]n recent times, medicine has not paid much attention to 
philosophy', largely because it has been so successful that there is no need to 
question the assumptions of medical knowledge. Philosophy in medicine has 
in fact been taken up again, this time in nursing theory, although, as I will 
argue later in this chapter, largely uncritically. Western medicine of course has 
its roots in philosophy; roots that can be traced back to the fifth century B.C., 
to the Cnoan (natural) and Cnidian (academic) schools, but for the purposes of 
this study I provide a brief outline of the development of modem clinical 
medicine, which has its foundations in eighteenth century Europe. 
57 
Jewson (1976) describes the trajectory of medical practice in European society 
- from a person-orientated to an object-orientated discipline - in tenns of 
transfonnations in the modes of production of medical knowledge. Three 
distinct modes of production are identified: first, 'Bedside Medicine'; second, 
'Hospital Medicine', and third, 'Laboratory Medicine', each mode 'associated 
with a characteristic ... cosmology' (Jewson, 1976: 227), that is, 'ways of seeing 
[and] of not seeing [ ... ] ways of knowing (and ignoring)' (Jewson, 1973: 226). 
At each stage in the construction of medical knowledge, the person, or more 
accurately, the embodied person, is further removed as the subject of medicine, 
until eventually he or she disappears altogether. 
'Bedside Medicine' was a holistic and individualising approach in which 
sickness was conceptualised as 'a total psycho-somatic disturbance' (Jewson, 
1976: 228). The patient, who was also, significantly, a patron, and therefore 
the social equal (or superior) of the attending physician, described his or her 
SUbjective feelings and was thus able to 'dictate and define the nature of illness' 
(Annstrong, 1999: 19). The patient was thus effectively 'read' by the doctor in 
a henneneutic context that attended to the 'external and SUbjective 
manifestations' (J ewson, 1976: 228) of sickness. This view of the sick patient, 
as a whole person, 'transcends the distinctions of psyche and soma' (Jewson, 
1996: 227) that are characteristic of medicine today, yet at that time medicine 
was an unruly art, its 'disciplinary boundaries weak and amorphous' (Jewson, 
1976: 227). The problem was that 'Bedside Medicine' treated the patient as an 
individual, with his or her 'own unique pattern of bodily events' (Jewson, 1976: 
229), and thus illness was regarded as particular to each person. Consequently, 
each physician held to and sometimes ruthlessly promoted his own set of 
beliefs to the 'affluent sick' (Jewson, 1976: 234). Physical, emotional and 
spiritual aspects were taken into consideration because they were 'deemed 
relevant to the understanding of the functions of the constitution' (J ewson, 
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1976: 229). Diagnosis was therefore a highly interpretive, speculative matter, 
and treatment was 'heroic and extensive' (Jewson, 1976: 228). 
Certainly it is easy to understand why, given the system of patronage, medical 
treatment was extensive (we only have to substitute the word 'expensive'); and 
the heroic nature of the 'cure' would surely speak of the distinctiveness of both 
physician and patient. In such a competitive climate, physicians vied for 
epistemological distinction, thus theories of sickness and cures became ever 
more diverse. More sympathetically, Porter (1985: 193) states that this form of 
practice went beyond drug interventions, and involved 'complex rituals of 
comfort and condolence, the consolations of philosophy and grit, acted out by 
the suffering, with the physician sometimes sharing in the psycho-dynamics of 
the bedside encounter'. 
In the absence of decisive anatomical or physiological expertise, and without a 
powerful arsenal of cures and surgical skills, the ability to diagnose and make 
prognoses was highly valued, and an intimate physician-patient relationship 
was fostered. 
(porter, 1997: 9-10) 
While Jewson's (1976) account lacks historical detail- for example, in the 
seventeenth century, Thomas Sydenham (1624-1689), although necessarily a 
practitioner of 'Bedside Medicine', was the first modem physician to use 
systematic, non-speculative observation (Cunningham, 1989; McWhinney, 
2001) - it nevertheless provides a convincing social history of the separation of 
psyche and soma and the eventual objectification of the body in medical 
cosmology. The next step toward this objectification was taken at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, in the new teaching hospitals of Paris. 
The bodies of the poor, accumulating in the growing cities of a soon to be 
industrialised Europe, witnessed at first hand the emergence of 'Hospital 
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Medicine', and were, under the 'clinical gaze' (Jewson, 1976: 229), subject to 
its classificatory systems. 'Hospital Medicine' was infonned by its precursor 
because, despite serious discrepancies in theories of disease, nosologies were 
constructed to account for the sUbjective and external manifestations of 
sickness, and thus general principles (in the fonn of a symptomatology) were 
established. As a mode of production, 'Hospital Medicine' is, arguably, linked 
to the maintenance of social order in that the poor - 'the accumulation of men' 
(Foucault, 1980a: 171) - represented the problem of the containment of 
disease. As such, the superficial appearance of disease was of less import than 
its internal, underlying causes. The verbal analyses and interpretations that 
were typical of 'person-orientated' medicine were superseded by physical 
examination, and observation and classification of organic structures (Jewson, 
1976: 229), and by autopsy and statistical analysis (Ann strong, 1999: 18). 
hnportantly, as the patients were of a lower economic status, the social 
relationship was reversed so that the physician held dominion over the patient, 
'a configuration which has remained in place for the last two centuries' 
(Annstrong, 1999: 19). Thus, medicine took on the status ofa science and a 
profession was born. Listening gave way to seeing as the dominant fonn of 
investigation, and as medical science gazed ever deeper into the interior of the 
sick person, searching for underlying pathologies of illness, the next mode of 
production, 'Laboratory Medicine', appeared. 
The development of imaging devices (Foucault, 1991; Stafford, 1997) 
doubtless contributed to the success of 'Laboratory Medicine', which sought to 
'discover' the 'fundamental particles' (Jews on, 1976: 231) oflife. Once the 
basic units oflife were 'discovered' the sick person was 'lost in a network of 
anatomical structures [and] particles of organic matter' (Jewson, 1976: 238). In 
a sense, the physician disappears at this point also, for 'Laboratory Medicine' 
reveals disease entities in a transparent manner: they speak for themselves, and 
as such require little or no further interpretation. This particular view of 
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disease - the view through the microscope - obscures the human presence, 
which is dissolved in a process of reduction, so that 'illness is increasingly 
removed, first by dualism, and then specialization, from the individuals who 
are ill, and from the physical, psychological, and social environmental contexts 
in which they became ill' (Synott, 1993: 39): 
Knowledge that matters is impersonal, public, productive, and empirically 
verifiable. Knowledge that is personal, experiential, or tacit is much less 
trusted and valued. 
(McWhinney, 2001: 338) 
Proper scientific knowledge is, then, that which is apparently decontextualised. 
Jewson's (1976) essay marks an important contribution to the study of medical 
practice in that it illustrates the significance ofthe relationship between the 
doctor and his or her obj ect of study - from the intimacy of 'Bedside Medicine' 
to the remoteness of 'Laboratory Medicine' - and that this relationship, 
however constituted, is instrumental in establishing the formes) of medical 
knowledge. In short, Jewson (1976) 'undermines the assumption that medical 
knowledge was discovered [emphasis in original] (Armstrong, 1999: 19). 
Aronowitz (1998) supports the argument that medical knowledge is the 
outcome of a negotiation between different perspectives, and that it is not, as 
such, 'discovered'. Indeed, the notion of 'discovery' implies that the 'truth' of 
the body (or of nature) rests within it (Armstrong, 1999; Geyer-Kordesch, 
1989). 
Medical technologies that 'visualise and measure' symptoms - for example, 
coronary artery lesions - effectively objectify the condition so that, for 
example, 'chest pain is more important for the pathological process it might 
signify than for how it is experienced by the patient' (Aronowitz, 1998: 106). 
Consequently, the objective visibility (and quantifiability) of disease, 'defined 
as an everyday reality [makes it] more difficult for physicians to empathise 
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with their patients' pain' (Aronowitz, 1998: 106). To suffer chest pain, to be 
told by a general practitioner that it is probably angina, and then to be infonned 
that, although tests reveal coronary heart disease, angina, as defined at this 
particular moment, is not present, undennines the patient's ability to 
comprehend and articulate his or her experience: 
Modem classificatory practices thus run the risk of constructing diseases that 
may have little or no clinical significance yet carry costs to individuals and 
society, such as iatrogenic harm, worry, [and] stigma. 
(Aronowitz, 1998: 107) 
Tellingly, ifpain is present yet angina is not diagnosed, the source of the pain 
is often attributed to confusion of the cerebral cortex (Aronowitz, 1998: 107). 
Thus laboratory medicine finds a way to explain experience while at the same 
time redefining it, according to the prevailing cosmology, as an objective fact. 
Certainly, disease is subject to clinical redefinition, but this medicalisation does 
not occur in a vacuum. The apparent objectivity of medical science is itself an 
aspect of social and cultural transfonnations in which its meaningfulness is 
rooted. That is to say, medicine is delimited by what can and cannot be said at 
any given time, which is to underline the obvious point that medicine is a 
socially constructed practice. 
In spite of the understanding that symptoms are representations of bodily 
experience they are nevertheless privileged to the extent that experience itself 
is given little attention (Rudebeck, 2001). On the one hand the physician's 
apprehension of the patient's experience of illness is primarily restricted to 
symptom categorization, and as such, interpretation is, historically conditioned, 
possibly 'shallow' (Rudebeck, 2001: 297). On the other hand the patient may 
feel that the physician does not fully comprehend the whole experience of 
illness, and therefore, unable to describe the experience, withdraw from the 
interaction: 
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"I felt awkward about it. I didn't know what was wrong - that's why I was at 
the doctor's - but I wasn't getting through to him. He kept asking me about 
smoking. I stopped smoking years ago, but he kept going on about it and I 
became quite annoyed with him ... his attitude. All he did was listen to my 
chest and then he said it was probably just a virus or something. [ ... J He was 
quite different the next time I saw him ... he referred me to a cardiologist right 
away. [ ... J I don't know what was different. Perhaps he realised that he'd 
missed something the first time round, or maybe I was more ... determined to 
get my case across ... or just more ill. 
(Andrew, 66) 
Medical science demands a high degree of objectivity on the part of the 
physician. Effectively, the physician must enter the private sphere of the 
patient in order to determine what is wrong, yet at the same time must maintain 
a position of 'affective neutrality' (Parsons, 1952: passim), 'which is the 
necessary corollary of the fact that medical practice is applied science' 
(Gerhardt, 1987: 117), or more specifically, 'applied biology' (Seldin, in 
Pellegrino, 1983: 154). Affective neutrality is the very mark of scientific 
objectivity, yet despite the disappearance of the sick person from medical 
discourse, the patient is nevertheless present in practice: 
"It's as if you're not important at all. Like you don't really need to be there. I 
went for these tests. They lasted nearly the full day. The last test was when 
they attached these things to my head, like the pads they use in EeG's 
[electrocardiographs]. They didn't even tell me what it was for. I had to ask. 
It turned out they were testing for brain damage, you know, a stroke. The 
doctor, a young lady, a junior doctor I think, didn't even talk to me. It was her 
assistant who told me what was going on, eventually. It was like I had brain 
damage and they were just ignoring me. You'd think if they were testing for a 
stroke they'd have asked me a few questions first." 
(Frank, 68) 
It is apparent that medical science objectifies illness, treating the disease and 
not the patient. Indeed, it is argued that the physician abstracts and focuses 
upon the nomothetic condition - the disease - and, as such, ignores the actual 
experiencing subject: in short, the physician focuses upon the indications of 
disease rather than the phenomenon of illness (McWhinney, 2001: 340; Zola, 
1991: 9): 
63 
"I didn't like it, but you've got to give them their due. They run you through 
the tests one after the other, and they try to tell you what's wrong, but it's a bit 
half-hearted. The cardiologist showed me this slip of paper, my EeG, and he 
points out this line at the bottom. He said it wasn't right, it was spiky in all the 
wrong places. It meant nothing to me, but Ijust nodded and he kept talking. 
To tell you the truth, I didn't have a clue what he was going on about. He was 
talking about my heart, but it was just a piece of paper. I felt he was talking 
down to me a wee bit, but maybe he was just trying to impress me. He was 
quite a young bloke, nice enough, I suppose." 
(Dave, 63) 
As the above interview extract suggests, patients allow themselves, or at least 
their illness, to be objectified, to be understood as something that exists 
independently of themselves. In the highly technologised space of the modem 
clinic it is difficult to retain a sense of one's humanity: 
"You go from one machine to another. You wait for ages, then you're called 
into a room and they wire you up to a machine, and then you sit outside and 
wait again until the doctor calls you to give you the test result. Then you get 
to go home, if you're lucky, or you're sent for more tests. It's just one machine 
after another, and they don't usually tell you what they are. And after the 
operation I was surrounded by machines. Tubes and wires sticking out of me. 
Even the painkillers were from a machine. It's like the nurses and all the rest 
are just there to look after the machines." 
(Margaret, 65) 
64 
Radley (1996: 128-132) claims that, after heart surgery, patients become 
emotionally attached to the hospital, stating that the mystique which surrounds 
hospital equipment becomes attached to the staff. I did not find this to be true 
of my informants, but it could be said that, because the hospital invests so 
much in the care of the patient, a little part of it remains in the patient's heart. 
Radley's (1996) statement is not surprising, however, particularly if we 
consider Parsons' account ofthe relationship between doctor and patient: 
[T]he element of dependency, through 'transference', is a basis of a strong 
attachment to therapeutic personnel, which can then be used as a basis of 
leverage to motivate the therapeutic 'work' which eventually should result in 
overcoming the dependency itself. 
(Parsons, in Gerhardt, 1987: 126) 
And if we ever thought that medicine was other than paternalistic, and does not 
infantilise us, then consider the following. 
Ideally speaking, the patient gradually gives up his deviant orientation and 
comes to embrace maturity in its stead. 
(Parsons, in Gerhardt, 1987: 126) 
The clinical encounter is the site where narratives begin to take a distinctive 
shape, that is, in the conflict between the language of science and the language 
of everyday experience; which is to say that the originating narrative of the 
sick person is subsumed under the more specific form of the medical narrative: 
"I definitely felt the doctors ignored me most of the time. They don't really 
listen. It's as if you're on a conveyor belt and they just go through the motions 
with you. It was like that with my own doctor, and it was worse in hospital. I 
never really felt they were listening." 
(Helen, 72) 
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As Komesaroff (2001: 317) points out, medicine has, for the past two hundred 
years, considered a 'singular discursive system', built upon an epistemology 
that serves to unify the disparate elements that constitute the body. Medicine, 
as 'applied biology', makes the body into a differentiated object. The facticity 
of the body, in this limited view of science as a unitary entity, provides the 
foundation for the truth that medicine speaks: 
[R]emembrance [is] guided by a language wherein the categories of medicine 
playa greater role than it presumes or recognizes. In order to speak the body 
better than medicine does, it is necessary to find a language that is both 
intelligible and suited to the purpose; everyday language is willing to offer its 
services - yet it is entirely wrought with medical reminiscences, wherein lies 
the difficulty of abandoning medical language in order to, in this case, speak 
against medicine. 
(Starobinski, 1983: 279) 
Lay experience provides the grounds for a form of resistance to medical 
discourse (Radley, 1996), although our language is already deeply coloured by 
that of medicine. Indeed, Gioia (2000: 209) asserts that the very language we 
employ to talk about our bodies is impoverished by reference to 'mostly 
clinical terms'. This is perhaps overstating matters for, as Komesaroff (2001 : 
318) observes, the language employed in the clinical encounter is 'stratified and 
heteroglot. .. [incorporating] a diversity of speech types and voices ... [from] 
specific jargon to colloquial language'. Komesaroff (2001), however, 
justifiably refuses to reduce the clinical encounter to the collision of two 
grammars, the scientific and the everyday, in which the latter is subsumed 
under the former; rather, he suggests that the encounter is the site of a 
dialectical manufacture of narrative. hnportantly, the patient is as multi-
faceted as the types of speech used in this encounter (Komesaroff, 2001: 321). 
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lllness involves a process of dissecting and reintegrating meanings of bodily 
experience. An important moment of the dynamic of the clinic is this process 
of revision and critique. 
(Komesaroff, 2001: 321) 
This point 'fleshes out' Leder's (1990) - that the telic demand of illness calls for 
interpretation and repair - by stressing that interpretation is an intersubjective, 
intercorporeal process. Komesaroff (2001: 322) suggests that dialogue, 
between doctor and patient, is part of the constituting process of selfhood, 
'through the operation of a dense and conflicting network of discourses and 
signifying practices that are bound up with the intricate phenomenology of the 
self-other relation'. 
Illness compels the patient to seek out a human response to the distress that it 
engenders, but Komesaroff (200 1) seems to invest the doctor with a basic 
humanity that borders on the naIve. Patient and doctor are re-humanised in 
their face-to-face encounter (Komesaroff, 2001: 322), and the doctor responds 
not with empathy, but with the basic human quality of 'caring'. This is just too 
simple, for aside from the assumption that caring is a basic human quality, it 
does not take into account the larger structure of medical science, which 
demands objectivity and an affective neutrality that essentially negates the 
doctor's own sense of humanity. Additionally, this position does not account 
for the economic constraints that determine medical practice: it may be 
difficult to 'constitute one's selfhood' within the eight minutes of a standard 
consultation, although Stewart et aI., (in McWhinney, 2001: 346), report that 
'nine minutes is the critical duration for patient-centred consultations'. The 
matter of that extra minute notwithstanding, Komesaroff (200 I) implicitly 
constructs an emergent model of practice that has become increasingly 
familiar; that of the patient-centred approach to clinical interaction. 
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While the general practitioner is expected (or trained) to engage 
intersubjectively with the patient, and must therefore by definition be a subject 
him or herself, or at least have a firm purchase on subjectivity, he or she is 
somewhat constrained by the over-arching authority of medicine (Gothill and 
Armstrong, 1999). The individual practitioner's view is considered to be 
'indistinguishable from that of the collective 'body' of [his or her] professional 
peers' (Gothill and Armstrong, 1999: 10). Despite assertions that the new, 
patient-centred medicine represents a 'paradigmatic departure' from the 
biomedical model, this emergent form 'shares [ s] the basic medical premise that 
there [is] an objective reality called the patient, which should be examined 
objectively in order to devise and apply rational methods of treatment' [my 
emphasis] (Gothill and Armstrong, 1999: 6). The principal difference in 
patient-centred medicine is that the language of anatomy and physiology has 
been replaced by that of biography and psychology (Gothill and Armstrong, 
1999: 6). 
The importation of psychoanalysis into general practice 'permit[s] doctors to 
make interpretations which define a psychological reality lying beneath the 
patient's presentation of their problems' (Gothill and Armstrong, 1999: 3). It is 
argued that the patient was previously, to some extent, able to 'control the 
penetration of the clinical gaze' by detaching himlherself from his/her body 
during examination (Gothill and Armstrong, 1999: 3). But, in an examination 
that includes psychological evaluation this is much more difficult, as all 
behaviour is deemed 'legitimate material suitable for decoding by the doctor' 
(Gothill and Armstrong, 1999: 3). 
As a newly psychologised entity, the patient requires a new type of doctor, a 
sensitive, 'perceptive, personal doctor' with carefully constructed social skills 
(Gothill and Armstrong, 1999: 7). The doctor's self therein becomes an 
instrument of communication and elicitation: a therapeutic tool. 'The message 
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carried by the new methods of training in consultation skills was not so much 
'know thyself as 'invent thyself' (Gothill and Armstrong, 1999: 8). The doctor 
is thus constructed as a subject who mirrors the patient's own subjecthood, 
eliciting information in a manner which is similar to that of 'Bedside Medicine', 
now relocated to the setting of the doctor's surgery. That doctors are 
themselves monitored (by, for example, Balint groups, established to 
psychoanalyse and review doctor-patient interactions), indicates the enduring 
presence of a larger body of medicine that enjoys an anonymous, epistemic 
privilege over its subject, which is now expanded to include the general 
practitioner. 
The patient-centred model represents a further refinement of techniques of 
surveillance and interrogation that 'produce' the subject as an objectified 
patient. Medicine has found a way to introduce the 'sensitivity of subjectivity 
into the clinical gaze without sacrificing the power associated with its reputed 
objectivity' (Gothill and Armstrong, 1999: 3). It has effectively produced an 
intimate space in the form of the doctor-patient relationship, yet has rendered 
this space subj ect to surveillance. 
In support, I cite Zola (1991: 3), who argues that the process of medical is at ion 
- that is, the means by which the person becomes a patient, and in so doing, 
becomes an object of medical inquiry - contains within it the potential to 
invalidate the individual as a person, or otherwise, the potential to render the 
sick person invalid: 
Medicalisation consists of defming a problem in medical terms, using medical 
language to describe a problem, adopting a medical framework to understand 
a problem, or using a medical intervention to "treat" it. 
(Conrad, 1992:211) 
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The Informed Patient 
[T]here is no reason why the history of the sick should prove any more 
intractable than the history of the labouring classes, of women, criminals, the 
illiterate ... or any other sort of history 'from below'. In fact, it should be 
easier. [ ... ] Pain has been evenhanded enough to visit the rich, educated, and 
visible ... and so the annals of sufferers are neither short nor simple. 
(porter, 1985: 183) 
The informed patient, a close relative of the 'reflexive consumer' of Giddens 
(1991), has emerged as a significant figure in sociological literature (Atkinson, 
1981; Davin, 2003; Frank, 1999; Fullagar, 2002; Henwood et aI., 2003), and is 
ideal typical of current rhetoric concerning patients' charters, doctor-patient 
partnerships, and holistic care. Henwood et aI. (2003: 596 et passim), in their 
discussion of 'information landscapes' (the various settings in which medical 
information is found), challenge the notion of the patient as a reflexive, literate, 
information-seeker by arguing that patients may not wish to take the 
responsibility to seek out health-related information for themselves, that they 
may lack the literacy skills to identify, retrieve, and interpret relevant 
information, and that, even if they are able to comprehend health information 
and apply it to themselves, they may not be capable of communicating such 
interpretations to their doctors. In addition, the ability of the 'informed patient' 
to assert himself or herself successfully is dependent upon the willingness or 
capacity of the general practitioner to accommodate or enable the patient as a 
self-disclosing phenomenon. In this respect, Henwood et aI. (2003), argue 
against the anti-paternalistic model espoused by, for example, Eysenbach 
(2000) and Ferguson (1997), which describes the patient as a newly 
empowered reflexive consumer: 
What is clear is that the informed patient will not emerge naturally or easily 
within existing structures and relationships [particularly] where 'lay' 
knowledge does not coincide with expert/medical knowledge and where a 
certain level of compliance with medical opinion is required. 
(Henwood et aI, 2003: 605) 
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Both positions in the clinical encounter are in fact social roles and thus, just as 
the patient may be reluctant to challenge the superior knowledge and authority 
of the general practitioner, so too the doctor may be unwilling to take on the 
role of equal partner in a relationship of care (Henwood et aI., 2003: 602-604). 
In such a structurally asymmetric relationship it is arguably easier for the 
patient to remain passive in relation to the doctor's authoritative objectivity: 
"I like to think I'm quite assertive, but you've got to be careful with doctors. 
They don't like it if you're too smart, and yet there's all this information now -
not like when 1 was young - about how to look out for your health, what to 
eat, what not to do, etcetera. But when 1 go to my doctor 1 think that 
sometimes it's best just to sit quiet and make my own mind up later." 
(Elizabeth, 68) 
"You tend to believe what doctors tell you. But now there's so much ... so 
many people telling you about health. When 1 was a girl we had a big medical 
encyclopaedia at home, but nobody ever really read it. We were scared to. 
Now it's different. You can find out anything about anything now. My 
grandson looks things up on the computer for me ... the Internet. Right 
enough, 1 forget most of it by the time 1 go to the doctor." 
(Helen, 72) 
With such diversity of 'information landscapes' (Henwood et aI., 2003: 596 et 
passim) - the Internet, television, public health announcements, information 
packs - it is difficult to imagine a consumer who is not now reasonably well 
informed about health matters: 
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"I used to like all the documentaries, and I watched Casualty, then Holby City, 
but mostly ER. And I'm old enough to remember Doctor Kildare and 
Emergency Ward 10. I like ER especially though. I know it's a bit ... 
overdone, but some of it seems quite realistic. It's just a bit exaggerated. You 
can make a connection with some of the characters, and the things that happen 
seem real enough, most of the time. But I don't watch them now, not at all. I 
can't stand to see them now. Especially anything to do with the heart. It's just 
too ... upsetting. Like those scenes when someone's heart stops and the doctor 
shocks them ... I can't stand that now .. .it happened to me, so they [nurses] told 
me. They said I was out for a little while and they had to ... shock me. Yes, I 
suppose they seem too real now. I'm probably just a bit sensitive just now, 
but I'll maybe watch them again in the future." 
(Richard, 69) 
Davin (2003) points out that viewers attribute informative properties to 
television dramas such as ER, that such dramas have educational and 
familiarising qualities which help to raise awareness of health risks by 
providing information on 'physiology, symptoms, diseases, treatments [and] the 
practice of medicine' (Davin, 2003: 664), and, that they 'help to prepare 
viewers for the experience of. .. going into hospital' (Buckingham, in Davin, 
2003: 665). Thus, fiction, more compelling than 'fact', has a 'pedagogic 
potential' (Davin, 2003: 665). As Birke (1999: 114) notes, 'such stories remind 
us how used we have become to the drama of heart failure'. Rather 
surprisingly perhaps, Davin (2003: 668-669) suggests that while viewers 
expect more in the way of 'facts' from documentaries, in reality they believe 
that they are more likely to glean useful information from dramas, holding the 
view that drama is better researched and less subject to bias. For example, 
some of Davin's (2003: 669) informants believed that the pharmaceutical 
industry is implicated in the discourses of medicine, so that when medicine 
speaks, on television, it does not especially do so with its own voice. Thus 
viewers' expectations, based on the form in which information is presented, 
may affect the perception of content (Davin, 2003: 669). Dramas such as ER 
foster emotional identification between viewers and (the plight of) characters, 
thus it is argued that: 
[C]ontrary to the long-held belief that new knowledge directly leads to 
behaviour modification (i.e. once informed that their conduct may be 
dangerous, rational listeners [sic] will stop/alter it), responses to health 
messages may have more to do with emotions than cognition. 
(Davin, 2003: 671) 
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This suggests that 'reasonably well informed consumers' are not necessarily 
rationally responsive to their situation, or perhaps it is that fiction (in this 
instance, in the form of television drama) provides a richer and more 
persuasive description of the experience of hospitalisation than do other 
informative media. As Lupton (in Henwood et aI., 2003: 592) observes, the 
concept of rational reflexivity underestimates the complexity of emotions that 
characterise the experience of illness and the clinical encounter. Quite simply, 
a rational response may not be possible. Emotional engagement with fictional 
lives, with the intertwining and continuous narratives of a variety of characters, 
seems, in Davin's (2003) argument, to be perceived as more real than, for 
example, documentaries, and more informative than public health 
announcements. Interesting as her argument is, Davin (2003) does not discuss 
whether patients' actual experience of illness and hospitalisation corresponds 
with dramatic representations. If fiction is more credible than fact, then 
perhaps this explains why my informants are now reluctant to watch hospital 
dramas: 
"I watched an episode just a week before I was due to have the operation, and 
that was it, never again. There was this character in for heart surgery, and 
everything that could go wrong did. It really gave me the willies. I had to 
stop watching there and then. I felt like asking the surgeon about it, about the 
73 
programme, but I knew he'd just say it wasn't like that in real life. But you see 
much more on telly than you do when you're in that situation yourself." 
(Robert, 59) 
Information about health also comes in other forms: 
"I read a lot of health magazines, and I take leaflets from my G.P.'s [waiting 
room]. I bought one of those little books that tell you about the pills, about 
side effects and that kind of thing. Doctors don't always tell you about side 
effects." 
(Jane, 62) 
This notion of the patient's 'informedness' is taken up by Atkinson (1981), who 
addresses the social organisation of knowledge within the clinical setting in 
terms of the problematic nature of its (knowledge) management and 
distribution. Too much openness on the part of the clinician may result in, at 
best, the patient's withdrawal from the relationship while, at worst, it may lead 
to genuine distress for the patient. Doctors must remain sensitive to the effects 
of knowledge, particularly when the patient is in a state of 'closed awareness' 
(Glaser and Strauss, in Atkinson, 1981: 61); that is, when the patient is 
uncertain as to the doctor's perception of him or her and of the degree of 
knowledge that the doctor has regarding his or her medical condition. The 
well-informed patient may 'threaten' the doctor's display of medical 
competence, which may result in a 'loss of face' on the part of the doctor 
(Atkinson, 1981: 67-68), a point illustrated in guidelines issued to junior 
doctors, which state that 'especially in front of intelligent patients some 
obliquity of expression is to be commended' (Atkinson, 1981: 62). The clinical 
encounter thus oscillates between guarded transparency and complete 
obfuscation. 
The enabling myth ofthe informed patient is that he or she is deemed 
knowledgeable and, consequently, a willing participant in the medical 
encounter. The patient, as a 'client', agrees to participate in therapeutic 
activities and exercise a degree of self-regulation. 
The Therapeutic Turn 
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[I]f it ever becomes possible to remove the hyphen from the term "psycho-
somatic", and subsume all of "medical science" under a single conceptual 
scheme, it can be regarded as certain that it will not be the conceptual scheme 
of the biological science of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
It is also certain that this conceptual scheme will prove applicable to a great 
deal of the range of social action in areas which extend well beyond what has 
conventionally been defined as the sphere of medical interests. 
(parsons, 1952: 431) 
Western medicine, in principle at least, now treats the patient more holistically 
than previously, in recent history (Rombalski, 2003). The therapeutic turn in 
medicine, and particularly in nursing, has effected the partial transformation of 
the medicalized habitus - that is, the embodied disposition - of the patient, 
from the more traditional, 'passive and analysable' (Armstrong, 1993: 402) 
patient, who is expected only to comply with the advice of physicians, to the 
active, corrigible patient, who is 'invited' to work with the physician or nurse in 
order to reach a mutually agreed, desired outcome. 
Medical literature on the rehabilitation of patients with heart disease now 
clearly stresses the efficacy of an assisted transition from dependence to 
independence, so that the patient may soon return to a state of health that is 'as 
near as possible to normal' (Jones and West, 1995: 2). Addressing the political 
underpinnings of therapeutic medicine, May (1992: 599) suggests that such 
practice effectively redefines the patient as 'more than the object of clinical 
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procedure and attention' [emphasis ion original]. Armstrong (1993: 402) adds 
to this by stating that the therapeutic subj ect is constructed as self-aware and 
willing to participate in 'temporal spaces of possibility', by which he means, 
presumably, that the patient will engage in projects directed toward some form 
of rehabilitative self-help. Although the patient is, seemingly, a willing 
participant in, for example, rehabilitation, it can be argued that he or she 
remains over-socialised, a mere functional requirement of a social system 
which now demands willingly 'docile bodies' (Foucault, 1980; 1991). 
May (1992: 599-601) argues that the subjectification of the person as a patient 
imbues him or her with a new found ability to resist the intrusions of the 
clinical gaze. Quite how this works is another matter, for May (1992: 600) 
only states that the patient, in interaction with medical staff, has the power 
either to lie or to say no. The strength of this argument rests upon the notion 
that the patient is no longer a mere object of medical science, but rather is 
accorded a greater degree of subjecthood, and as such, possesses a greater 
degree of autonomy. Yet, as this subjecthood is conferred from above, as it 
were, the problem of the over-socialised patient remains, for the subjectivity of 
the patient is only instantiated in relation to the structure of medicine, in the 
moment a/play. In short, the over-socialised patient is compelled to adopt 
roles within this therapeutic encounter, responding 'eagerly or anxiously to the 
expectations of other role-players in the settings in which he finds himself 
(Wrong, 1961: 190). 
So the question remains: is rehabilitation, in practice, a different approach to 
the disciplining of bodies? If it is, we return to Parsons (1951: 616), who states 
that the physician always, knowingly or not, exerts a psychotherapeutic effect 
on his or her patients. If modem medicine is a disciplinary force, and if it 
functions by means of surveillance, first of populations, and then of 
individualised subjects, can we say, as Turner (1995b: 14) does, that every 
'aspect of modem medicine is a contribution to surveillance'? 
Nursing Theory and Practice: Sometimes a Bedpan is just a Bedpan 
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'New nursing' represents itself as a site of resistance to the medicalisation of 
illness, and as a form of practice whose field is the embodied person rather 
than the body of the patient. [ ... ] '[O]ld' nursing accepted medicine's 
construction of the patient as a psychologically inert body, whose hypothetical 
status as a person was irrelevant to care and treatment. 
(paley, 2000: 106-107) 
Contrary to the notion that nurses deal only with bodies, that they do all the 
dirty work, 'new nursing' theory (Mulholland, 1997; Paley, 2000) focuses on 
'nursing's rediscovery of the mind' (Paley, 2000: 103). It is argued (Paley, 
2000: 106) that 'new nursing', in adopting a holistic paradigm, which 'fastens 
on the psycho-social dimensions ofthe patient's illness and claims them for its 
own ... elides the body'. This form of nursing represents a new division of 
labour in which 'medicine gets the body and nursing gets the mind' (Paley, 
2000: 106). Certainly, interviews with cardiac rehabilitation nurses (as part of 
this study), revealed that their express intention was to 'change the patient's 
mind' regarding his or her attitude to the care of the self, for example, by way 
of dietary and general health advice, and in the provision of specifically 
tailored exercise regimes. This advisory role marks an obvious elevation of 
status, and is indicative of a general trend toward professionalisation within 
nursing (pendleton, 1991; Witz, 1992). 'New nursing' is in part regarded as 
overly ambitious and potentially invasive in that it reconstructs the patient as 
yet another subject of discourse, and 'far from providing a genuine alternative 
to the 'medical model', and the mindlbody dualism with which that model is 
identified, the holistic paradigm merely serves to confirm and reinforce [the 
dualism], (Paley, 2000: 104-105). 
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Nursing theory has recently taken up philosophical, phenomenological, and 
sociological concepts such as the 'lived body' (McDonald and McIntyre, 2001), 
'lived experience' (Claessens et aI., 2005; Miklaucich, 1998), 'intersubjectivity' 
(pierson, 1999), 'hermeneutics' (van der Zalm and Bergum, 2000; Wiklund et 
aI., 2002), and 'narrativization' (May and Fleming, 1997; Sakalys, 2000), as 
methods of addressing patients' experience, as well as more traditional, 'old 
nursing' issues such as 'care'. In this, many of the nurse-researchers turn to 
Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Polanyi, albeit in a highly selective 
manner (Paley, 1998). 
'New nursing' adopted sociology first, bringing it into the educational 
curriculum in order to stress the humanization and communicative aspect of 
nursing care (Mulholland, 1997: 845). Willingness to include sociology in the 
nursing curriculum resonates with a dominant managerialism, in that 'sociology 
is seen as a valuable tool for nursing because in certain forms it empowers 
nurses to exercise particular modes of power over clients' (Mulholland, 1997: 
845). The communicative model of nursing, that is to say, should not be taken 
as a 'discarding of power [but] rather it ought to be seen as the adoption of an 
alternative mode of power vis-a.-vis clients and other professionals' 
(Mulholland, 1997: 845). This instrumental approach serves to determine just 
what kind of sociology is taught in nursing colleges, the criteria for which 'owe 
much to largely unacknowledged political and ideological assumptions' 
(Mulholland, 1997: 845) about what constitutes a relevant topic of study for 
nurses. Sociology in nursing is thus largely individualistic, micro-oriented, and 
uncritical of professional practice. As such, 'sociology is more likely to be 
used to examine 'them' (patients) than 'us' (medical professionals)' 
(Mulholland, 1997: 845). Misappropriated as a theory of patient control, 
sociology in nursing cannot take on a transformative or emancipatory role 
unless nursing is prepared to challenge its own taken-for-granted assumptions 
(Mulholland, 1997: 847). 
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Equally, in adopting phenomenology as a method of investigation, nurse 
researchers frequently mistake subjective experience for the 'essence' of 
phenomena, making no distinction between phenomena and the way( s) in 
which they are experienced (paley, 1997: 189). While Paley (1997: 192) states 
that accounts of lived experience are valuable, they are not to be mistaken for 
universal truths. 
Pierson (1999: 297) suggests that for nurses to be more effective they must not 
rigidly adhere to a single scientific perspective, and that they must find a way 
to reconcile 'instrumental skill and objective knowledge [with an] aesthetic, 
intuitive, emotional, imaginative, spiritual and experiential approach' to their 
interactions with patients. Emphasising the point that health is a 'practice', 
Pierson (1999: 301) states that the 'single scientific perspective' is overly 
determinative and as such impedes the development of the intersubjective 
process necessary to the optimisation of effective health care. However, we 
must ask: is this not, to some extent, what nurses already do? Similarly, Bolton 
(2001: 91) describes 'new nursing' as patient-centred rather than task-oriented, 
and states that 'nurses ... work to achieve a fine balance between showing 
concern and care for the patient whilst also maintaining a professional 
demeanour' . 
Mulhall (1997: 969) is critical of 'new nursing' theory because it is founded 
upon research or theoretical discussion that is removed from nursing 'in 
practice', and is in reality too obscure and unfocused to implement. It would 
appear that nursing theory is at the moment subject to much discussion 
regarding its implementation, but whatever it is, it is evident that nurses are 
choosing to take the more difficult option of caring about, rather than only 
caring for their patients. Perhaps Gothill and Armstrong's (1999) assertions 
that the general practitioner has been reconstructed as a subject can be applied 
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to the 'new nurse', who is now imbued with subjectivity in his or her position in 
relation to the patient. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to provide a detailed review or analysis of 
the theoretical content of 'new nursing' literature, but it is significant that, 
despite claims to the contrary, nursing seems to have somehow misplaced the 
body (Paley, 2000: 105-108). Paley (2000) should add that this is largely a 
theoretical loss, because nurses, in practice, can hardly escape their own 
embodiment or that of their patients. 
Cardiac Rehabilitation: Gym'll Fix It! 
The feeling of 'differentness' (Zola, 1991), to which I referred earlier, is 
addressed by Moons et aI., (2002), who recognize that it is not only that the 
patient feels different about him or herself, but indeed also feels so about the 
surrounding environment and other people. Configuring this as a 'psycho-
social-problem', Moons et aI., (2002: 26-27), suggest that patients require 
education regarding 'behaviours', screening for psycho-social symptoms, and 
counselling to address any problems that may arise from such problems. 
It was a common complaint among the nurses I interviewed that they did not 
have the tools at their disposal for the screening of psycho-social problems, and 
that they had to deal with patients' problems on an ad hoc basis. 
In the field of cardiology, rehabilitation is one example of increased roles in 
nursing (Smith, 2002: 19-21), and, as a practical response to the problem of 
heart disease, it marks the transition to a model of care 'encompassing health 
promotion, disease prevention and management' (Smith, 2002: 19). 
Formally, the goals of cardiac rehabilitation may be outlined thus: 
Medical goals 
• Prevention of sudden death 
• Decrease in cardiac morbidity, infarction, and graft closure 
• Relief of symptoms: angina, breathlessness 
• Increase in work capacity 
Psychological goals 
• Restoration of self-confidence 
• Relief of anxiety and depression 
• Improved adaptation to stress 
• Restoration of enjoyable sexual activity 
• Relief of anxiety and depression in partners or carers 
Social goals 
• Return to work, if appropriate 
• Independence in the activities of daily living in the elderly 
Health service goals 
• Reduction in direct medical costs 
• Early discharge and early rehabilitation 
• F ewer drugs 
• Fewer readmissions 
(Source: Cay, 1995: 35) 
Less formally, the purpose of cardiac rehabilitation is quite clear: 
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"We want to get them back on their feet and feeling better about themselves. 
We don't ram it down their throats, but it's there if they want it. We know it's 
too easy just to sink back into old habits. They don't always realise that their 
arteries could get blocked again, or that they'll need another angioplasty. It's 




In tenus of post-surgical treatment, cardiac rehabilitation has some history. 
From the efforts of the eighteenth century English physician, William 
Heberden, to the publication of William Stokes' (1854) The Diseases a/the 
Heart and Aorta, the 'pedestrian cure' of mild exercise and strictly regulated 
gymnastics was strongly advocated. However, after Stokes' death in 1878 his 
regimens were forgotten, superseded by the 'bed rest' method. As recently as 
the 1940's and 50's, extended bed rest was deemed necessary for patients with 
heart conditions. During the Second World War the American Medical 
Association held a symposium on 'the abuse of rest in the treatment of disease' 
(Dock, 1944: 1083-1085). Physicians such as Levine and Lown (1952) then 
recommended 'armchair treatment', which required that the patient not lie in 
bed too long, but instead sit by the bed as soon as possible after surgery. This 
heralded a move [sic] toward early ambulation and a regime of progressive, 
graded activity. Without citing numerous studies on the subject, over the next 
five years a marked decrease in mortality rates of patients who suffered 
myocardial infarction (heart attack) was observed. 
Heart disease is, as already stated, the main cause of death in western society, 
and it is now on the increase in developing countries (Cay, 1995: 35). Heart 
disease is therefore a costly business: loss of working hours, cost of treatment, 
and sickness benefits are all economic factors that must be taken into 
consideration by governments. Illness cannot be separated from the socio-
economic conditions in which it occurs. An example of this is found in Howell 
(1994: 94). During the First World War, British soldiers affected by Da 
Costa's syndrome, also known as 'athlete's heart', or 'soldier's heart', were 
initially treated with extended hospital bed rest. However, economic and 
political exigencies - the strain on military hospitals, and the institution of a 
military draft to replace convalescing soldiers - led the Medical Research 
Council to reconceptualise 'soldier's heart' as 'effort syndrome', to prescribe a 
series of graded exercise rather than bed rest, and to reclassify soldiers as fit for 
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service (Howell, 1994: 94). This example could be said to represent a 
paradigm shift in medical science, brought about by economic demands. In 
this, Foucault's (1980b: 58) question - 'what type of body does society need?'-
has a particular relevance in that the larger social requirements determine the 
form of the socially desirable body. As such, it might be said that society, at 
this moment, needs healthy, productive, consuming bodies (Sawchuck, 1995). 
As recently as the 1960's, many cardiac patients 'led miserable unproductive 
lives', frightened to engage in normal activities and, as such, 'became cardiac 
invalids' (Cay, 1995: 31). In the early 1970's cardiac rehabilitation, initially in 
the form of exercise only, was developed strictly for patients who had suffered 
myocardial infarction. Exercise training was directed at selected groups, 
largely male, and consisting of those whose infarcts were deemed 
'uncomplicated' (Cay, 1995: 32). It was not until the 1980's that rehabilitation 
was further developed to encompass other heart conditions and post-surgical 
patients, and to include stress management and lifestyle advice, and then only 
in a limited number of hospitals. 
"Money's always been the problem. That, and being taken seriously. There's 
a lot more money available for English hospitals, yet we've got more patients, 
more people in need of help. There's been studies, not like a few years ago 
when we didn't have a clue what the long-term benefits were, or how 
successful we were, but it's getting the information to the right people that 
matters, and then getting the funding. [We] spend a lot of money on health 
education, and that's fine, but that won't reduce the numbers much. We'll still 
have plenty coming in for bypass. The numbers don't seem to go down at all. 
The wards are as busy as ever, and we're moving them through the system 
faster and faster all the time. [ ... ] The problem is ... rehabi1itation is regarded 
as an extra ... not part of the whole treatment. We talk about 'total patient care' 
and 'holistic care', but it comes down to money in the end. That and the fact 
you can't force people to change their lives." 
(Rehabilitation nurse) 
In the cardiology literature it is generally held that 'lifelong exercise protects 
against coronary events, independently of [other factors such as] smoking, 
obesity, and hypertension' (Julian, 1995: 6): 
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"I'm not so worried about them smoking a bit, or drinking, as long as it's not 
excessive. Diet's important, but you've got to be practical about it. They can't 
always just change their diet. They can't always afford to. I think stress is an 
important factor ... a lot of the literature supports that. Ifwe can help them 
with stress that'll go a long way to helping. Exercise definitely reduces stress, 
and we show them relaxation techniques as well. I think it helps build their 
confidence back up ... it helps them stop dwelling on morbid thoughts." 
(Rehabilitation nurse) 
While previously it was believed that exercise had to be taken vigorously in 
order to be effective, it is now thought that mild exercise - 'sufficient to cause 
slight breathlessness' - taken three times a week, is adequate for most needs, 
healthy or otherwise (Harris et aI., in Julian, 1995: 6). Strenuous or vigorous 
exercise may indeed bring about a heart attack, but only in those who take no 
exercise at all (Julian, 1995: 6). Thus, 'progressive mobilisation', 'early 
ambulation', and 'graded exercise regimes' (Julian, 1995), are all terms familiar 
to cardiac rehabilitation staff: 
"Yes, graded exercise is what we try to do. We tailor it to meet the needs of 
individual patient as much as we can, and we monitor them very carefully, but 
for the average patient in the fifty to sixty-five [year-old] range, we try to push 
them a bit, if we think they're up to it. This notion of causing mild 
breathlessness is really relative. At the beginning of the programme we'd 
expect to see a lot of breathless people, but twelve weeks later, if they keep at 
it, they should be able to push themselves a bit harder but still be a little 
breathless, so it's a progressive thing. They're still out of puff but they're more 
capable, more flexible and fit. There are degrees of breathlessness. What we 
do is show them how to take their pulse, and they monitor themselves ... see 
how quickly their pulse-rate drops back to normal. That's the test of fitness. 
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[ ... J The problem is, there's new people coming in all the time, so you'll have 
someone who's been there for six weeks, say, working out beside someone 
who's only just started, so we really have to keep an eye on them all. Of 
course, some of them don't put much effort into it. They're here for the tea 
and biscuits ... and the company." 
(Rehabilitation nurse) 
Progressive mobilisation, graded exercise programmes, and stress management 
techniques may even reduce the need for medication (Julian, 1995: 12), thus 
cardiac rehabilitation has the potential to reduce the costs of long-term health 
care (Cay, 1995: 35-36). 
Rehabilitation nurses realise that they are dealing with people who have been 
through an emotionally and physically devastating experience, but their 
principal concern is with the body of the patient: 
"We're not psychologists, but we have to deal with different problems. We 
can refer patients if they need it, or if they ask, but the patients who talk to us 
about their emotional problems - you know, intimate problems, or family 
matters - they'd rather talk to us than go for counselling. I mean, they're 
depressed enough, some of them, and it's hard getting them to come here in 
the fIrst place, so we don't want to scare them away. We can't go poking 
about in their lives. I doubt the older ones would go to a psychologist 
anyway, because of the stigma. They'd rather talk to us, but we don't push 
them into it. At the end of the day we're here to help them get into better 
shape. There's patients who don't do much exercise, but they still come, so 
there's defInitely a social aspect to it, and that helps. And there's some who 
are really frail, the older ones. They're basically disabled. But if we help 
them to think about themselves ... take care of their bodies a bit better, get their 
confIdence back. .. you've got to remember they were mostly out of condition 
for ages before the surgery. But if they look after their bodies, you know a 
healthy body and a healthy mind ... they go together." 
(Rehabilitation nurse) 
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Cardiac rehabilitation is yet in its infancy. The increasingly diverse nature of 
the cardiac population (Horgan and McGhee, 1995: 244) demands a 
sophisticated response to the problems attendant to heart disease. The 
rehabilitation nurse is quite clearly an example of the increased specialisation 
and professionalisation of nursing. He, but more often she must be a 
counsellor, a coach, and an educator (Fridlund, 2002: 15), capable of adopting 
different perspectives according to the needs of individual patients; for 
example, if the patient is obese the nurse will design an exercise programme 
that is suitable and which will not discourage him or her from returning to the 
clinic. The nurse's response is therefore both 'medico-physical and 
psychosocial' (Fridlund, 2002: 15), and as such, is in keeping with the 
recommendations of the 1993 World Health Organization Report on Cardiac 
Rehabilitation. 
The rehabilitation of cardiac patients is the sum of activities required to 
influence favourably the underlying cause of the disease, as well as to ensure 
the patients the best possible physical, social and mental conditions so that 
they may, by their own efforts, preserve, or resume when lost, as normal a 
place as possible in the life of the community. Rehabilitation cannot be 
regarded as an isolated form of therapy, but must be integrated with the whole 
treatment, of which it forms only one facet. [my emphasis] 
(Extract from WHO Report, 1993, in Fridlund, 2002: 17) 
Cardiac rehabilitation provides a means of 'empowering' both patient and nurse 
(Fridlund, 2002; Smith, 2002). First, rehabilitation contributes to the patient's 
well-being and improves quality oflife. Second, nurses take on a greater 
advisory role in the care of patients, and in some cases, become more involved 
in their daily lives. Cardiac nurses also visit patients at home, to assess 
mobility, psychological well-being, and to address any needs arising from post-
surgical disability or depression. It is important to note that cardiac 
rehabilitation is relatively inexpensive. 
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"We believe that exercise and careful lifestyle management might save the 
patient from coming back for more surgery later. It's not definite. There are 
too many variables you just can't control to take into account. But, if we can 
keep them offthe operating table then we've helped them and we've helped 
ourselves. It beats sitting around waiting for your arteries to clog up." 
(Rehabilitation nurse) 
Responsibility for the maintenance of health ultimately rests with the patient. 
Risk management is thus passed on to the patient, but this is shared, for a while 
at least, with the rehabilitation nurse who, according to Smith (2002: 21), is 
best positioned to 'drive forward initiatives to promote improved health care'. 
May's (1992) position, that the patient may resist the intrusion of the 
therapeutic gaze is borne out by the fact that attendance at rehabilitation clinics 
is not compulsory. But, it would seem that cardiac rehabilitation, as yet far 
from being unduly intrusive, is a valuable addition to the field of coronary care. 
"I didn't want to go to rehabilitation at first. The idea of exercising in a gym didn't 
appeal at all. The last time was in the gym at school. .. that was a long time ago. 
I'm not one for joining clubs, but I changed my attitude after the first session. I 
was doing things I'd forgotten about, or thought I couldn't do any more. Really, it 
was like being back in school again, exercising - ten steps this way, ten steps that 
way - and I felt so good afterwards. Tired, but good." 
(Marie, 64) 
"No, I didn't like the idea at all. I was quite depressed, now I look back on it. But 
I felt obliged to go. The [rehabilitation] nurse was so nice I couldn't refuse her. It 
was hard work at first, but I got used to it and I really enjoyed it. I looked forward 
to my sessions. It really helped me to get my confidence back. It's such a simple 
thing too. It's just like dancing. And I made new friends there. We keep in touch 
now, go out for walks and visit each other. It's like our wee gang." 
(Kate, 75) 
Concluding Remarks 
It would appear that in developing a programme of holistic care, and the 
patient-centred model of clinical interaction, the body has once more 
disappeared, and that the Cartesian dualism which lies at the heart of modem 
medicine has been reasserted. 
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Yet it is not that simple in practice, for on the one hand medical science 
apparently objectifies its subject and, seemingly, constrains the self-revelation 
of the patient; but, on the other hand, the therapeutic tum in medicine, which 
effectively produces the self of the patient (and doctor), is deemed to amount to 
an invasion of the private sphere of subjectivity. Is the therapeutic tum 
representative of the further objectification of populations, or is it a genuinely 
more holistic treatment ofthe patient? Can we have it both ways? We expect 
doctors to be omniscient but we do not want them to know too much about us. 
As for 'new nursing', despite the turn to sociology and phenomenology in 
nursing theory (and practice, perhaps), nursing remains what it has been since 
its inception, that is, 'communicative and reflexive' (Mulholland, 1997: 847) 
and, an embodied activity that is directed toward the embodied patient 
(Fridlund, 2002: 16). 
Porter (1985: 194) states that we should stop seeing the doctor as the agent of 
primary care, for 'people took care before they took physick'. Medicalisation 
theses such as Foucault's over-determine the patient, and thus neglect the 
contribution that the sick make to medical knowledge. We should thus be wary 
of rigid, mechanistic views of doctor-patient relationships. History is in eternal 
flux, as are the people who make it. Relationships may seem fixed, and indeed 
some doctors and patients may wish to step into an already established role, but 
if, as stated, social relationships determine the form of medical knowledge, 
then the dynamics of those relationships need not be eternally fixed. 
Some literature (for example, Van Manen, 2001) already acknowledges the 
intersubjective nature of the clinical encounter, and suggests that greater 
attention be given to the dynamics of speaking and listening in the doctor-
patient relationship. Therefore, research that focuses upon the general 
practitioner's experience of the patient may yield some insights into the 
practice of medicine. As ordinary language is suffused with that of medicine, 
so medical language is informed by the everyday usage of its practitioners. It 
is not as if doctors live in another world, detached from the everyday life of 
their patient. 
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McWhinney (2001) suggests that time is of vital importance, that for the 
clinical relationship to develop beyond the current patient-centred model, the 
doctor must learn to wait, to wait for the patient to describe experience in his or 
her own terms, without prompting, without pre-judgement, and most 
importantly, without recourse to orders of abstraction. 
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Third Narrative: Going to the Theatre 
I am sitting up in a hospital bed, waiting to be taken to the operating theatre, 
waiting also for the sedative to take its effect. I know that, soon, my chest will 
be opened and that a surgeon will cut into my heart, remove two diseased 
valves, and replace them with carbon-titanium prostheses. Prior to this, my 
heart and lungs will be taken 'offline', their normal actions performed instead 
by a bypass machine. To initiate heart-lung bypass, the surgeon must first 
impair my body's own clotting system, otherwise my blood will immediately 
clot upon exposure to the plastic tubing and artificial surfaces inside the heart-
lung machine. Thinning of the blood (anticoagulation) is achieved by 
administering a powerful anticoagulant called heparin. Once clotting is 
impaired, a large drainage tube will be placed in the right atrium, one of the 
upper chambers of the heart. This tube drains the blue (oxygen poor) blood 
from my right atrium into the heart-lung machine. Then a smaller tube leading 
from the machine will be inserted into the arterial system - most likely, into my 
aorta - so that red (oxygen rich) blood can be returned to my body. Thus, 
artificial oxygenation and circulation is established and maintained (by a 
technician called a perfusionist) and my heart can be stopped for anything 
from a few minutes to a few hours. I know that, according to the surgeon, I 
have a ninety-two percent chance of survival; a seemingly precise calculation 
- four percent per valve. I know this, and I want the sedative to take its effect 
so that I will not need to think about it, that other eight percent. I am surprised 
to see two nurses and a porter arrive with a trolley. They tell me that it is time 
to go. I begin to fret, feeling indignant at the same time because I am not 
ready. I am not yet unconscious. Like the character in Catch 22, Major 
Major, who is only available for appointment when he is not in his office - who 
can only be seen when he is not there - I cannot possibly make myself 
available while I am still here. I want to be 'not here'. The last time this 
happened I was out before I left the ward, a slight stinging in the back of my 
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right hand the last thing I remember before waking after the operation. But 
this time I am fully awake. Nothing happens. Then I am in an elevator, a 
nurse at my side, holding my hand, squeezing gently while she talks with the 
porter, exchanging words about people I don't know. Life goes on, apparently. 
Meanwhile, the elevator descends slowly, noisily, deep into the heart of the 
building, to the surgical suite. The nurse says something to me, a question I 
think, but I am staring at the fluorescent ceiling of the elevator. I turn to say 
something but nothing happens and then the elevator doors open and we are in 
a tropical jungle by Henri Rousseau. Gigantic spiked plants, smiling lions, 
exotic birds, and, rather oddly, a desk. Other people are there too, but I 
cannot see them. They must be hiding. Then, nothing happens ... [. . .} ... and I 
hear someone say "swallow". A bird? But no, someone is telling me to 
swallow. I cannot see anyone. They must still be hiding. All I can see is that I 
am in a cathedral, where splashes of stained glass and white light melt and run 
into each other. Wet colour, like the feeling of wetness in my throat as I feel 
something move. Ah yes, I must swallow something, but as I swallow 
(although I have no sense of actually making any effort), Ifeel something come 
out of my mouth. Surely this is wrong. Somehow I extract a memory from the 
few thoughts that flutter around me, the memory that when you swallow, things 
don't come out of your mouth. But now I feel a tube slithering in my throat -
an air hose, like a deep sea diver's (yes, I have been under) - and then it is out, 
and a voice says "good". I am free to return to forgetfulness. The colours of 
the cathedral, its enormous vaulted ceiling, the sense of people nearby, all 
merge, subside, are washed away, and then ... nothing happens again. David 
Mamet (1998: 53) writes that the gambler does not play for riches, but plays 
instead for time, more time at the table. The patient gambles on just the right 
amount of time at the table. 
Chapter Three: From the Heart 
For here the lover and killer are mingled 
who had one body and one heart. 
(Douglas, 'Vergissmeinnicht, 1943') 
Special days are made of special moments that live forever 
in the memory of the heart. 
(Hallmark Greetings Card) 
The Heart - 'that shiftless emblem' (Atwood, in Birke, 1999: 112) 
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From poetry to philosophy, from the sublime to the less so, it is apparent that 
the human heart is imbued with powerfully evocative tropological qualities. 
Any English language dictionary of quotations will contain multiple entries for 
'heart', and of those entries few invoke a medical frame of reference (although, 
as an organ a biological status is generally implied). In the most recent edition 
of The Penguin Dictionary o/Quotations, 'heart' occupies one-and-a-halfpages 
of the index, whereas its figural opposite, 'head', occupies only half a page, 
which suggests that, as a signifier, the former has a greater symbolic potency 
than the latter. The head and heart couplet has endured, from Graeco-Roman 
Antiquity to the modem epoch, but as Le Goff (1989) notes, the 'metaphorical 
strengthening' of the heart (over the head, liver, and other organs and limbs) 
was more firmly established by mediaeval Christianity. Largely, metaphors of 
the heart, 'designat[ing] the affective life and interiority' (Le Goff, 1989: 16), 
refer to the passions: love and hate, anger and remorse, joy, longing, desire and 
loss. 
Admittedly, many of the metaphors of the heart are very old, but despite the 
development of anatomical knowledge, which has thus far produced a 
mechanistic model ofthe human body, the heart yet 'signifies on many levels' 
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(Stevens, in Emslie et at., 2001: 207). Indeed, it is in part this 'rich history of 
metaphoric associations' (Birke, 1999: 112) that makes the heart such a 
productive topic for study. The heart, as something that occupies biological 
and imaginative space, seems at once familiar yet strange, both reliable and 
treacherous. As such, the human heart is far from 'shiftless', that is, 'lacking 
resourcefulness; lazy; inefficient' (OED, 1990). Rather, the heart is a 'versatile 
organ' (Birke, 1999: 125) in that it supports so many metaphors. 
"It is a pump, isn't it? I mean people say that, they talk about the heart 
pumping blood. It's electrical as well. I didn't know that before, how your 
heart needs the right amount of salt to make the electrics work. That's why I 
was on potassium tablets. It's for the salt. They [cardiologists] told me that I 
had fibrillation. That's like the heart getting jittery because the electrical parts 
aren't working properly. A young doctor said it was like a bag of worms, 
that's what they call it when it's fibrillating. Apparently it's quite common 
when you get older. You don't even need to have something wrong with your 
heart to get fibrillation. I never thought of the heart as electrical, so I suppose 
it's an electric pump." 
(Kate, 75) 
"It's not until it goes that you realise just how hard your heart works, how 
important it is. That's not right, I mean I know it's important .. . it's the 
heart .. . but, although I know about. .. heart disease ... you can't avoid knowing 
about it nowadays, and I've relatives and friends who've died from heart 
attacks, but you still take it for granted. You think that one day it'll give out, 
but until then, you don't tend to give much thought to it, pumping away all the 
time. I mean, if it was a washing machine you'd expect it to break down, 
wouldn't you?" 
(Tom, 67) 
The heart may be regarded as a 'pump', whose 'work consists in the propulsion 
of blood through the circle of vessels in adequate quantity to meet the needs of 
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the body' (Lewis, 1944: 1). This metaphor apparently originates in William 
Harvey's (1578-1657) prelectiones - notes to be read aloud by the author 
during public dissections (Wilson, 1987: 62). It should be noted, however, that 
although Harvey observed and conceptualised the action of the heart in 
mechanical, or more accurately, in hydraulic terms, in his view the heart only 
'accidentally' resembled a pump (Plochmann, 1963: 209). Developing an 
Aristotelian methodology, Harvey drew his premises from 'one subject matter 
at a time ... [and thus] ... would not prove conclusions about hearts from 
premises about pumps, or conclusions about blood from premises about divine 
spirits' (Plochmann, 1963: 209). However, Sawday (1996: 23) argues that 
Harvey's, like Aristotle's, was a theory of correspondence, and as such, 
'features observed within the body were held to replicate features to be seen in 
the world at large'. It seems unreasonable to suggest then, as Plochmann 
(1963) does, that Harvey's conceptualisation of the action ofthe heart was not 
at least partially informed by an already established knowledge, or at least 
awareness,ofhydraulics. As Harvey was primarily concerned with 
establishing a theory ofthe movement of blood, it can be argued that he was 
actively seeking an explanatory mechanism that would account adequately for 
this; therefore a pump seems a likely metaphor to choose. Indeed, Pouchelle 
(1999: 103-104) notes that, prior to Harvey, mediaeval surgeons commonly 
drew upon the 'mechanical arts' - for example, architecture - to explain the 
inner workings of the human body in terms of 'engines', that is, 'cunning 
techniques' (Pouchelle, 1999: 104-106). It is important to note that while the 
heart is metaphorised in mechanical terms, this is not to say that the heart is, at 
this point in history, considered machine-like. Harvey's was a hydraulic 
economy and, as such, is distinct from later, industrial economies; for example, 
that ofthe nineteenth century (Asendorf, 1993; Rabinbach, 1992). 
Harvey's epistemological position was already established within a specific 
(Christian) tradition of thought and practice, a tradition which had at its centre 
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an 'organicist conception of society based on bodily metaphors' (Le Goff, 1989: 
13). As such, the body represented the larger social system, and objects within 
that system were in turn taken to represent parts of the body. Further to this, 
Pouchelle (1999: 195-197) asks how metaphorical representations could 
coexist with anatomical knowledge, and why the progress of the latter did not 
effect the death ofthe former. Her answer is that to see is immediately to 
interpret, and that to interpret is to draw upon a stock of socially prescribed, 
deeply embedded images. 
Thus dissection, far from dealing the deathblow to metaphor, used it as a 
jumping-off point, and afterwards, for anatomical knowledge progressed via a 
complex and almost incomprehensible dialectic of visual perception and 
mental images deeply rooted in language. [my emphasis] 
(Pouchelle, 1999: 196) 
The early anatomists, struggling to make sense of 'the chaos of the human 
interior, [the] mad confusion of unidentified tissues' (Pouchelle, 1999: 196), 
saw what they wanted or expected to see. If what the early anatomists saw 
when they opened up a few corpses (Foucault, 2003) was 'almost 
incomprehensible', it was not only because the interior ofthe body was a 
muddle of barely distinguishable parts, but also that their thoughts were not 
immediately able to organize what they saw. 
The Anatomy Theatre: From Corpse to Corpus 
Boyd Hill (1965) writes that, according to at least one mediaeval school of 
thought, the heart was perceived as the seat of vital forces - it is where the 
spirit resides, and is thus conceived as a house (Hill, 1965: 73). Blood flows 
from this house, through the conduits ofthe arterial system, filling the body 
with spirit, and thus the heart is the animating 'matter' of the body. Noting that 
the word 'record' derives from 'cor', the Latin for heart, Jager (1996: 2-3) 
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identifies the mediaeval heart as the literal site of memory, and as such is 
equated with interiority, or the innermost self. To speak from the heart is to 
speak the truth of oneself. The heart is then a book ofthe self. Text and heart 
are intertwined, and it is therefore impossible to think of the heart without 
recourse to a long history of association that can be traced far back in history; 
'and today if we still refer to learning texts by heart, to writing down records [it 
is] because we speak a language inherited from the Middle Ages' (Jager, 1996: 
26). 
Aside from being 'resolutely bound to ancient [medical] texts' (Siraisi, 1997: 
1), the study of human anatomy in the Middle Ages was subordinated to a 
religious (Christian) text, which prohibited experimental research. Thus, 
'perception [of the body] was submitted to a textual meaning that controlled the 
gaze' (Gil, 1998: 220). While discussion of mediaeval conceptions ofthe body 
is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is enough to say that although anatomical 
investigation was constrained by religious ideology, the body was nevertheless 
positioned centre-stage for what was to become the spectacle of its 
anatomisation: 
[T]hey undertake with their own hands to probe and examine more profoundly 
in man and the rest of the animals those things that were handed down to 
them. 
(Vesalius, in Siraisi, 1997: 32) 
Despite anatomical dissection's association with the illicit - 'an association 
resulting from the use of executed criminals as subjects [and] the low esteem in 
which surgeons, who touched the body, were held' (Wilson, 1987: 68) - the 
practice of dissection became increasingly ritualised and spectacular, often 
accompanied by banquets, theatrical performances and concerts. Anatomical 
dissection as spectacle reached its peak in the public demonstrations of 
Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564), who was arguably as much a showman as he 
was a remarkable anatomist, and one whose 'touch' animated the corpse and 
made of it a body of knowledge. Dispensing with the services of the usual 
assistants, Vesalius dissected and lectured simultaneously, cutting into, 
pointing at and discoursing on what he revealed of the body. 
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The title page to De Humanis Corporis Fabrica (1543) [see following page] 
presents the viewer with a representation of early medicinal secularisation. 
Indeed, it has been suggested that the publication of the Fabrica 'mark[ ed] the 
beginning of modem science' (Saunders and O'Malley, 1973: 19). The 
illustration, a woodcut, is an outstanding example of sixteenth-century 
engraving, 'executed with a skill and craftsmanship of the highest order' 
(Saunders and O'Malley, 1973: 42). 
The illustration, which could just as easily be of a theatrical scene, presents 
Vesalius, slightly to the left of centre-stage, in the process of revealing a 
womb. Interestingly, in the history of western theatre, stage-left, the sinister 
side, is traditionally reserved for the entry of devils and villains (Nagler, 1952). 
This is perhaps a minor point, but given that the artist is believed to have 
'deliberately diminished Vesalius' actual stature' in order to create the effect of 
the anatomist being engulfed by the crowd (Wilson 1987: 71), one may wonder 
ifhis contemporaries did not hold Vesalius in similarly low esteem to that of 
the mediaeval anatomists. 
The illustration depicts an outdoor scene, evident in the plants clinging to the 
arch on the left. Perhaps this refers to the public nature of the spectacle, or it 
may suggest that anatomical dissection, not at this point fully respectable, yet 
awaits entry to the academy. Vesalius, sUlTounded by his students and fellow 
physicians, and representatives of the nobility and church, is half-turned toward 
the viewer while his hands are engaged in demonstration. (I will return to the 
issue of the gaze of Vesalius momentarily, for it is a matter of some 
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significance.) Unusually, he is discoursing, not, as is traditional, ex cathedra, 
but instead/i-om the cadaver, thus indicating a break with authority. He has 
dispensed with the services of the dissector and the ostensor, relegating them to 
a position beneath the table where they are seen, apparently quarrelling. In the 
foreword to the Fabrica, Vesalius comments on the decline of medicine, 
observing that physicians lost their 'practical acquaintance' with anatomy 
because they left the manual work to others (Saunders and O'Malley, 1973: 
42). The robed figures in the foreground represent the 'golden age' of antiquity. 
That they stand on the same level as Vesalius indicates the anatomist's 
aspirations to respectability: 'there is ground for hope that anatomy will ere 
long be cultivated in all of our academies as it was of old in Alexandria' 
(Vesalius, in Saunders and O'Malley, 1973: 42). This 'dynamic confrontation 
between living and dead authority' (Sawday, 1996: 66) is illustrated also by the 
presence of the monkey and the dog (foreground, left and right), which are 
symbolic ofthe older, Galenic tradition- Galen (129-199 AD) drew inferences 
about humans from his study of animal anatomy. Sawday (1996), and Wilson 
(1987) point out that Vesalius would probably have vivisected the animals at 
the end ofthe lesson for purposes of comparison. Wilson (1987: 71) comments 
that, 'still living, they are members of the audience', the monkey seemingly 
watching the dissection, the dog possibly looking for scraps to eat, and thus, 
'both in different senses behaving like men', are superior to the men quarrelling 
beneath the table. The suggestion that an animal is like a human, merely 
because it is looking for food, is, I believe, an unsupportable reading of the 
illustration. 
The nude figure clinging to the column on the left represents the importance of 
surface anatomy, while the skeleton at the centre is of course the very 
foundation upon which the human body is formed, and quite properly occupies 
a position of authority, suspended above the dissection, for Vesalius insisted 
that the study of anatomy must begin with the bones (Saunders and O'Malley, 
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1973: 42). The scene is comprised oflittle spectacles that constitute 'rival 
visual centres of anatomical information' (Wilson 1987: 71). For example, the 
slashed hose of the man standing on the extreme right could be taken for the 
muscles of the leg, as could the brocaded arm of the man three figures to his 
left, all of which 'givers] the peculiar sense that [the] body is permeable to 
vision' (Wilson, 1987: 71). All bodies, live and dead, clothed and naked, man 
and animal, are 'potential subjects of dissection, and all share with the cadaver 
the anatomising gaze ofthe onlookers' (Wilson, 1987: 71). 
The illustration perfectly exemplifies the new Renaissance principle of 
aesthetics, which was that art should faithfully represent its subject matter. 
This principle 'required that the artist acquaint himself with the structure and 
physical properties of natural phenomena in order to insure objectivity and 
with the rules of perspective and mathematics in order to obtain 
representational correctness' (Saunders and O'Malley, 1973: 22). Mathematics, 
a system of 'anonymous signs, by rights useable and comprehensible for 
everyone' (Gil, 1998: 218), challenges the hermeticism of arcane knowledge, 
which can only be read by initiates. Additionally, as Sawday (1996: 73) notes, 
the structural elements of architecture are founded upon the dimensions of the 
human body, thus the illustration provides an example of correspondence 
between art and reality, or between the human-made and the natural world. 
Despite the apparent chaos of the scene, it is unified by the vertical axis, which 
draws the eye from cadaver to Vesalius, and to the skeleton, all enclosed within 
the precisely rendered Corinthian columns. In this aesthetic correspondence 
between the body and science we find the origins of 'modem' rationalism. 
The path that leads to the new scientific gaze had been traversed for a long 
time by the representational technique that painters discovered: perspective. 
In overturning mediaeval iconography, it introduced precise tools; perspective 
analysed space, separated bodies, de-sacralised nature. The exactitude of the 
plates in the Fabrica are instances of the powers of the new gaze. [They] are 
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not just illustrations, additions to the text; rather they bring an irreplaceable 
dimension to scientific work - more than a 'reminder', as Vesalius says, they 
are an instrument of analysis, and, as such, they contribute to the installation 
of a knowledge. 
(Gil, 1998: 221) 
Returning to the illustration, this complex scene, in keeping with the time, 'a 
brassily strident age' (Saunders and O'Malley, 1973: 42), is worthy oflengthier 
discussion, but I must restrict myself to the exploration of two points: the 
public nature of the anatomy lesson and the focusing of the 'anatomical gaze', 
by which the flesh is opened 'to the experience of the eyes' (Turner, 1990: 8); 
and the animation ofthe cadaver - the bringing to life of death - and the 
consequent re-textualisation of the body. 
Earlier depictions of anatomical dissection (see following page) were static in 
comparison to that of the Vesalian scene. Usually, as in the image reproduced 
here, the physician is observed, elevated, lecturing from an ancient, 
authoritative text, while the dissector and the ostensor work on the cadaver 
below, all arranged in 'a hierarchical presentation of knowledge' (Sawday, 
1996: 65). Generally, few others are depicted. The anatomising gaze is thus 
restricted to a few, and originates in the book, the authoritative text. But, in the 
Vesalian scene, we are witness to what seems like 'the sudden eruption of a 
crowd into the anatomy theatre' (Sawday, 1996: 66). The formerly private, 
esoteric gaze of medicine is herein made public. Both Sawday (1996) and 
Wilson (1997) concur that the Vesalian scene is an 'idealisation', but Gil (1998: 
223) states that the subject ofthe demonstration, the womb, would have 
attracted an interested crowd, and therefore the illustration is a realistic 
depiction of an actual event. That the womb should attract so much attention is 
significant in that 'the question "where do children come from?" is the 
foundation ofthe desire for knowledge' (Gil, 1998: 224). 
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Yet this belly only shows organs, and the open womb will only bring out. .. the 
Fabrica itself, that is, medical knowledge. [ ... J It has given birth, by 
Caesarean section, to a science. 
(Gil, 1998: 224) 
The central positioning of the skeleton immediately above (perhaps touching) 
the womb is of great significance. The body, from birth to death, is situated 
within a mathematical, 'uterocentric' (Sawday, 1996: 71) universe, its entrance 
and exit from the world metaphorically contained within the conjunctional 
image of the womb and the tomb: 
What is represented is no less than a demonstration of the structured 
coherence of the universe itself, whose central component - the principle of 
life concealed within the womb - Vesalius is about to open to our gaze. 
(Sawday, 1996: 70) 
Sawday (1996: 215) comments that the identity of woman, in anatomical 
investigation, is defined entirely by her uterus. As Laqueur (1992), among 
others, (Petersen, 1998; Shildrick and Price, 1994), has noted, within the binary 
categorisation ofthe two-sex model, the male body is affirmed as the standard, 
and thus the female is implicitly inferior. Sex was not simply an ontological 
category, but was in fact distinctly sociological (Laqueur, 1992: 8). However, 
it could be said that while the cadaver ofthe woman in the Fabrica is the 
'unquestioned font of authority, enforced by the lordly skeleton that presides 
over the scene' (Laqueur, 1992: 72), her sex is immaterial: it is only the body 
that matters. Laqueur (1992: 74) states that the availability of bodies, and not 
sexual politics, determined the sex of the generic cadaver. Yet, almost two 
hundred years after Vesalius, in 1734, Bernhard Albinus, who produced the 
definitive illustration of the human skeleton, lamented that 'we lack a female 
skeleton' (Schiebinger, 1986). Additionally, in later editions ofthe Fabrica, 
the woman's body is further eroticised, posed suggestively at the feet of a 
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clearly male skeleton (cloaked and holding a scythe - the grim reaper, no less). 
As Birke (1999: 115-116) notes, by the nineteenth century, a recurrent theme 
of medical illustration was the 'beautiful but dead young woman lying draped 
suggestively on a mortuary table'. 
What Vesalius brings to the practice of anatomical dissection is the 
'perfonnative" (Wilson, 1987: passim): that is, he animates the body with his 
touch so that his and the dead body are almost indistinguishable. Thus, a 
drama of life and death is played out in the anatomy theatre, and 'the gaze no 
longer has to bend itselfto the meaning dictated by the written work' (Gil, 
1998: 220). No longer ostensive, the anatomist's role is now presentative: 'the 
'body' the anatomist shows is both his own and that of the cadaver' (Wilson, 
1981987: 69). It is as ifVesalius says to us: "Look, here it is", rather than the 
anatomists who read the body from a book and declared, "There it is". Life 
and death are intertwined in the presentation and representation of the body. 
Anatomising the dead body, Vesalius presents the viewer with an 
understanding oflife. The frontispiece to the Fabrica (see following page) 
illustrates this point more effectively. 
Here, Vesalius is seen holding, not pointing at, the flayed arm of a corpse. The 
upright posture of the corpse - for the purpose of more effective display -
suggests an equality or lack of distinction between anatomist and his subject. 
That the corpse seems taller than Vesalius could imply that it is possessed of a 
greater authority than he (Wilson, 1987: 69), and therefore it could be said that 
it gives - or hands - its secrets to Vesalius. In this sense the body is implicated 
in its own anatomisation. 
In bringing the body to life, Vesalius establishes the 'life of science' (Gil, 1998: 
222), which is to say that death is exorcised from the body, and thus the proper 
subject of medicine becomes life instead; 'a life detached from the forces of 
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nature, whose bodily functions will be progressively assimilated to 
physiochemical processes' (Gil, 1998: 222). It is not, then, the corpse that is 
the object of medicine, as Foucault (2003: 124) asserts when he states that the 
dead body is the 'first principle of positivity'. Death is effectively separated 
from the body by the gaze of medicine, reconstituting its forces in the text of 
scientific knowledge (Gil, 1998: 222). 
The opening up of bodies in theatres of anatomy is an attempt to understand 
not only the body, but also the larger structure to which it corresponds, for 'the 
human body [is] seen metaphorically as the microcosm of the macrocosm' 
(Turner, 1995b: 27). As the foundation oflife itself, the body is more than 
metaphor. The body, opened by medical science as a subj ect of investigation 
and knowledge, later becomes closed to the experiencing subject, which is to 
say that the body is appropriated, and made a thing of parts, by medical 
science, which, as an agent of social forces, determines or at least constrains 
embodied modalities, that is, ways of being and having bodies. Additionally, 
medical science determines the language of embodiment, through which is 
expressed the being and having of a body. Such language therefore diminishes 
our capacity to understand our bodies (and embodiment) in anything other than 
medicalised terms. 
Sawday (1996) and Turner (1990; 1995) describe a political economy of 
anatomical dissection in which the body, laid open in order to reveal its secrets, 
is circumscribed by a moral discourse that supports an ethic of world-mastery 
(Turner, 1990: 4). As the production of a 'masculine discourse of science and 
reason' (Sawday, 1996: 230), anatomical dissection is not only concerned with 
mapping the body's interior; it is also an attempt to consolidate and exercise 
authority over irrational, feminine, nature (Sawday, 1996: 245; Turner, 1990: 
13). Laqueur (1995) and Sawday (1996) trace a detailed genealogy, which 
situates the creation ofthis new type of body firmly in the seventeenth century. 
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It is at this point, they argue, that the language of science becomes less veiled, 
less metaphorical, in the attempt, by scientists, to get at the thing itself, that is, 
the body, and by extension, society. Yet, the body, in the seventeenth century, 
is increasingly analogised in terms ofthe mode of production (for example, see 
Hobbes' comments on the circulation - again a hydraulic metaphor - of 
money). The anatomist Walter Charleton, in furthering William Harvey's 
efforts, conceived of the heart in terms of it having an 'office with work to 
perform within the larger structure of a mechanical process' (Sawday, 1996: 
243). The circulation of blood, in this analogy, represents the circulation of 
money, the lifeblood of a newly emergent system of commerce - capitalism. 
The body thus remains machine-like in that it mirrors the machinery of state 
bureaucracy. 
The heart of animals is the foundation of their life, the sovereign of everything 
within them, the sun of their microcosm, that upon which all growth depends, 
from which all power proceeds. The King, in like manner, is the foundation 
of his kingdom, the sun of the world around him, the heart of the republic, the 
fountain whence all power, all grace doth flow. 
(Harvey, in Rothman et aI., 1995: 68-69) 
According to Sawday (1996: 245) science developed, at this point, a 'stridently 
aggressive language from which it has never recovered'. Further to this point, 
Emily Martin (1991) discusses how culture shapes scientific description, that 
metaphors of aggression (male) and passivity (female) are embedded in the 
language of medicine, and as such, serve to naturalise social practices. It is not 
then the body of which science speaks; rather, it is the socio-economic 
inequalities ofthe larger social system that are projected onto the body. The 
anatomist is then the guardian not only of knowledge, but also of power 
(Turner, 1990: 13). Despite certain philosophers' disdain for metaphors - for 
example, Hobbes, who thought that metaphors 'openly profess deceit', and must 
therefore not be admitted to reason (Hobbes, in Sawday, 1996: 235) - the body, 
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as a medical object, held to be 'the paradigmatic figure of truth' (Leder, 1990: 
45), retained its capacity for macro cosmic correspondence. 
The body, its contents 'secret. .. hidden and dangerous' (Donne, in Sawday, 
1999: 159) is, in illness, a 'place of treachery' (Sawday, 1996: 159). Conceived 
as an architectural trope, the body is, in its familiar immediacy, home-like (or 
homely), and simultaneously its opposite, unheimlich (Sawday, 1999: 159-
162). But, in order to construct this metaphor, the body must first be 
deconstructed and 'imagined as a scattering of parts' (Sawday, 1999: 160), 
before it can be considered a composite entity. Quite simply, this means that in 
order to consider the integrity of the body as a whole one must be able to think 
of it also in terms of its integral parts. A specific awareness of the heart as 
lacking in integrity will then undermine the feeling of wholeness, and the body 
will thus be considered incomplete, strange and uncanny. The following 
interview extracts illustrate this sense of the uncanny, of the moment when 
body and machine, or body and other become indistinguishable, and raises the 
question: '[ w ]here, now, are the bounds of body-property which the anatomists 
struggled so hard to establish?' (Sawday, 1996: 267). 
"The surgeon said I'd probably tick afterwards, but he said it quite jokily and I 
didn't think much of it. But the first week after surgery my heart was ticking 
so noisily, and it seemed so erratic that I kept thinking there was something 
wrong. By the time they sent me home it had quietened down a little, and the 
ticking became very regular, like a clock. That disturbed me even more. It's 
funny how we sometimes call it a ticker, you know, and now it really is a 
ticker ... it's like a constant reminder of the time ... oftime running out." 
(Frank,68) 
"I have a pig's valve now, and when I tell people they ask if! 'oink'. It's 
funny, I keep wondering how long pigs live." 
(Kate, 75) 
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Far from quieting our anxieties, medical science has 'succeeded only in 
introducing new manifestations ofthe fear of interiority' (Sawday, 1996: 267). 
While medical conceptions of the body could be said to determine, if not 
dominate everyday understanding, medical science operates within a larger, 
cultural framework - as we have seen, in the correspondence theories of the 
surgeons and anatomists of the Renaissance - and therefore further 
examination of cultural association is required. 
By way of an aside, it should be noted that Hobbes's hostility to the abuse and 
misuse of language (catachresis) is characteristic of seventeenth century 
philosophy in its concern with transparency, with representing social reality in 
realistic - that is, objective - terms (Stillman, 1995: 791-792). 
[Metaphors] are capable of inventing the most fantastic entities by dint of the 
positional power inherent in language. They can dismember the texture of 
reality and reassemble it in the most capricious of ways [and] in the most 
unnatural shapes. 
(De Man, in Stillman, 1995: 792) 
Metaphor then, in the seventeenth century, is a potential source of 
embarrassment, because of its association with subjective fancy and passion. 
Yet metaphor, this 'monstrous rebel to linguistic law' (Stillman, 1995: 792), has 
a constitutive role in Hobbes's (and others') philosophy: what else is his 
'artificial man' if not a metaphor? Leviathan is a monster created to do battle 
with the monstrous abuse of thought, yet a 'discursive victory over metaphor 
[can] only occur outside of language altogether' (Stillman, 1995: 793), that is, 
either within the positivist dream of an uncontaminated objectivity (affective 
neutrality), or 'in the design of a pious magic to create a discourse in which 
words have the power to become incarnate as things, as the very fulfilment of 
desire' [emphasis in original] (Stillman, 1995: 793). I will return to the 
question of the objectivity oflanguage in chapter four, but in concluding this 
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discussion of anatomical dissection, I turn to another image that represents the 
emergent spirit of modem capitalism. 
The Anatomy Lesson of Dr Tuip, 1632 
The anatomy lesson portrayed here could hardly be more different to the unruly 
Vesalian scene. Here we see a return to the reading of the body from a text. 
The anatomist is restored to the chair of authority, and the spectators appear as 
the bourgeoisie of a mercantile, Protestant society, 'wealthy surgeons . .. 
representatives of an intellectual elite' (Sawday, 1996: 150). The cadaver, this 
time male - Adriaen Adriaenszoon, convicted of stealing a coat - 'is the matrix 
of a demonstration of civic and corporate power' (Sawday, 1996: 150). 
Equally the painting represents 'a discourse about medical and bourgeois 
authority over the disruptive forces of human disease, frailty and error' (Turner, 
1990: 11), in which the social, or civic, body triumphs over death (Sawday, 
1996: 150). 
The scene is an idealisation, for the hand would not have been the fIrst part to 
be anatomised. The hand is that which differentiates the human (from the 
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animal) as a creative, productive being. As such, it represents a corporeal 
reality, reminding us of life rather than death. It was a hand that stole the coat, 
therefore its dissection - an extreme and rational violence (Sawday, 1996: 153) 
- may be considered a further punishment. Anatomical dissection, in this 
example, is a distinctively Protestant response to deviance, to the recalcitrant 
will of the criminal, who reminds us that the rational, Cartesian mind is 
susceptible to potentially disruptive desires. The anatomist probes 
Adriaenszoon's flexor muscles, his dead fingers made to curl, an action 
indicated by the anatomist's left hand, and thus the 'Cartesian truth of. .. order 
and rationality' (Sawday, 1996: 153) is re-established in this demonstration of 
the mechanics of the body. The anatomy lesson is a punishment. What is 
punishment ifnot a lesson? It is the application of scientific reason to the 
unruly, frighteningly natural body. But, at the same time, it is more than that, 
for opening up the body is an attempt to know oneself, and in so doing, to 
know God - cognito sui, cognito dei. Dr Tulp's anatomy lesson is, above all, a 
metaphor of Calvinist self-examination. 
While the history of science and the rational-scientific 'discovery' of the body-
which was part ofa larger discovery of the laws of nature (Geyer-Kordesch, 
1989) - is a fascinating and very important topic, it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to further investigate this history. 
Medical science focuses on the unpredictability, or irrationality ofthe body, yet 
'at the core of modem medical practice is the Cartesian revelation: the living 
body can be treated as essentially no different from a machine' [emphasis in 
original] (Leder, 1998: 121). The informants in this study have certainly 
experienced the 'irrationality ofa heart gone crazy' (Birke, 1999: 115). The 
'bag of worms' effect of ventricular fibrillation, the wild contractions of the 
heart's 'walls' during infarction, the 'furring' of occluded arteries, speak of an 
organ that has yet to be tamed by rational science. The metaphor of the heart 
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as a pump sustains the image of a fairly simple organ, one that is both 
industrial and domestic. Yet, the heart is perceived as so much more than that. 
It is the very ambiguity of the metaphorical heart that connects the emotional 
and the rational. 
Myth and metaphor 
The signifier of myth presents itself in an ambiguous way: it is at the same 
time meaning and form, full on one side and empty on the other. As meaning, 
the signifier already postulates a reading ... 
(Barthes,2000: 117) 
The body, ultimately, cannot be grasped through its metaphorical extensions, 
but the value of metaphor in understanding experience is made clear by 
Johnson (1987), Kirmayer (1992), Lakoffand Johnson (2003), and Stelter 
(2000). Metaphorical conceptualisation plays an important role in defining 
reality, for as Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 77) explain, 'metaphorical concepts 
[ are] ways of partially structuring one experience in terms of another'. But, 
such concepts 'have little to do with objective reality, if there is such a thing' 
[my emphasis] (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 184). This is to say that metaphors 
are devices for understanding, and are not identical with the reality they are 
employed to explain. 
The fact that our conceptual system is inherently metaphorical, the fact that 
we understand the world, think, and function in metaphorical terms, and the 
fact that metaphors can not be merely understood but can be meaningful as 
well- these facts all suggest that an adequate account of meaning and truth 
can only be based on understanding. 
(Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 184) 
112 
'Fact', 'world', 'truth': clearly, Lakoff and Johnson (2003) do not deny the 
existence of an objective world. Rather, metaphor is the principal interpretive 
device mediating between the experiencing person and the experienced world. 
That is to say, metaphor is constitutive of ordinary experience. To state that 
metaphors have little to do with 'objective reality' is similar to Butler's (1998: 
279) observation that 'the linguistic effect is not the same as the referent it fails 
to capture'. This raises the issue of the value of using metaphor as an 
explanatory tool in that disparities between the phenomenon (the topic) and its 
metaphorical referent (the vehicle) may be discounted purely in order to make 
the metaphor work. For example, in chapter two I cited an informant who 
stated that being in hospital was, at times, just like ER. The significant 
question then is: how much like ER? What I am suggesting is that, because it 
is not identical with its object, there is inevitably a gap between the experience 
of the world and its description. 
Metaphors are one-sided analogies in which salient features of the vehicle are 
applied to the topic in order to make its latent features conspicuous. This 
asymmetry is made clear if I say that a heart is a pump, but a pump is not a 
heart. Perhaps in establishing what something is like, and therefore by 
determining what it is not like, it may eventually be possible to get to the heart 
of the matter. However, the purely linguistic approach to the comprehension of 
bodily experience is inevitably confounded by the privileging oftextuality, 
which is to say that language describes words more effectively than it does 
things (Barthes, 2000). Therefore, metaphor never quite manages to capture 
the sensuous vitality of the body. 
Stelter (2000: 64) advocates a distinctly non-objectivist approach to the 
description of bodily experience wherein the experiencing subject and the 
environment 'are understood as interrelated, or better, co-dependent' [emphasis 
in original]. He suggests that bodily experience does not easily find its 
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correlate in an objectively verifiable reality. The 'tacit dimension' (Polanyi, in 
Stelter, 2000: 68) of experiential and bodily-based knowledge is inaccessible 
and therefore cannot be communicated in the usual manner, through the use of 
language. In normal communication, Stelter (2000: 69) argues, the unique 
aspect ofthe individual's meaning system, the 'personal content', is a 'felt 
meaning', which cannot realistically be communicated. But, in stating that this 
personal content 'evolves from the subject's own history and experience, and as 
such, is influenced by the social, cultural and economic basis of society', Stelter 
(2000: 69) appears to contradict himself when he admits that all 
communication is a matter of negotiation between perspectives, and within a 
context. Communication is a drawing upon of shared resources, and as such it 
is a reciprocated negotiation, which is only to say that meaning cannot be 
determined in isolation. 
Although he does not distinguish between 'personal content' and 'personal 
narrative', Stelter (2000: 69) admits that the process of negotiation effects the 
creation of a 'more broadly accepted narrative', which is influenced, ifnot 
determined by the 'power structure of the social context'. This last statement is 
useful if it can be applied to descriptions of bodily experience, or 'felt 
meaning', because it permits an understanding of the ways in which power 
'goes to work' on the body, a detail which Howson and Inglis (2001: 312) argue 
is missing from a phenomenologically inflected sociology of the body. In 
order to obviate the problem of incommunicability, Stelter (2000: 70) applies 
Gendlin's (1981) method of bridging the gap between 'empirically based 
knowledge and discursive knowledge by the use of imagination', which 
transforms 'felt meaning' (implicit and pre-reflexive) into a specifically 
structured language by way of images and metaphors (explicit analogues). 
For example, if a patient is asked by her doctor, 'what's the pain like?', she 
might respond thus: 
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"It was a metallic pain, like chewing silver paper, like my teeth were being 
pushed out. Then it was a jaggy feeling down my neck, like wee pins jagging 
me." 
(Elizabeth, 68) 
"Did the doctor understand you?" 
"Yes, he took notes, and he said it could be angina." 
"But he already knew you had heart trouble?" 
"Yes, he suspected as much." 
Couched in such imaginative tenns, the pain of angina is imaginable, and 
communicable: indeed, we can feel it, or something like it, with her. Yet 
angina could just as easily present itself differently, and be described 
otherwise. The infonnant draws upon the experience of something else -
chewing silver paper, the sharpness of pins - to convey her pain experience, 
which is identified with that of angina. The question of whether or not she felt 
the pain differently as she experienced it is answered by Lakoff and Johnson 
(2003: 57), who state that 'it can be misleading to ... speak of direct physical 
experience as though there were some core of immediate experience which we 
then 'interpret' in tenns of our conceptual system'. Pain can therefore be 
experienced differently. There is no pain that exists objectively, no pain of 
angina. Only the pain of the experience of angina. This is what Lakoff and 
Johnson (2003) mean when they say that metaphorical concepts have little to 
do with an 'objective reality'. The sense and communicability ofthe 
infonnant's description is dependent upon the doctor's experience or knowledge 
of what it is like to chew silver paper. As such, perhaps the tenn 'objective 
reality' should be placed within inverted commas. Or perhaps it should be 
replaced by the tenn 'shared reality'. 
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In the following extract, responding to the question of how fatigue was felt, an 
infonnant is describing his experience of a weekly round of golf with friends. 
"It got to the point I was so out of breath I couldn't keep up with the rest. I'd 
tell them to walk on while I caught my breath, and I'd stop for a bit, but I 
couldn't really catch my breath at all. I'd calm down a bit and then I'd catch 
up with them. Then I'd go through the whole thing again, stopping and 
starting. I felt I was really letting them down, but Ijust couldn't keep up. [ ... ] 
We kept it up for a few weeks, but I had to give it a miss eventually. I had to 
stop playing." 
(Andrew, 66) 
"Was this always a problem? Was it only on the golf course that you 
experienced this type of breathlessness?" 
"No, no. I was breathless a lot of the time. It was worse there, though. [ ... ] 
Well, maybe not. But it felt worse there. We were always a four for golf, 
every Saturday for a long time. I think that's when I felt it most. That's when 
it really bothered me. Falling behind like that. .. always feeling I had to catch 
up." 
Here, the problem of fatigue is described in tenns of shortness of breath. The 
infonnant's feeling of inadequacy is expressed by the word, 'catching' -
'catching breath' and 'catching up'. His subjective, bodily feeling (catching his 
breath) correlates with the objective reality of not being able to keep up with 
his companions. Thus, the 'tacit dimension' of experience is rendered more 
explicit by the metaphorical 'bridging' (Stelter, 2000) of the gap between a 
seemingly private feeling, of inadequacy or incompetence, and a more 
obviously social problem, that is, ofletting his friends down. 'Felt meaning' 
and the social context are therefore quite clearly interrelated. 
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When Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 185-194) state that 'truth is always relative to 
a conceptual system, that any human conceptual system is mostly metaphorical 
in nature, and that, therefore, there is no fully objective, unconditional, or 
absolute truth' [my emphasis], they do not subscribe to a radical subjectivist 
epistemology. Rather, treating both subjectivism and objectivism as 'myths', 
which effectively oppose and negate each other, they espouse that which they 
refer to as an experiential alternative, founded upon the 'experientialist myth' 
(Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 186). The term 'myth' is not applied derogatorily, 
but in a loosely Durkheimian sense, in that myths provide 'ways of 
comprehending experience; they give order to our lives' (Lakoff and Johnson, 
2003: 185). Myth, according to Lakoffand Johnson (2003: 185-186), is the 
overarching system ofthought, while metaphor is the tool employed to bring 
thought to bear upon its objects, although at times it seems as ifmyth and 
metaphor are conflated, or at least reduced to simile. 
Metaphors are realistic in that they must refer to something that is relevant to 
the topic, so, for example, to think of the heart as a pump, the heart must have 
features that are similar to a pump. It would be of no use to think of the heart 
as having features similar to, for example, an umbrella, for this just would not 
work. Therefore, a metaphor must find its correlate in experientially real and 
relevant objects. But, what is it about the heart that leads Harvey to the 
analogy of a pump? What I am trying to suggest is that the motion of the heart 
is inexplicable until a referent, a metaphorical association, can be found. 
Therefore, metaphors are actively sought as a means of understanding the 
world. What if there were no pumps in existence and Harvey had said that the 
heart is like an umbrella? Would that metaphor have endured because he had 
the power, the scientific authority, to make his meaning prevail? Would he 
have looked at hearts until he found a resemblance to an umbrella? 
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Lakoff and Johnson's (2003) theory of myth and metaphor points to the ways in 
which linguistic communities - for example, medical practitioners - and 
individuals (such as patients) employ language that is drawn from the wider 
social system. Thus, metanarratives and individual narratives draw from each 
other and from external sources. The metaphorical description of the pain of 
angina as something like 'chewing silver paper' was readily interpreted by the 
doctor, although, suspecting an underlying heart problem, he brought his own 
cultural presuppositions to bear upon the topic. He was therefore able to match 
one set of metaphors with another to arrive at a conclusion, which, in the end, 
was correct. 
What Lakoff and Johnson's (2003) work reveals, more than anything else, is 
that objectivism remains the dominant paradigm, and as such, their 
(objectivist's) metaphors can be presented as objective reality. Finding 
correlation between the patient's description of pain, and his understanding of 
pains, the doctor was able to arrive at the 'objective reality' of angina. 
Laurence Kirmayer's (1992) essay on metaphor as presentation and 
representation in illness experience begins with the rather odd statement that 
the tum to the body, in reality (that is, outside the rarefied sphere of academic 
abstraction), 'represents a longing for community' (Kirmayer, 1992: 324). The 
reason for this longing is that the world of 'substance and feeling' is 'unmade' 
by a hyper-rationalism that ignores the significance of 'felt meaning' and, as 
such, divorces ideas from agents, or thoughts from bodies. In addition, the 
postmodern decontextualization of knowledge and value neglects the historical 
trajectory of human expressivity, and as such, divorces communication from its 
textual and 'communal ground' (Kirmayer, 1992: 323-324). Humans are then 
isolated between two extremes, of objectivist abstraction and of subjectivist 
relativism, both of which 'negate the [felt] meaning of the individual' 
(Kirmayer, 1992: 324). Again the problem oflanguage is raised when 
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Kinnayer (1992: 324) asks: 'how can we say the body is "so-and-so", when that 
knowledge is worked out through language that imposes its own structure on 
experience and thought?'. This effectively reduces the ability of the 'sufferer' 
to express and understand the meaning of illness: body and text co-exist in a 
relationship of 'epistemological circularity' (Kinnayer, 1992: 324) in which 
language closes off the self-understanding of the body and, in return, the body 
eludes textual explanation. (In short, there is no language without the body, 
and no body without language.) Developing this point, and as a corrective to 
the structuralist privileging of text over experience, Kinnayer (1992: 324-325) 
notes that body and text exist in a dialectical relationship, that 'text [ s] stand for 
a hard-won rational order, imposed on thought through the careful composition 
of writing, [but] the body provides a structure to thought that is, in part, extra-
rational and disorderly'. Meaning resides not only in relationships between 
concepts, but is grounded in bodily experience and practice (Kinnayer, 1992: 
334-335). Bodies, as Mauss (1979) notes, are skilled in practice, and it is this 
skilfulness, in the fonn of 'body techniques', that structures our apprehension 
and understanding of the world. For example, the person who walks the same 
streets every day knows their every (relevant) feature, but when one day a 
slight incline causes the feeling of breathlessness, then the practised walker 
knows that something is wrong. A new technique is thus required in order to 
circumvent this problem. The development of this technique does not require a 
linguistic intervention, although it may be thought in tenns such as, 'I'll walk 
more slowly', or, 'I'll find another route'. 
Imag[in]ing the heart 
[I]n the domain of perceptual apprehension, images belong so fundamentally 
to the structure of the phenomenon that to attend to the phenomena (as the 
things themselves) requires a correlative attending to the relevant imaging. 
(Sallis, 1995: 64) 
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Returning to the matter of the heart, Guillemin (2004) provides some insight 
into the ways in which patients represent their hearts (and disease) pictorially, 
and in so doing more effectively communicate the different modes of being 
that are experienced in illness. Like Herzlich (1973), Guillemin (2004: 224) 
notes that illness (in this instance, heart disease) is not a single entity, but is 
characteristically diverse, and thus not experienced in the same way by 
everyone. Guillemin (2004) is specifically concerned with drawing as a 
process of telling the story of illness, a process which is comprised of an 
'assemblage of cultural metaphors, biomedical knowledge and lived experience' 
(Guillemin, 2004: 224). Drawings are not then merely depictions of disease; 
they are neither 'stable products [nor] coherent representations' (Guillemin, 
2004: 224), but instead they offer insight into lay understanding and the 
practice of illness. 
When Guillemin (2004) states that she is more interested in the process of 
drawing - wherein 'drawing' is a verb - than with the product of drawing - in 
which 'drawing' is a noun - she is concerned with the ways that patients situate 
themselves in relation to the lived experience of illness, to the immediate, 
interactive environment of friends and family, and to the larger social system 
(including the institution of medical science). 
Similarly, Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1985: 7-8) identify three realms of the 
body: the individual body-self of lived experience, the social body of everyday 
representation and interaction, and the body politic of power, domination and 
regulation, this latter type exemplified in Foucault (1980b; 1991; 2003). 
Kirmayer (1992) points out that these distinctions indicate not three types of 
body, but rather, three ways of conceptualising bodies; in short, three types of 
text (Kirmayer, 1992: 324). 
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This criticism, however, does not apply here, as the utility of Guillemin's 
(2004) study lies not in its textuality, but in the power of images to convey 
complex meanings that cannot be reduced to words but can yet be 
communicated. In other words, images have a capacity to express and invoke 
the feeling, or 'felt meaning' of experiential phenomena that texts do not, which 
is to say that images are possessed of a 'sensual capability' (Sontag, in 
Shusterman, 1991: 106) which eludes interpretation. Images have a 
presentational quality as well as a representational quality. In addition, and 
despite Guillemin's (2004) necessary translation of the images into sociological 
text, drawing is, for her informants at least, a less rigidly structured mode of 
communication, particularly as none of her informants are artists. The 
drawings in themselves, other than representing the heart in a different way to 
that of medical science, do not necessarily provide a richer account of the 
experience of heart disease, but attention to the process of drawing, the 
'drawing upon' of diverse sources to explicate the experience of illness, 
expands more traditional ethnographic approaches and permits 'a different kind 
of insight into illness experience and knowledge production' (Guillemin, 2004: 
236). The most striking conclusion to be drawn from this work is that drawing, 
a different form of expression from that normally employed in daily life, 
evokes quite vividly the 'different kind of social reality' (Guillemin, 2004: 235) 
that patients experience. Their experience of heart disease is situated in 
different locations - personal, social, familial. It may be problematic in one 
setting but not in another. For example, one informant drew her 'personal' 
heart in the form of the traditional love-heart, whereas her 'social' heart was 
misshapen and seemingly 'threatened' by arrows. The very fact that I can 
describe this suggests that, as the viewer, my apprehension of the image is 
informed by cultural presuppositions, and as such, I cannot help but 'read' the 
Image. 
That the heart, or rather, heart disease, is felt in different ways in different 
settings, goes some way to explaining the comments of my informants, 
previously cited in chapter two, that the pain of angina may be experienced, 
yet, in certain circumstances, not present a problem. 
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In discussing the use of metaphor as a way of exemplifying bodily experience 
the problem arises: does this transform the body into a text? Am I, as Barthes 
(2000) describes, just writing words about word, and not in fact discussing the 
body and embodiment? 
For Butler (1993) the body, or rather, its materiality, cannot be understood 
outwith its materialisation in language. 'The body posited as prior to the sign, 
is always posited or signified as prior' [emphasis in original] (Butler, 1993: 
30). Ifthis is the case, then what is actually doing the positing, and why? 
Language as a constituting force (or form) cannot conceive of a body without 
reference to itself (language) as that which constitutes the body in the first 
place. 
Johnson (1987), and, to a lesser extent, Sheets-Johnstone (1990; 1994), provide 
a corrective to the post-structuralist privileging oflanguage, by stating that it is 
the form, or eidos, of the body that establishes the grounds upon and from 
which we make the world meaningfulJor us. It is our immediate bodily 
intentionality that provides the structure(s) of consciousness. Language is 
merely the expression of that intentionality (Sheets-Johnstone, 1994: 265). 
The body ... abides over time and is part of an unbroken, continuous historical 
process. Constructionist theories that fail to take the evolutionary body into 
account not only ignore the relational ties that the historical process describes 
and that bind us to certain corporeal acts, dispositions, and possibilities, and to 
a certain related intercorporeal semantics; they also put us on the edge of an 
unnatural history. It is as if we humans descended deus ex machina not just 
into the world but into a ready-made culture, a culture that, whatever its 
nature, can only be the product of an immaculate linguistic conception. 
(Sheets-Johnstone, 1994: 69) 
The Body is the Spanner in the Works of the Project of Modernity 
[T]here are changes afoot in our embodied dispositions. 
(Martin, 1992: 134) 
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The migration of the body's perceived centre, from the heart to the head, is a 
consequence of the privileging of and trust in reason. 
(Jager, 1996: 3). 
From the body with manners (Elias, 1994), to the upwardly trained body 
(Vigarello, 1990), to the accumulation of men (Foucault: 1980a; 1991)-
wherein bodies were disciplined and machine-like (Asendorf, 1993), subject to 
a strict clock-time both in production and in consumption - to the present, and 
the flexible bodies of the post- or late-modem epoch, there is reason to 
consider that the body, or perhaps more accurately, the image of the body, is a 
direct correlate of the mode of production. 
Citing as support Levi-Strauss's contention that phenomena become of 
scientific interest at precisely the moment when they are coming to an end, 
Emily Martin (1992) proclaims the end ofthe body. However, as she goes on 
to suggest, the body has not reached its end; rather, it is only that bodies are 
undergoing fundamental changes in the ways that they are organized and 
experienced (Martin, 1992: passim). A supplementary argument is that the 
body has come to prominence at the time when the intellect, as the seat of 
SUbjectivity, has been decentred by the postmodem turn (Csordas, 1994). 
Perhaps it is simpler just to say that bodies last longer now, there are more of 
them than ever before, and because ofthis they have become increasingly 
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problematic, as medical, economic, political, moral, and social entities. 
Because of this, the salience of 'the body' to social theory is beyond question. 
What is questionable is the manner in which the body should be theorised. 
When we discuss it, what is it that we are talking about? 
Martin (1992) conceptualises the body, as percept and in practice, as a correlate 
of the mode of production. It seems then that the body is perceived and 
practised through the filter of ideology, that it is the product of (or reflects) 
overarching socio-economic forces; in particular medical science, which 
produces models of the body according to the demands of the particular mode 
of production. It need hardly be mentioned that the body is the most obvious 
tool available to any given historical configuration of productive forces. Citing 
Gramsci, Martin (1992) depicts Fordism as an organisational form that 
penetrates the body in the most intimate manner, constructing 'new types of 
sexuality, reproduction, family life, moral ideals, masculinity and femininity' 
(Martin, 1992: 122). The type of worker required by this mode of production 
is thus a new type of person, with a new type of body, which, as previously 
suggested, has its origins in the mercantilism of the seventeenth century. It is a 
body that is tamed, disciplined, subject to reason, exhausted by its labours, and 
thus no longer unruly and dangerous. 
New embodied habits required to meet the demands of the Fordist 
organisational form, acted out in different spatio-temporal settings, preserved 'a 
certain psycho-physical equilibrium which would prevent the physiological 
collapse of the worker, exhausted by the new mode of production' (Martin, 
1992: 122). That these habits - that is, bodily dispositions - were impressed 
upon the body largely by means of coercion, for example, in the organization 
and management of time and space, and not least by way of scientific 
discourse, suggests that the Fordist body was Taylor-made for its tasks. 
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Now it seems that, in late modernity, a post-Fordist body is required; a body 
that is capable of a 'flexible response [to] rapidly collapsing time and space' 
(Martin, 1992: 134). As the labouring Fordist body was analogised as a 
machine, so the post-Fordist body finds its correspondence in discourses of, for 
example, immunology and artificial intelligence (Stafford, 1997). In times 
such as these, when HIV / AIDS and other viruses threaten the integrity of the 
body, when heart disease is the number one killer in the world, when 
aeroplanes pierce buildings and illegal immigrants penetrate borders, the 
threatened/threatening body is perhaps a more appropriately evocative trope. 
The prominence of the body in modernity, as a cultural form associated with 
self-identity, is evident in the ways that bodies are 'hailed' by commodities, 
political regimes, and religions. Yet, as Martin (1992: 122) observes, it is 
principally medical science that writes the truth of the body. The 
contemporary body is precisely that of 'specialised responses and adaptability 
of skills' (Martin, 1992: 123). It is the marketable, communicative, flexible 
and reflexive body ofthe current epoch. As such, medical science has, Martin 





The Red Balloon 
It is 1999 and he (let's call him Bob, for academic convention demands that he 
be named) is about to have a balloon angioplasty to dilate an occluded 
coronary artery. This is a simple enough procedure, performed on the fully 
conscious patient. A deflated balloon catheter is introduced, by way of a vein 
in the arm, or the femoral artery in the leg, to the narrowed segment of the 
coronary artery. Then the balloon is inflated, thus transmitting circumferential 
pressure and compressing the plaque that has narrowed the artery. It 
shouldn't take too long, and then, the next day, after a period of bed rest, Bob 
will probably be allowed to return home. The success rate is very high and the 
patient will feel better almost immediately. Bob tells me that he lay staring at 
the ceiling while the surgeon and his assistants performed their tasks. Bob was 
nervous, but Valium softened the experience, and all was going well until 
suddenly he felt a change in the mood of the room, and then a crushing weight 
on his chest. The surgeon leaned close and asked him how he felt. Bob said 
that he'dfeel better if the surgeon would only get offhis chest, and then the last 
words Bob remembers hearing were ''prepare for bypass ... we're going in" 
(although, in retrospect, Bob isn't certain that he actually heard those exact 
words). The balloon catheter had ruptured the wall of Bob's artery and blood 
was rapidly filling his chest cavity. He would have been dead in minutes had 
the surgeon not opened him up and performed an emergency bypass on the 
damaged artery. Two days later, when he regained full consciousness, Bob's 
cardiologist told him that he'd had an open-heart procedure, that it had been a 
near thing, and that he'd need to stay in hospital for a week, and then the 
cardiologist asked Bob how he felt. Told that the surgeon wouldn't be coming 
to see him, Bob said, "don't I get to meet the man who almost killed me?", but 
in a half-joking manner, for he knows that the surgeon also saved his life. 
Although extremely fearful of surgery, Bob's fine now, but he feels 
uncomfortable telling his story, although he says that he tells it often. 
Ein Heldenleben 
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It is 1929, and Werner Forssmann, a young doctor in a rural hospital near 
Berlin, is determined to attempt cardiac catheterisation on a living human 
being - himself He is familiar with the literature on the catheterisation of 
horses' hearts, and he is eager to find a way to deliver medication safely and 
directly to the human heart. Thus far, no one has catheterised a human heart. 
Unfortunately, he cannot convince his supervisor that a self-experiment is 
worth the risk, or indeed, ethical. However, young Werner manages to arouse 
the interest of the nurse in charge of theatre and she suggests that he perform 
the procedure on her. He agrees, and instructs her to lie on a trolley, tying her 
down, so as to minimise movement, he says. With the nurse lying immobile 
beside him, Werner inserts a urethral catheter into the antecubital vein of his 
left arm, then, feeling slightly unwell, and with the catheter dangling bloodily 
from his arm, he unties the nurse and asks her to take him to the radiography 
department where an x-ray reveals the presence of the catheter in his heart. 
Werner was heavily censured after this (although he became something of a 
local hero in the press, and therefore in the public imagination), and he moved 
on to other areas of medicine (settlingfinally in urology), never to touch the 
heart again. (Indeed, cardiac catheterisation was not attempted again until 
more than a decade later.) Werner's story, as the man who first catheterised 
the human heart, is reproduced in countless medical history textbooks: 
sometimes the details vary - was it the antecubital or brachial vein, and did the 
event take place in 1929 or 1930? - but the power of the story, that in an act of 
creative brilliance this daredevil first catheterised the human heart, is 
undiminished. 
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'The fire which in the heart resides' (Matthew Arnold, Morality) 
It is 1979, just afew weeks before Werner Forssmann's death, and I'm in 
hospital for an x-ray angiogram. My cardiologist wants to measure blood flow 
across my heart valves and, to this end, two catheters are inserted, one in my 
left arm and the other in my right leg. I can't feel the Valium but I canfeel the 
distant scraping of the second catheter as it is inserted into my femoral artery. 
After a rather tedious round of tests the surgeon says that he wants to take a 
look at the blood vessels of my heart and that he's going to inject a contrast 
medium, which is opaque to x-rays. From a remote position behind a lead 
screen he injects the medium, instructing me to hold my breath while it goes in. 
Then he tells me to breathe out, warning me that I may experience some 
discomfort. A massive understatement, in my opinion, for as I breathe out it is 
as if all the fires of Hell are raging through me. For a few seconds I feel that 
fingers of flame are dissipating through the top of my head and flying from the 
fingertips of my left hand - a quite unique sensation - and then I am left with 
the worst headache in the history of headaches. And there I am, a twenty-six 
year-old man, I feel like eighty-six, what with my incompetent, stenosed mitral 
valve, and now, post-angiogram, I've got a limp too. But, I mustn't complain, 
for this is but a precursor to the surgery that will restore me to good health, 
and on my first day back home I decide to do some shopping, so I slowly climb 
the stairs from my basement flat. I am wearing a grey flying suit, trench coat, 
black Doctor Marten's boots (it is 1979 after all); my hair is short and spiky, 
dyed blonde (as I said, 1979). I use a walking stick to accommodate the limp, 
and I'm carrying an old-fashioned net shopping bag. As I reach the garden 
gate, some little boys playing in a tree across the road notice me and shout 
excitedly, "hey, look at that old guy done up like a punk!" If I had the energy 
I'd shake my stick at them. They seem like nice kids, and I think that I could 
tell them my story, but it's so involved, requires too much explanation of 
background, and I doubt that, aside from the gory details, they'd be interested. 
Instead, I just smile, allowing them to own me with their words, and for a 
moment I catch a glimpse of myself through the eyes of others. I'm a young 
man in an old man's story. 
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Chapter Four: For Narrative 
My experience simultaneously seeks and flinches from its verbal expression. 
My words become other-for-the-other. Language is objectification, it is the 
occasion of the Other's appropriation of my subjective reality. [ ... J [TJhe 
ontological truth of language is that. . .its structure is always that of being-for 
the-other. There is no private, interior language which does not have this 
structure. The inaudible utterances of my talking to myself reflect the way I 
am a quasi-other to myself. 
(Laing and Cooper, 1971: 20-21) 
Our experience of the world, both physical and cultural, is always mediated by 
conventions of enquiry, and that experience is equally mediated by 
conventions of writing. 
(Atkinson, 1991: 9) 
Not only are we born into complex communal narratives, we also experience, 
understand and order our lives as stories that we are living out. Whatever 
human rationality consists in, it is certainly tied up with narrative structure 
and the quest for narrative unity. 
(Johnson, 1990: 171-172) 
The truth of Johnson's (1990) observation, that we are born into communal 
narratives, is evinced by Werner Forssmann's story inasmuch as it is 
comprehensible as an heroic narrative. Bob's story is that of tragedy averted, 
while mine, in the end, is one of mistaken identity. As sociologists, we are 
familiar with the grand narratives of enlightenment, capitalism and the class 
struggle, while as postgraduates we are told that our theses should 'tell a story', 
all of which goes to suggest that narratives are deeply embedded in our 
everyday lives and, as such, are intelligible because we are possessed of a 
narrative competence. Reading and telling stories are simply the means by 
which we try to make sense of other people's lives and the resemblances and 
differences among them. The construction of narrative - narrativization - is 
the delimitation, organization, and explication of experience (Ricoeur, 1991: 
3). But, for the purposes ofthis thesis, I do not distinguish greatly between 
'narrative' and 'story', and thus use the terms interchangeably. 
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If every story has its beginning I should state here what my central questions, 
the questions that drive this particular story, are. First, what purpose does 
narrative, specifically the 'illness narrative', serve? To this end I want to stress 
the constitutive role of the body, as a 'walking memory' (Turner, 1995: 250), in 
the construction of narratives. At its beginning, the illness narrative has a 'key 
embodied moment' (Hockey and James, 2003: 51), which I described 
previously as the fateful moment that marks the onset of illness and which 
unsettles the integrity of the body and self-identity. Second, I ask if remaking 
the body during the process of surgery, rehabilitation and recovery entails a 
remaking of the self, and whether the body is an essential component of self-
actualisation. In short, do illness narratives possess a transformative, if not 
emancipatory, quality? 
Illness Narratives 
The conceptualisation of a difference between disease and illness, wherein the 
former is conceived as a pathology defined by medical science, and the latter as 
the experience ofthe disease (Radley, 2002: 3), has opened up the possibility 
for study of the patient's 'narrative activity' (Hyden, 1997: 48). Narratives give 
voice to illness in a way that medical science does not. As such, the illness 
narrative is not a recent phenomenon, as Epstein (1986) reveals in her 
discussion of the writer Fanny Burney's (1752-1840) letter regarding her 
mastectomy. 
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As an intimate confession and 'persona building' (Epstein, 1986: 131) exercise, 
Burney's writing on the subject represents a courageous and imaginative 
confrontation with the public - that is, medical- appropriation and violation of 
her body, in which she 'remembers and renders the event [surgery] not merely 
as a grim fact but as gothic melodrama overlaid with imaginative structure and 
symbol' (Epstein, 1986: 140). Significantly, Epstein (1986) argues that the 
memorial act of writing, the re-experience of the mastectomy as a literary 
event, enables Burney to address her suffering (at a remove). Unable to fully 
detach herself from her history - the actual experience of surgery - Burney 
distances herself, by way ofthe tools of her trade, in order to assert some 
degree of autonomy. Burney's 'illness narrative' - and it can be defined as such 
because the writer makes a story of her experience - represents one voice 
speaking out for itself (and to others - her friends and family). Thus 'aroused 
from [her] passively submissive state' (Burney, in Epstein, 1986: 147), the 
writer asserts her will by articulating her 'speechless agony'. (futerestingly, the 
doctors communicate by sign language during the procedure, so not to disturb 
the patient with their speech.) Epstein (1986: 162) concludes by stating that 
Burney writes to 're-undertake her own surgery ... to control the knife ... to speak 
for the wound's gaping unspeakableness ... reopening and reclosing the 
incisions in her own body and in the body of her writing'. The language, or 
'proto language' (Culbertson, in Kilby, 2002: 206), oftrauma is here replaced by 
narrative language, and in this process the event experienced in memory 
becomes re-embodied. 
Culbertson's (in Kilby, 2002: 206-207) main concern is that, in the 
demystification of the inchoate memories ofthe body, certain dimensions of 
experience are lost. Yet, she admits that there is no other way to distance 
oneself from trauma, to make sense of it, to recover a sense of continuity, both 
ofthe self and of community, and thence to universalise experience. For 
Culbertson (in Kilby, 2002), it seems that history is something to be disposed 
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of, but as I intend to show, history remains with us, in the memory of the body 
and in the stories that we struggle to say and write. 
It is pointless to deny that there is a 'non-verbal outside oflanguage, by which 
it is conditioned, and upon which it acts' (De Man, 1979: 121). Experience 
does not correspond with the telling (or writing) of it, which is to say that there 
is always a gap between experience and its description. Nevertheless, 
narrativization represents the struggle to constitute ( or reconstitute) experience 
comprehensibly, and is thus expressive ofthe narrator's attempt to assert a 
degree of autonomy, as evinced by Fanny Burney's narrative. 
If, as we have seen, medical science has, during the course of the past two 
hundred years, produced docile subjects (Foucault, 1980a; 2003), and if the 
clinical gaze has been increasingly directed toward the interior of the body, 
then the language of organs has come to dominate, if not drown out, the speech 
of patients. Indeed, speaking during clinical examination is often discouraged; 
an observation exemplified in the statement, 'I can't hear you while I'm 
listening' (Baron, 1985), suggesting as it does that while the doctor is listening 
to one story the patient is speaking another. There is a time for listening but 
that moment is constantly deferred because the patient's story is so often 
considered flawed, too subjective, or tainted by emotion. In short, the patient's 
story lacks objectivity, and therefore, credibility (Hyden, 1997; Rimmon-
Kenan, 2002). Yet, the impersonal attitude of modem medicine finds, or 
'provokes' (Rimmon-Kenan, 2002: 11) its response in the personal narratives of 
the sick. I emphasise 'personal' because I wish to suggest that there are no 
wholly personal narratives. Narratives are social constructions and, while each 
of my informants' stories may seem personal, and may indeed feel personal to 
them, narratives are necessarily co-authored, constructed in a relationship with 
other people and 'organisations' (Williams, 1984: 181), even or especially those 
which appear to their authors to be products of a hermetic process. 
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Narrative aside for a moment, as Laing and Cooper (1971) point out, there is 
no personal language. Language is a shared medium, the structuring capacity 
of which determines a certain objectification of experience, a point which has 
already been observed in my discussion of the power of medical discourse, and 
in Starobinski's (1983) and Gioia's (2000) comments that everyday speech is 
already suffused with the language of medicine. To paraphrase Merleau-Ponty 
(2000: 190), language 'implants the idea of truth in us as the presumptive limit 
of its effort' [my emphasis]. Language is the very expression of the telic 
imperative to render the world meaningful; to have the final say on the subject, 
as it were. Language, particularly in the form of narrative, has the additional 
potential for incorporation, not only in the 'me too' response of recognition 
(Skultans, 2000: 8), in which people recognize that they too may have had a 
near identical experience, but in a more general feeling of mutuality; that is, 
'some degree of transcendence of differences, [ a] reaffirmation of common 
humanity' (Caplan, in Plummer, 2001). 
[W]riting about someone else always involves writing about yourself and vice 
versa. 
(Jolly, 2005: 215) 
As a method of addressing not only the medical 'facts' of illness, but of 
discoursing on 'the exigencies of chance, necessity and the ways of rising to the 
unknown [the illness narrative] shares something with Simmel's idea of the 
'adventure' as an experience where there is a dropping out ofthe ordinariness of 
everyday life, a brush with something alien that is yet connected to its centre' 
(Radley, 1999a: 780). If illness can indeed be considered an adventure - and 
narratives such as 'The Red Balloon' suggest that it can - it is perhaps because 
the experience of illness has extraordinary qualities: the heightened sensibility 
of the sick person, special treatments to be endured, medications to be 
consumed at specific times. Consequently, the sick person is endowed with a 
special, quasi-heroic status, much in the same way that Simone de Beauvoir 
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regarded her sickly childhood friend Zaza (Pilardi, 1999). Certainly, the figure 
of the sick person as 'survivor' is a commonplace of cancer and HIV / AIDS 
narratives (Charrnaz, 1983,2002; Frank, 1995; Yingling, 1997). Equally, the 
terms 'sufferer' and 'victim' are used in many narratives, although as Charmaz 
(1983) points out, these terms tend to devalue the sick person's sense of self-
worth, particularly those who 'hold ideologies ... which reveal residuals ofthe 
Protestant Ethic' (Charmaz, 1983: 169). Notably, my informants, most of 
whom had endured some hardships during and after the Second World War, 
were quite adamant that they did not wish to be regarded as victims, and 
neither did they consider themselves, or their condition, in any manner special. 
That everyday life takes on a new significance, or that its significance is 
displaced, has already been observed, but the component parts or 'fragments' of 
life gain an 'additive weight as objects that have achieved an alien 
independence from the sick person' (Radley, 1999a: 782). Illness thus effects a 
'double movement' of displacement and addition, and that which is most 
affected is the person's power and ability to engage in everyday aesthetics; for 
example, 'the ability to engage in fancies, to contemplate beauty and to create 
space and time for frivolous activity' (Radley, 1999a: 782). This argument, 
that in illness people lose their capacity for the realisation and appreciation of 
beauty (and fun), may seem flippant at best, but it is in this setting - of falling 
into a 'chasm between the mundane and the terrifying' (Radley, 1999a; 782), in 
which the unthinkable appears in the guise of the innocuous - that the 
condition for finding a voice, and the subsequent construction of narratives, is 
discovered: 
"I didn't think I'd survive the ordeal, to be honest. But, when I came through it 
in one piece I knew I had to make things better. It's not just a case of getting 
better. You've got to make yourself better. It was an effort at first, especially 
immediately after the op, and then going through rehabilitation, but I knew I 




"You keep telling yourself you'll get through this. I think it was at its worst 
the month before the operation. I was in a terrible state. I wasn't sleeping 
much, I was having powerful dizzy turns, and I was gasping for air all the 
time. I kept wishing for the operation. I just wanted that chance to get 
better." 
(Frank,68) 
The virtue of the illness narrative resides not only in the way that it explains 
illness, but in the manner in which illness is portrayed, or symbolised; 
fashioning 'a world a/being into which the account admits us, as readers' 
[emphasis in original] (Radley, 1999a: 784). The illness narrative does not 
provide simply a representation of life; it is instead a 'performative unfolding 
of the account' in which the reader is initiated into an 'aesthetic/ethical 
relationship' with the narrative object (Radley, 1999a: 791). To speak of an 
aesthetic is not to assimilate suffering with art, for that would be to romanticise 
the experience of illness. Rather, it is only to say that illness narratives draw 
upon the same reservoir of symbols that fertilize other spheres of 'art': 
[A]n account of illness should show not just what it means, nor just how it is 
what it is, but 'that it is what it is'. 
(Radley, 1999a: 793) 
Themes and Motifs 
[C]onscious thinking of the aims and focus of interviews must destroy 
spontaneity, and make the whole process self conscious and almost 
unbearably artificial. 
(Beaumont, 1953: 475) 
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Interviews are the stock-in-trade ofthe qualitative researcher, but they can be 
'unbearably artificial' in certain situations. The extracts reproduced in this 
thesis are all taken from interviews conducted either in the informants' homes 
or during walks in a local park. The setting in which the narrative is 
constructed contributes to its presentation and organisation. This is of 
particular relevance to this study because of the problems faced when 
interviewing informants within the hospital setting. Initially, I conducted some 
interviews with out-patients in rooms set aside for that purpose. The 
informants, generally tired after their rehabilitation session, were not always at 
their best, but the greater problem was their apparent suspicion of and 
deference toward me. It became clear that, despite my assertions to the 
contrary, the informants associated me with the hospital, and it appeared that 
they felt obliged to speak and behave as model patients. 
Although generally grateful for the care they received while in hospital, my 
informants remained fearful of the setting, which may go some way to 
explaining why attendance at rehabilitation clinics is generally quite low 
(Farleyet aI., 2003; Page et aI., 2005). It is not unusual for patients undergoing 
surgery to face a barrage of questionnaires during their stay in hospital, and 
although my questions were of a different sort, I believe that the interviews 
were perceived as extensions of medical inquiry. To remedy this problem, to 
dissociate myself from the hospital, I decided to conduct all other interviews 
outwith that setting. 
Often enough in studies of human lived experience, people confound our 
expectations, even after long and diligent research. They say one thing and do 
another, conceal what seems obvious, find the ineffable in trivia, dramatise the 
routine, and otherwise act in ways that to us appear mysterious, courageous, 
mean-spirited, beatific, or silly. 
(Charmaz and Mitchell, 1997: 193) 
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At times there is no greater obstacle to the process of research than the 
researcher himself or herself, by which I mean that the researcher may be too 
dedicated to a specific theory, or to a research agenda, to allow anything 
outwith the aims and objectives of the research to emerge, so that when the 
unanticipated does arise, he or she is at a loss to account for it. Semi-structured 
interviewing usually entails the exploration and development of specific 
thematic frames: the 'broad descriptive categories' (Silverman, 1997: 37) 
typical of qualitative research. The principal themes I intended to explore 
were: fatigue, anxiety, social dislocation, memory, and the body itself - its 
capacities and modalities. While these themes give form to the research, the 
necessary imposition of thematic limits constrains both the researcher and the 
researched, and obscures the emergence of other themes. However, certain 
motifs emerged during the course ofthe interviews, motifs that were consistent 
across the range of informants. As the researcher has an agenda, a plan to elicit 
certain aspects of social experience, and as that experience (of illness, surgery 
and recovery) is (objectively) common to all informants, it is inevitable that 
there will be some similarities in the informants' responses. I use the term 
'motif only to differentiate and draw attention to my informants' themes, which 
I did not anticipate. Whereas my themes were generally abstract - as is so 
often the way in sociology - my informants' motifs were without exception 
quite mundane and material: for example, staircases, mirrors, and parks. 
Losing Oneself 
Like Lyotard (1997: 15), that 'epigon[e] of post-structuralism' (Callinicos, 
1996: 5), I adhere to the view that a self does not amount to much, and that it 
exists only in a fabric of relations. ill other words, the self is a product of 
socialisation, constructed in social relationships, and is neither innate, nor need 
it be essentialised. The view that the self is 'fundamentally social in nature' 
(Charmaz, 1983: 170), that it is produced by way of a lifelong process of 
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socialisation, need hardly be restated here at length. However, that the self is a 
social construction is not an opinion generally held by my informants. While I 
am reluctant to make too much of a distinction between the personal and the 
social, maintaining the view that the social is the precondition for, and is thus 
intertwined with the personal, and that the dividing line between the two is at 
best blurred, I nevertheless cannot ignore the persistence and pervasiveness of 
the belief in a personal, 'continuous', and coherent self that exists 'behind' the 
various roles that are assumed in everyday life (Gullestad, in Hockey and 
James, 2003: 210-211): 
[P]eople undeniably develop a sense of self - a sense of what characterizes, 
transcending time and situation. 
(Butt and Langdridge, 2003: 480) 
There is no inner man, man is in the world, and only in the world does he 
know himself. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2000: xi) 
I should restate my position, lest I trip over myself later, by admitting that I do 
not know this 'continuity of self. The'!, that does not know this - the'!' of the 
'I am' - is not identical with the self, or to cite Merleau-Ponty (2000: 347), 'I 
am never quite at one with myself. The self is a character, a characteristic, 
'implied reflexively', of the posited'!'. The'!', or rather the 'I am', just is, there 
in its simple immediacy (Ricoeur, 1994: 18). It could be argued then that the 
selfis a consequence ofthe 'exploratory function' (Merleau-Ponty, 2000: 93) of 
this embodied'!'. As an incarnate being I find myself immersed in an already 
meaningful - cultured - world, a world in which I act and am acted upon. 
Open to this world, I render it explicit in 'perceptual exploration' (Merleau-
Ponty, 2000: 404), elaborating upon it by means oflanguage, yet never quite 
able to grasp fully the experience of it, for as I take hold of this moment the 
next succeeds it, therefore I am forever engaged in the process of catching up 
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with experience. Or, rather, experience is continually chasing after appearance. 
But it is in this cultural world that, 'alone of all expressive processes, speech is 
able to settle into a sediment and constitute an acquisition for use in human 
relationships' (Merleau-Ponty, 2000: 190). These relationships bear the form 
of a linguistic 'community' directed toward, or clustered around, specific 
phenomena, and the self is produced as an identity that is appropriate (or not) 
to those situations. Thus the self is thematised, realising itself in its 
communicative activity: 
It [the self] helps the person anticipate their social role while accommodating 
to what may be fragmentary and inconsistent social action. 
(Butt and Langdridge, 2003: 480) 
Returning for a moment to the notion of an enduring, personal self, this 
phenomenon is predicated upon an awareness of the existence of others, and is 
no less than the outcome ofa 'process of individuation' (Ferguson, 1997b: 1), a 
civilising process that, whatever its form, whether violent or passive (Elias, 
1996: 450-452), focuses increasingly on the differentiated, self-contained, self-
regulating 'individual'. The very notion of differentiation implies the presence 
of others. This awareness of, and openness toward, others is the simple 
condition that permits a sense of the autonomy and durability of the personal, 
private, self. Thus the fact of our being homines aperti is that which facilitates 
the conception of homo clausus. This civilising process is supported by the 
efforts of science, which seeks out uniqueness of identity, for example, in the 
building blocks of human biology, and of commerce, which produces 
commodities that are Just for you'. The notion of a personal self is perhaps 
then only a sense of coherence in social identity, and that while we daily prove 
the existence of the social, we yet maintain the belief in a 'true' self. 
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When people say, 'that's not like me', they are referring only to a character trait, 
a characteristic that they believe they have either inherited or which they have 
developed over time. The self is then a 'self-concept' or a 'self-theory', which 
may be considered not as 'a set of internal cognitions, but as a narrative that the 
person uses in accounting for his or her action' (Butt and Langdridge, 2003: 
480). 
This notion ofthe truth of the self, however, is a phenomenon readily 
witnessed in, for example, reality television 'shows' such as Big Brother (the 
producers of which surely owe the estates of both Orwell and Goffman 
considerable royalties), in which one housemate is generally to be found 
complaining that another mate is not being himself or herself, that they are 
'acting' (a somewhat odd notion in itself, given that this is a television show, 
albeit of a format that falls somewhere between melodrama and wildlife 
documentary). So, to declare 'that's not the real me' could mean that of all the 
selves to which 'I' give myself, that is not one of them. 
There is no reason to believe that one's self is the same today as yesterday, or 
that tomorrow it will be the same as today (Rimmon-Kenan, 2002: 19). Kelly 
and Field (1997: 364) maintain that belief in a substantial, underlying selfis a 
fallacy 'based on the physiology of the person'. Similarly, Burkitt (1999: 76) 
states that 'the self is primarily based on the feel we have of our body and the 
way it connects us to the world'. Regarding this sense of connectedness, belief 
in an enduring self may be founded upon the persistence of pre-modem modes 
of thought and previous forms of embodiment (Ferguson, 1997a). Thus, in 
various contexts this belief might be fully justified; for example, in close 
familial relations, or in friendship. Perhaps the best that can be said is that 
there is a multiplicity of selves, and some of them are real, until further notice. 
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'Mirror, Mirror' 
When I look in the mirror I see someone who's finding herself, who has said 
once and for all it doesn't really matter what role society said I should play. 
(Rosen, in Shilling, 1995: 7). 
Shilling (1996: 7) identifies investment in the body as a 'tightening [ofthe] 
relationship between the body and self-identity'. The daily, mundane routines, 
attendant to the care and presentation of the self, represent, or rather, embody 
the struggle against time and inevitable death. Although this position has been 
criticised as 'simplistic' (Finkelstein, 1997: 153), attention to appearance goes 
some way to presenting a selfthat is possessed of social value. This is 
particularly significant in illness, when the fragility of existence is most keenly 
felt, and the patient's sense of self-worth is at its lowest ebb: 
"The night before the operation I took a shower and I was drying myself, and 
then wiped the mirror so I could, you know, do my hair, and you know how 
dark it is in there, in the bathroom, and I couldn't see myself very well, and 
just then I had this strong feeling that I was ... fading away into the 
darkness ... but I thought, 'no, no, don't be silly', and I wiped more steam off 
the mirror and looked carefully [laughs], really, to see that I was there. The 
funny thing is, it wasn't that dark but it just felt like it at the time .. .it/elt 
dark." 
(Wilma, 62) 
"You know, lots of people have these mirror stories ... in which they really 
look at themselves. Perhaps they're significant. .. do you think?" 
"I think I was just feeling sorry for myself. .. " 
"I knew you were going to say that." 
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"Oh [laughs] I was .. .it was just in the shower, you know, time to think and 
that. .. everything was different and I was worried I suppose ... about the next 
day ... you know?" 
"When you say 'everything was different' ... ?" 
"Mmmm, well, it's as ifit wasn't me ... this is hard ... but you know how 
sometimes you feel like parts of you aren't you? lt was like I was washing 
something that wasn't me, but it felt like me too, I mean it really felt like me. 
lt was a bit like watching myself, but not like one of those .. . um ... " 
"Out of body experiences?" 
"Uh-huh, yes, not like that, no. I think it was just having the time to myself. I 
was on my own and I was scared." 
The fore grounding of the body in illness is accompanied by a loss, or 
displacement ofthe person's sense of self (Charmaz, 1983). As the perceptual 
horizon shrinks, the everyday world of familiar things takes on a different 
aspect. I could cite various sources in which mirrors represent, for example, a 
means of seeing the future (in the film, Dead of Night), or the boundary 
between life and death (in Orphee). I could suggest that the mirror image is the 
person's double, albeit in reverse, but this would perhaps be to over-analyse 
and to draw too much of a comparison between the illness narrative and fiction. 
Instead, it would seem that this informant, facing the prospect of surgery, is 
expressing an anxiety about her future. Within the 'dehumanising, 
technologised environment' (Meerabeau and Page, 1998: 297) of the hospital 
the patient withdraws into an affectless state in which she experiences a loss of 
emotional rapport with the world, a loss of contact with normal oscillations of 
feeling. When the above informant states, "I was on my own and I was 
scared", she might be expressing the feeling of being disconnected from the 
larger, collective sphere of emotion. The mirror motif appeared in other 
interviews: 
"I've been on my own eight years now ... eight years since my wife died. 
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But ... and this is what makes me think ofM. [his wife] now ... the way I felt in 
the weeks before the operation ... and now too. She'd have said I was 
vain ... she used to say that. .. you know ... too fond of myself. I've always 
taken care of my appearance, still do ... but in the weeks leading up [to his 
surgery] I kept looking at myself in the bathroom mirror. It's as if I was 
looking for something. But it didn't dawn on me for a while. You know when 
you look in the mirror, really look, and you don't recognize yourself? You see 
yourself in a different way. You're not looking at your face in a ... oh ... you 
know, checking for nicks and hairs and that. You see your face, like it's in the 
background. Oh, I don't know ... does that sound daft? [ ... ] Okay, I couldn't 
stop doing it. It was like a nervous tic. Every time I went to the toilet I'd 
look. .. check to see .. .! don't know ... whatever I was looking for. .. see if it was 
there. [ ... ] No, I don't do it as much .. just now and then, to see if anything's 
changed." 
(Frank,68) 
Illness forces a particular realisation upon the 'sufferer', which is that, 'the 
variety of responses by family, medical or non-medical observers - of facing 
an 'abyss', a glass 'wall', etc. - can be seen as modes of self and other 
recognition, evoking an awareness of self in respect of its crucially constitutive 
moment: the other self (Zaner, 1981: 246). Charmaz (1983) states that 'loss of 
self is a fundamental form of suffering, engendered by heightened - and 
paradoxical - self-concern about who and what people see themselves 
becoming, and by the diminishment of valued self-images from their past. 
Doubtless the above informant values his self-image and seeks affirmation in 
his reflection. The informant cited below is quite clear about what she sees in 
the mirror: 
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At times I'd get very tearful, especially when I caught sight of myself. I'd say 
I was quite disturbed for a while, before and after the operation, especially 
with the pain after. I was all hunched up. I was very withdrawn. I'd look at 
myself and I looked awful. I was turning blue. I'd see it in other people's 
faces, too. Some people said I looked really ill. They'd say, 'oh, you don't 
look yourself at all". 
(Marie, 64) 
Coherence of self-identity across the lifecourse is not a matter of psychological 
continuity alone, as Gallagher (2001: 147) states. Indeed, the 'meaning' of 
illness is not to be found in the psychology or physiology of the person. It is 
found 'out there', in the social environments in which physiological states are 
lived. Meaning is 'located in the procedures people employ to understand their 
experiences, and in the cultural resources, categories, and folklore they 
summon to do so' (Hilbert, 1984: 39). 
Narrative Identity 
An affinity between narrative and identity is indicated within various 
disciplines - sociology, literary studies, psychology - but, like Rimmon-Kenan 
(2002), and after Ricoeur (1994), I replace the term 'identity' with 'narrative 
identity': a form (of identity) that is neither essentialised or static. It is curious 
that, contrary to current post-modem literary trends, which stress fragmentation 
and destabilisation of identities (Lash, 1996; McNay, 2000), illness narratives 
'tend to preserve, even strive for, coherence and continuity' (Rimmon-Kenan, 
2002: 19). The assumption of continuity may only be a recent (and specifically 
western) social phenomenon, and indeed, in the example of serious illness, a 
tacit adherence to stable identity may prove untenable. Equally, the 
biographical rupture engendered by illness may reveal that continuity is in fact 
something of an illusion (Rimmon-Kenan, 2002: 19). This position, I believe, 
complements Herzlich's (1973) statements regarding the continuum of health: 
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the best that can be said is that we experience health in flux, 'one day at a time' 
(Rimmon-Kenan, 2002: 19), and it should not therefore be assumed that the 
health status of a person is a given. 
While narratives of fragmentation (Middlebrook, 1996), and 'chaos' narratives 
(Frank, 1995), address the issue of continuous existential disruption, and the 
near impossibility of 'writing chaos' as it is lived through, these are not the 
narratives ofthis study. The experience of heart disease has, for some, been 
disruptive, and has certainly brought chaos to their lives, for a while at least. 
But while some of my informants realise that, "I'll never be the same again", 
theirs are most decidedly stories of a quest for stability and community: 
"I wouldn't want to go through that again, but I must say, I've made lovely 
new friends, and I feel much more positive about myself. .. about everything. 
The rehabilitation clinic was great fun after all. I've had lots of support from 
people, and I'm enjoying my life now, which I didn't before. I've got my 
health back. A lot of good has come out of it. [ ... ] I think it's changed me in 
some ways, yes. You can't go through something like that and not change. I 
don't know, maybe you can. I've met people at the hospital, and it's like water 
off a duck's back to them, but I think, 'no, you're kidding'. They're just putting 
on a show, pretending it was nothing. How could it be nothing? I don't think 
they really appreciate what they've got, what everyone's been through ... their 
families and friends, and all that. It doesn't just affect you. [ ... ] At my age, 
though, I doubt I'll go through that again." 
(Kate, 75) 
Regarding continuity, it could be argued that the informants of this study, while 
aware of their existential fragility, nevertheless strive to regain at least some 
small sense of a previous self-identity: 
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"Even if it comes back and if I have to go for more surgery ... not that I'd want 
that, no, but, even if it happens all over again, at least I'll be able to remember 
how I coped with it. I hope I will. [ ... ] It changes you, yes, but you slip back 
into the old routines. It's quite an ordeal, but you can get your life back again. 
It could be worse." 
(Robert, 59) 
If illness narratives serve to bridge the gap between the before and after of 
illness, then narrative describes a continuity, 'governed by different emphases' 
(Rimmon-Kenan,2002: 13), that redresses the disruptive effects of illness. 
Illness narratives more often stress continuity over fragmentation, and as such, 
are typical of the classical narratives of modernity. In seeking their 'happy 
end', such illness narratives are characteristic ofthe ideological, teleological 
thrust of the Enlightenment quest for emancipation, and as such, meet the telic 
demand - 'for interpretation and repair' [my emphasis] (Leder, 1990: 81) - of 
illness. 
The already meaningful world is one of narratives. Some take the form of 
enduring, powerful, 'master narratives', upon which are modelled the various 
stories that we tell each other and ourselves. This is not to propose that master 
narratives possess a wholly normative function, for the 'narrative of resistance' 
enables the adoption of a critical stance toward, or non-identity with, dominant 
norms. Indeed, the 'narrative of resistance' is, arguably, the master narrative 
par excellence of the Enlightenment. That we recognize ourselves, understand 
ourselves, in and by way of these narratives, suggests an identity with 
narrative, or an identity that is forged in engagement with narrative, which, we 
must remember, is always constructed with others. A reconciliation is sought 
between 'master' (culturally approved) narratives and the sick person's own 
'personal', or 'micro' narrative. In other words, in its encounter with narrative, 
the self seeks out its virtual and actual social identity (Gof:frnan, 1990). That 
the self finds identity in and with the narratives of others supports the notion of 
mutuality, posited, for example, in some specifically feminist narratives 
(Martin, 1987; Salvaggio, 1999). 
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For Rimmon-Kenan (2002), the concept of narrative identity obviates the 
problem ofthe adequacy ofthe illness narrative as a method of explaining 
reality, because narratives of illness cannot be contained within generic 
categories: they are always changing form, altered by those who take them up. 
The disruption caused by serious illness is, according to Rimmon-Kenan 
(2002: 21), often associated with recurrent motifs. These motifs suspend 
textual fragmentation, forming connections between past and present, between 
health and illness, and, in recovery, between illness (past) and health (present). 
For Fanny Burney (Epstein, 1986) the motif was the handkerchief her surgeon 
placed over her face. Her limited vision during surgery seemed to represent the 
distance that she sought from the experience, and which she attained (partially) 
in her writing. As for my study, if, for example, staircases present a problem 
during illness, and are identified as physical and psychic obstacles, then it 
could be said that the sick person forms identity through these objects. 
Initially, it is a negative association in that the object eludes the intention of the 
person, but later, the object is regained, as the following section reveals. 
Walking the Walk (While Talking the Talk) 
Every story is a travel story - a spatial practice. 
(De Certeau, 1988: 115) 
Every site is haunted by countless ghosts that lurk there in silence, to be 
"evoked" or not. [ ... J Sites are fragmentary and convoluted histories ... folded 
up ages that can be unfolded but that are there more as narratives in suspense, 
like a rebus: symbolizations encysted in the body's pain or pleasure. "I feel 
good here" - an effect of space, set apart from language, where it suddenly 
bursts into light. 
(De Certeau, 1985: 143-144) 
As long as you are not abandoned by your memories, you are free to be 
abandoned with them. [ ... ] Do not waste the little time left. Retrace your 
steps. Your memories will come to your aid. 
(Bobbio, 2001: 12) 
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I tum now to the exploration of embodied practices such as movement, 
exercise, and my informants' activities outwith the setting of the cardiac 
rehabilitation unit. As we have seen, a consequence of heart disease is a 
decline in the ability to negotiate ordinary spaces such as stairs and inclines of 
any sort. Walking, sometimes even on flat surfaces, is itself quite a task. For 
many with heart disease, the ordinary activities of daily life become 
increasingly problematic. An essential aspect of their recovery of good health 
is the ability to return to the spaces - or more accurately, places - that the 
informants previously occupied with relative ease but, which in illness, became 
alien to them. To examine this further, as well as interviewing informants in 
their own homes, I used the 'go along' technique (Kusenbach, 2003), 
sometimes walking with informants in a local park as they went about their 
daily exercise routines. 
During the course of home-based interviews it became apparent that parks 
were important locales for many of my informants: the park represented the 
opposite ofthe constrictive space ofthe hospital, and of illness itself (Leder, 
1990: 80-81). I therefore decided to go along with some informants on their 
walks in and around one local park. It is one thing, particularly in these 
sedentary times, to talk about walking, but quite another to actually walk, and I 
wanted to find out if my informants really accomplished this task, or only 
talked about it. 
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It is argued that the 'go along' aids in accounting for 'the complex and subtle 
meanings of place in everyday experience and practices [and as such] brings 
greater phenomenological sensibility to ethnography' (Kusenbach, 2003: 455). 
(Recording interviews while walking presented only minor problems, for 
example, in the quality of recording, and the necessity to take occasional notes 
during and immediately afterwards as an aide memo ire to the task of interview 
transcription.) My initial notes referred to just how much elderly people talk 
with each other (and engage strangers in conversation) during their walks. 
However, my informants did not at first wish to spend too much time in 
conversation with old friends and acquaintances, preferring instead to 'push on' 
with their walk. De Certeau (1985: 129) writes that 'history begins at ground 
level, with footsteps [ ... ] a style of tactile apprehension and kinesic 
appropriation ... spatial creations ... they link sites one to another', and he 
continues by identifying walking with speaking. First, walking is a process of 
'appropriation of the topographic system Gust as the speaker appropriates and 
assumes language)'; second, 'it is a spatial realisation of the site Gust as the act 
of speaking is a sonic realisation of language)'; and third, 'it implies 
relationships between distinct positions ... Gust as verbal utterance is 
"allocution")' (De Certeau, 1985: 130). The informants seemed very eager to 
reassert (and re-formalise) their position within the interaction order of the 
park, and an ability to walk briskly, to cope with the various circuits in the 
park, was a prime indicator of their competence as human beings. Walking 
was, at this point of re-entry, more important than talking. The park was to 
them a meaningful place, and as such, it was of great importance that they re-
establish their relationship with it: 
"Yes, I went to the park three days after getting out of hospital, but that was 
far too soon. I couldn't walk very far and I didn't make it to the pond, which is 
where I usually end up ... for tea and cake with friends. In fact, I barely 
managed to go a few steps beyond the main gates. I wanted to go there [to the 
park] to let everyone see I was back. .. you know, 'here I am'. I wanted it to be 
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my park again. We spend so much time there, unlike the weekend walkers, as 
we call them. In fact, I don't always go at weekends, because of them. " 
(Elizabeth, 68) 
The 'transcendent and reflexive aspects oflived experience ... grounded in 
place' (Kusenbach, 2003: 456) are quite apparent in the above extract, as are 
De Certeau's (1985) comments on appropriation, realisation and allocution. 
The walker 'takes up' the task of walking again, finds her style of walking, and 
establishes, or fonnalises, her position (in relation) within the setting. 'Finding 
a style' (of walking) entails a recovery and modification of appropriate 
embodied dispositions. At first, the infonnant cannot walk far, but during the 
course of visits to the park she regains strength and draws upon and 
reconstructs her habitus - that is, skills, body-schemas, and techniques -
modifying it according to the objective conditions that prevail- for example, 
distance and time - until she attains a 'style' of walking that is appropriate, and 
which meets her needs. Finding her style was not restricted to this situation, 
for previously this infonnant (and others) stated that, immediately after leaving 
hospital, she found that staircases remained insurmountable: 
"For the fIrst week Ijust couldn't manage the stairs ... they're very steep .. .I 
found it was easier if I went up them on all fours, you know, with my hands 
out in front. I must have looked ridiculous, but I didn't care. Anyway, 
nobody saw me, and it worked. I could go up quite fast. Coming down was 
quite diffIcult, though. I tried coming down sitting ... on my bottom, but that 
wasn't a good idea. So I'd come down the same as I went up, on all fours, 
backwards. " 
(Elizabeth, 68) 
In this situation the standard repertoire of culturally approved styles is not 
adequate to the task of 'getting around'. This infonnant, and others, used a 
style that was drawn from memory; that is, she used a style that was more 
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appropriate to children. Thus, experience is modified by memory. It could be 
said that climbing the staircase became something of an adventure for this 
informant. While adults generally tend not to climb stairs in the above manner, 
the style is itself a 'body technique' (Mauss, 1979), that is, an effective and 
traditional (historical) bodily practice. This method of tackling stairs was 
effective in the specific situation of the informant's home, particularly as 
nobody saw her, but it is unlikely that she would have approached stairs in this 
manner in public, for that would doubtless have met with cultural disapproval. 
Another informant discussed her initial difficulties regarding mobility and 
motility: 
"Not long after the operation ... a couple of days, I think. .. they [rehabilitation 
nurses] made me walk round the ward. I was slow, but it was okay ... Just take 
tiny steps', they said. Then we were taken to the stairs the next day and we 
had to walk up one flight. It was terrible. I couldn't do it. .. my legs were like 
lead. They made me do it. . .lifting my legs slowly. It wasn't the pain .. .just 
the sheer weight. I couldn't believe how tired I felt. .. just a few stairs. [ ... ] 
When I came home I didn't want to go anywhere. I just sat in this chair for a 
few days. Then I went to the park. That was nearly as bad as before. I was 
so slow, but I kept thinking, 'tiny steps, tiny steps'. You've just got to find 
your way agam. 
(Anne, 65) 
Some of my informants were not only attached to the park, because it was 
where they met up with their friends, but they felt that they had a place in the 
park itself. The spatial practice of walking is thus associated with a specific 
'social architecture' (Kusenbach, 2003: 456). It is in the park, 'my park', that 
this informant reasserts herself, and reclaims this previously out of bounds 
space as her own: 
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"It was good to be back in the park, but it felt strange at first, because I'd been 
away for so long. It all felt very new .. .it was like going there for the first 
time, seeing what a beautiful place it is, the way it's all set out. I felt a bit like 
an explorer at first. That feeling's passed now, but I still feel different 
here ... better than before, even before I became ill." 
(Elizabeth,68) 
This infonnant's environmental perception has doubtless been altered by the 
experience of illness and recovery. What was for a while lost to her is now 
recovered as she traces out old paths, reacquainting herself with the 
environment, and clearly displaying her regained mobility and stamina. The 
body, in this situation, its 'management ... central to the acquisition of status and 
distinction' (Shilling, 1996: 127), is a fonn of social capital. As such, the 
active body is a speaking body in that it says something about the person's self-
worth, for as Shilling (1996: 85) notes, 'the vocabularies of body idiom used by 
people to classify others are also used for the purposes of self-classification' 
[emphasis in original]. Comparison with others is a significant aspect of 
recovery, for no matter how ill one feels, there is always someone who acts as 
an example: 
You know, it could be worse. I mean, there's S. [a friend], she hardly ever 
misses a day, even when it's raining, and she's had a terrible time of 
it. .. cancer, rheumatism, tinnitus, and goodness knows what else. If she can 
do it, so can 1. 
(Elizabeth, 68) 
Radley and Billig (1996: 221) note that a person's illness (or health) status 
should not be assumed as given, but that attention should be paid to the ways in 
which people 'constantly construct or reaffinn their own health in different 
circumstance and in different relationships [and that] health and illness are 
imputed'. As such, illness narratives articulate both person and world, such 
that the relation to others is always one of comparison. 
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It was evident that the motif in this section of the interviews was the park itself. 
While the rehabilitation unit was the 'springboard' to a healthier lifestyle, the 
park was where many of my informants felt most naturally at ease, and 
significantly, the place in which they were most able to assert their self-
identity. As stated in chapter three, most cardiac rehabilitation regimes do not 
begin until twelve weeks after surgery, by which time the patient is, generally, 
fairly active. Thus the park, for my informants, provided the setting in which 
the serious business of rehabilitation was first taken up. 
Many ofthe older people who use this park know that two-and-a-halftimes 
around the pond represents a walk of one mile. They know this because one of 
them, an informant of mine from a previous study, borrowed a pedometer from 
a park attendant and measured it. Now they refer to the pond as 'the bypass', 
and it has become the centre, the heart if you like, of this little community of 
people who have undergone coronary bypass surgery. Walking has, for them, 
become something of a game, which is not to say that they do not take their 
exercise seriously, because they do, but in framing their practice as play they 
'amplify the experiential depth oftheir routines' (Kusenbach, 2003: 470). The 
purely functional aspect of exercise is 'thickened' by the additional layers of 
meaning that the informant adds to this rather mundane daily practice. That 
these mundane practices become 'so saturated with meaning and experiential 
depth that they turn into symbols of someone's personal identity' (Kusenbach, 
2003: 471) was made apparent to me when I realised that, identified as a 
shifting companion, walking with different informants, tape recorder and 
notebook at the ready, I quickly became known as 'the heart guy'. 
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If walking in the park is a significant narrative element, it is at least because the 
ability to walk, the determination to reassert one's 'place' in the social 
architecture of the park, and to display a self that is competent and balanced -
that is, in harmony with the body - are exemplifying practices which represent 
a 'showing forth of qualities' (Radley, 1999a: 780) that capture the narrator's 
newly established perspective. 
The park, its history, its features, and the people in it, all potentially 
components of narrative, connote a totality in which the threads of the story are 
drawn together. The objects here are accorded a new power of signification, 
standing for something that they previously did not: for example, the pond is 
given a quantitative value - two-and-a-halflaps equal one mile - that enriches 
the qualitative experience. These sensuously felt objects, both immanent and 
transcendent, then come to exemplify specific, that is, historical, modes of 
being. Thus the mundane and the sublime appear in concert, united by the 
memory of the body. The memory of place is always that of what one did 
there (De Certeau, 1985: 144), of a bodily relation in time and space: 
"I've been coming here [to the park] for over sixty years. I met my wife right 
there [points to the middle of the pond]. We used to skate on the pond in 
those days ... a great way to meet the lassies. I haven't seen anyone do that for 
a long time ... skate. It was great fun." 
(Tom, 67) 
In illness the world is drained of significance, or rather, it is accorded a largely 
negative significance. It is a world of impossibilities, of dys-abilities, of spaces 
that cannot be walked, of stairs that cannot be climbed, of mirrors that reflect 
something other than oneself. Recovery entails a re-occupation of the spaces 
and dispositions that were lost to illness, so that they no longer 'stand out' as 
problems. 
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Keeping Oneself Occupied 
Aside from the 'sick role', illness is an occupation, in two senses ofthe word. 
First, illness occupies the body, much as an invading force occupies a territory. 
This is evident in that terminologies of combat are employed in medicine and 
ordinary speech - for example, cells attack invading bacteria and viruses, one 
'fights off a cold'. Describing the onset of rheumatic fever, Thomas Lewis 
(1944: 194) wrote, 'the modem conception of the disease is of an organism that 
invades the blood-stream ... '. Interestingly, (or perhaps not), rheumatic fever, 
now rare (in the developed world) thanks to more sophisticated antibiotic 
therapy than was available to Lewis, is recognized as a condition that arises 
from a streptococcal infection. The body's own bacteria attack the infection, 
and in so doing, scar the valves ofthe heart (Drake et a1., 1997: 107-108). The 
body thus attacks itself. Sawday (1996) also reminds us ofthe mediaeval 
figure of the body as a house or castle, and we are doubtless familiar with the 
expression 'my body is my temple'. Thus, like a temple, a house, or a castle, 
the body is something that must be defended. 
Second, and more importantly, illness is an occupation inasmuch as the term 
denotes the work that goes into recovery, the effort that is required on the part 
of the patient to 'fight' illness (Herzlich, 1973: 119-125): 
"It's no use just thinking about it. You've just got to drag yourself out and 
walk. There are days when I just can't face going out. But, I force myself, 
and it usually works. I'm usually glad I did it. You've got to make an 
effort ... otherwise, what's the point in having the operation." 
(Kate, 75) 
Thinking of this informant 'dragging herself out', I am reminded of a line by 
Beckett (1958): 'If! had the use of my body I would throw it out ofthe 
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window.' That I remember this line reminds me also that fiction informs life as 
much as life provides the subject for fiction. 
'Welcome to the Zipper Club' (Krusty the Clown, in The Simpsons) 
"A young doctor told me that Mr. A. [informant's surgeon] does nice 
scars ... he'd leave me with a thin straight scar. Mine's not straight." 
(Margaret, 65) 
The surgeon's knife slices through skin and flesh, and then an electric saw 
cleaves the sternum (breastbone) from top to bottom. The ribcage is spread 
open and the heart lies fully exposed, ready for surgery. The patient on the 
table could almost be a partially dissected cadaver. In recovery, as a 
consequence ofthe sternotomy, the patient will experience significant 
musculo-skeleta1 discomfort, described in some manuals as musculo-skeletal 
insult. For a coronary artery bypass, the patient's own veins are harvested from 
the lower leg, thus the patient will have additional scarring on the calf. 
Something that belongs to one part of the body is taken out and moved 
elsewhere. In the case of valve replacement, something that is quite foreign to 
the body - a pig's valve or a mechanical prosthesis - is implanted. 
The sternum scar, six to eight inches long, reveals the presence and activity of 
the surgeon: it is a (permanent) signature written on the body. In Western 
culture, the scar is generally viewed with some distaste - a sign of violence or 
disease - although Gilman (2001: 121-124) notes that the duelling scar, 
particularly in nineteenth and early twentieth century Germany, was a mark of 
distinction, of manliness and 'racial' purity, and that some who wished to 'pass' 
as German gentlemen actively sought cosmetic surgery to replicate the marks 
of the gentlemanly art of duelling. The scar, in Gilman's (2001) example, is a 
mark of authenticity and membership of a community, whereas the cosmetic 
scar, if detected, is the brand of a fraud. 
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Two years ago I attended a photographic exhibition of scars. The exhibition 
was held in a cafe used as a base by bicycle couriers, and the scars were theirs. 
I interviewed two couriers who both displayed their old wounds to me: 'car 
door, last April', 'dragged along by a bus, two years ago', 'altercation with a 
lamppost, February'. The couriers' bodies were like a map of the city, each scar 
corresponding to a spatial and temporal location. Their blase attitude toward 
their bodies, their seeming fearlessness, was expressive of their sense of 
belonging to an elite group. Similarly, the sternum scar, although generally 
hidden, indicates membership, and is a topic of discussion among some former 
patients: 
"Yes, we compare scars. Silly, isn't it, they're all pretty much the same, aren't 
they? But at first it was really horrible. I cried when I first saw it. It made 
me realise just how much I'd been ... ravaged .. .I don't think that's the right 
word, but it made me realise I'd been tom apart. I think it's because of that 
you want to show it to some people ... 'look what they did to me!' But it's like 
a badge too. Sometimes I see a little bit of a scar on someone, you know, if 
their blouse or shirt is unbuttoned, and I think, 'you've been through it too, you 
know what it's like'. Sometimes I want to say something, just a word of 
encouragement, but I don't. I'd be too embarrassed for them, in case they 
hadn't meant to show it. It's quite a private matter. .. the scar. I feel a bit 
ashamed sometimes, it's so ... ugly. " 
(Jane, 62) 
That the scar indicates some sense of shame is supported by Gilman (2001: 
48), when he states that the surgical scar hides the patient's secret. But the 
presence of the scar may also reveal that secret. The very sense of a secret, of 
something hidden, may imply a degree of shame, and speaks of a moral value 
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attached to bodily integrity. This is hardly surprising, given that in a culture of 
risk assessment and management, in which the social-behavioural basis of 
disease is stressed in order to heighten public awareness of personal 
responsibility regarding the care ofthe body, 'discourses of blame' (Morgan 
and Scott, 1993: 8) are attached to conditions such as coronary artery disease. 
The mark of disease on the body is thus perceived as a 'residue of indulgence' 
(Becker, 2000: 101): 
"I felt different about it before. If I heard of someone having a bypass I'd 
probably have thought that they deserved it somehow ... that they'd not taken 
care of themselves ... a heavy smoker, drinker, that kind of thing. But now I 
don't feel that way, but that won't stop people thinking about me that way. I've 
never smoked and I hardly drink at all. .. and I'm careful about what I 
eat ... well, for a good while anyway. After the op I felt as if I'd been 
punished, it hurt so much, that deep pain in the bones ... sheer agony for a 
while, I cried, and I still get the pain now, for shorter periods, but that's nearly 
a year since the op ... and the scar, it's hideous. It's no use to think this way, 
but I still wonder sometimes what I did to deserve it. 
(Marie, 64) 
The above informant previously associated heart disease with specific activities 
- drinking and smoking - and, as a non-smoking, occasional drinker, excluded 
herself from that 'stigmatised' group. The scar, however, is self-validating, 
representing something real (the presence of disease, and surgery) and saying 
something about the bearer (deserving or undeserving, violated, healthier). 
I have already suggested similarities between the experience of heart disease 
and the ageing process - reduced mobility, shortness of breath, fatigue - and 
while I could question the distinction between the breathlessness associated 
with ageing and with that of heart disease, I must strongly assert that my 
informants did not think of themselves as old people, or if they did, then they 
160 
did not regard their age as particularly problematic. We may wonder if people 
above the age of sixty are susceptible to cultural pressures regarding the care 
and presentation ofthe body, but, as Featherstone and Hepworth (1982, 1995, 
1996), and Turner (1995a) have observed, ageing is not what it used to be: 
[T]here is an inherent tension between the inner reflexivity of the subj ective 
self and the outer biological degeneration of the body. 
(Turner, 1995a: 258) 
"As you get older you expect things to go wrong. You can feel young in your 
head but you feel it in your bones, getting older. You just can't do what you 
used to do all the time. You slow down, you ache, and you start to sag in all 
the wrong places. It can't bother you, you can't let it bother you, but this 
surgery really did for me, and the scar. .. I always tried ... still do ... tried to take 
care of myself. .. but the scar, it's like the final insult. All these years I've been 
taking care of myself, and I'm not being vain when I say I looked good. I was 
never short of dancing partners when I was younger. I've started dancing 
again. But now I've this horrible scar. .. and it's not the only one, but it's where 
it is that gets me ... and people joke and say, oh, you should have got them to 
put a zip on it' .. .I don't know how many times I've heard that one. Ha, bloody 
hal I suppose the operation added years to my life ... yes, it probably has done 
that, but it's taken something away from me too. I don't think you can ever 
feel the same again after something like that." 
(Eleanor, 67) 
This informant experienced significant post-operative complications, and 
although she is much recovered, her experience was particularly traumatic. 
Her scar is quite ragged and she joked that her surgeon must have had a bad 
round of golf beforehand. The scar, for her, is more than just the locus 
musculo-skeletal'insult'. It is an insult to the integrity of her appearance and of 
her image of herself. The surgical scar is a mark of in authenticity (while 
simultaneously it represents something real), intimating that the bearer is 
flawed (Gilman, 2001: 124). While the possibility of further surgery lends 
some verity to the zipper joke, the scar also has a liminal quality I that it 
represents the boundary between the interior and the exterior, between the 
private space of the body and the public space of the social world. The scar 
reminds its bearer that the interior is but a cut away: 
"Yes, I worried about the wound opening up. I read a story about that 
happening. It scared the hell out of me." 
(Marie, 64) 
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"I felt really tender for ages afterwards. I kept worrying that it [the scar] 
would burst open. I was really worried. I'd get these sharp pains at the top, 
where the wire is [surgical wire is used to bind the sternum] and I thought it 
was coming loose. You !mow how they tell you to sleep holding a pillow to 
your chest, to support the chest? I still do that." 
(Andrew, 66) 
Fear ofthe wound reopened speaks of anxieties regarding the inside of the 
body - the 'anonymous visceral domain' (Leder, 1990: 38) -leaking to the 
outside, just as a sudden, inexplicable nosebleed may cause concern. The 
outside of the body is subject to 'a measure of personal command' inasmuch as 
'I can' (Leder, 1990: 49) choose to pick this up, walk over there, jump up and 
down, and so on. In short, I have volitional control of parts of my body (Leder, 
1990: 49). However, I cannot stop my stomach from 'rumbling', and neither 
am I aware of the circulation of blood in my veins, the action of my kidneys, 
liver, and other internal parts. The interior of the body is then a foreign land, 
its mysterious workings necessarily taken for granted. I catch glimpses of this 
mysterious interior, this 'hidden geography ofthe body' when I look at an x-
ray of my chest, or an echocardiograph of my heart, but, somehow it is never 
'my body'; rather it is 'the body' (Sawday, 1996: 7). 
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Doubtless the infonnants will eventually be able to gain the distance from their 
experience that Burney (Epstein, 1986) achieved, but the scarring of their 
bodies remains as a mark on their biography. The sternotomy scar meets the 
definition of stigma, as 'a mark made by a pointed instrument, a brand; a 
visible sign or characteristic of disease' (OED, 1990). It may seem excessive to 
focus upon such an unavoidable consequence of life-saving surgery, and given 
that some of the infonnants had other scars from previous, different surgeries, 
it may seem odd that they experience difficulties in coming to tenns with the 
sternum scar. But, in a culture that stresses a youthful, healthy presentation of 
self (Featherstone and Hepworth, 1982: 118), to be older and in diminished 
health, and to bear the sign of age and disease, runs contrary to valorised 
images of embodiment. The interview extracts suggest that the scar, as an aide 
memoire, written on the body, is a constant reminder of the infonnants' status 
and vulnerability: 
"I think it's where the scar is, right down the middle like that. The left side 
always feels weaker to me. It's like I've got a good side and a bad side." 
(Margaret, 65) 
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Seventh Narrative: The Loneliness of the Long Distance runner 
Do you remember Bob? Every now and then I meet Bob. Rather, I wave to 
him as he goes running by. After the disaster of the balloon angioplasty he 
decided to shape up and now he runs a few miles each day, sometimes as many 
as ten, he says. Bob's in his early seventies now, but he still works as a part-
time college lecturer and, as a skilled carpenter his furniture is in great 
demand. But what Bob loves best is running. Sometimes he stops for a brief 
chat and I ask if his heart's still in good condition. He says that he's better, of 
course, but he admits to worrying about it much of the time. I ask if he isn't 
pushing himself too hard by running every day, but he says that running helps 
him to forget his anxieties about his arteries. I ask him what he thinks about 
his arteries, and he replies that he imagines them clogging up again, and he 
admits that he's a bit scared to remain stationary for too long. I believe him 
because I think that Bob is haunted by the memory ofhis terrible experience. 
I imagine him, solitary, running and running, never quite able to escape his 
memory. Or perhaps he's running after it, trying to catch up with it. I can tell 
that he's anxious to resume his run and Ijoke that the only exercise I take these 
days is lugging my book-filled briefcase to and from work - academic 
aerobics. Bob asks if I'm still working on my thesis, and he always inquires 
politely ifhe's going to be in it. I reply yes, of course, you'll run right through 
the story. 
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Chapter Five: Toward Interpretation 
The meaning of the story is not immanent in the text. The process of 
theorising, analysing, and categorising personal narratives is shot through and 
through with the imagination and ways of seeing of the interpreter. 
(Bochner, 2001: 136) 
[I]magination [is] as important as rigour, meanings as important as facts, and 
the heart as important as the mind. 
(Bochner and Ellis, 2003: 506) 
Narrative analysis, as a fonn of sociological inquiry, has become increasingly 
(and problematically) privileged. Current attention to 'illness narratives' 
(among others, Atkinson, 1997; Ellis and Bochner, 1999; Frank, 1995,2000, 
2001; Kleinman, 1988; Radley, 1997, 1999a, 2002; Williams, 1984) is, 
perhaps, emblematic of a recuperation of the human subject, and marks a return 
to and recognition ofthe social actor's standpoint as a source of valid 
knowledge. Interest in narratives is indicative of a greater trend within the 
social sciences, which are currently witness to an efflorescence of alternative 
epistemologies that seek to challenge and subvert the orthodoxies of, for 
example, positivism, realism, and post-structuralism. The legitimisation of the 
illness narrative, as a fonn of social scientific inquiry, is illustrative of a 
general tendency, within late modem culture, that emphasises the significance 
of individual and lay beliefs (Emslie et aI., 2001; Radley, 1996), and which is 
itself a consequence of 'the loosening of the authority of the grand narratives of 
science and medicine' (Bury, 2001: 265). Thus, the tum to narrative accounts 
of illness, and consequently it seems that every conceivable medical condition 
now has its corresponding narrative. (perhaps we may soon look forward to a 
probing study of runny noses.) Despite, or perhaps because ofthe proliferation 
of illness narratives - which, as a topic of interest to sociologists, are a fairly 
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recent addition to the discipline - they have yet to gain full approval (Atkinson, 
1997; Atkinson and Silverman, 1997). 
In this chapter, following an introductory discussion of narrative form, I 
propose firstly that, to some extent, social scientists are sceptical toward illness 
narratives because sociology, as a practice that lacks the authenticity of self-
belief, is suspicious of voice, particularly of voice belonging to those of whom 
it writes. In the positivist view, ordinary speech lacks objectivity and is value-
laden, while at the opposite end of the spectrum, post-structuralists, in their 
privileging of text, are critical of voice either because language 'speaks' its 
subject, or because subjects may express politically incorrect - racist, 
homophobic, or Eurocentric - views (Charmaz and Mitchell, 1997: 194). 
Ordinary speech is deemed to be either a flawed medium of description that 
cannot reliably describe phenomenal existence, or, which simply reproduces it 
by encoding existing forms of power. 
Secondly, I want to stress that illness narratives are the ordinary tales of 
ordinary people, and that there is no reason why they should be accorded a 
privileged status over and above other forms of data-gathering (Atkinson, 
1997: 326). However, in providing an insight into how experience is organized 
and explicated, and as a social structure by which intersubjectivity is 
actualised, narratives may yet, as Atkinson (1997: 341) urges, be regarded as 
social facts, and as such, recognized as legitimate topics of investigation. 
I intend, therefore, to discuss some problems arising from the narrative tum. I 
do not argue that narrative provides unimpeded access to the human subject's 
reality, but neither do I adhere to the strictly objectivist view that the 
informants' truths can only reveal themselves through the 'transparent 
mechanism' (Charmaz and Mitchell, 1997: 194) of the scientific researcher. 
The researcher, as a human subject - an embodied person - is only as 
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transparent as the subject of research, despite prevailing notions of scientific 
objectivity. Narratives of experience are 'as conventional and as artful as any 
other mode of representation', and therefore it should not be implicitly assumed 
that they provide 'untrammelled access to a realm of hyper authenticity' 
(Atkinson, 1997: 341). 
The illness narratives of this thesis are, in a sense, works in progress, which is 
to say that there are no final, unequivocal statements to be made about them, no 
grand sociological conclusions to be drawn from them, and little regarding 
future health care policy suggested by them. Rather, the purpose of this thesis 
is to evoke the world of illness in order to illustrate the mundane, therefore 
general, predicaments of ordinary people. The illness narrative may represent 
a political accomplishment, particularly if it embodies the voice of lay 
experience (Radley, 1996) speaking out against the inequities inherent to the 
practice of medical science. It is the capacity of such narratives to speak in 
general, to provide a universal voice that challenges, or engages in dialogue 
with, the master narratives of, for example, medicine, patriarchy, and class, that 
is of importance. 
These illness narratives are quite clearly co-authored. They are the end result 
of semi-structured, in-depth interviews. My informants have never previously 
written about their experiences, but this does not mean that they have not 
employed narrative techniques to help make their lives more meaningful; for 
'the concept of narrative is not limited to written or oral discourse [it is] one 
mode of experiencing, perceiving, and interpreting the world, as well as 
negotiating identities' (Rimmon-Kenan, 2002: 22). Even if the informants are 
not the sole authors of their own lives, it can be argued that they are, at least, 
competent readers. Certainly, in telling their stories they adhere to common, 
structured, recognisable forms of expression. When asked if they ever thought 
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of their lives as narratives, the infonnants in this study replied similarly - with 
a look of mild puzzlement. I decided to revise the question: 
"Forget narratives. Could you or do you ever think of your life as a story?" 
"I don't see why not. People write biographies and autobiographies, so yes, 
why not? You're born, you grow up, work, get married, have children, then 
they have children, you become ill, and then later you die. That's a story for 
you." 
(Fred,70) 
While the above extract may contain the bare bones of a story, it requires some 
fleshing out. Although it depicts an ordered series of events, there is no detail, 
no real sense of a person telling a story; it is little more than a list. What 
constitutes a narrative, then? There is some agreement on the definition of 
narrative (Prince, 2001; Sternberg, 2001), that it is 'a spoken or written account 
of events, in order of happening' (OED, 1990). 'The distinguishing feature of 
narrative is its linear organization of events' (Cohan and Shires, in Franzosi, 
1998: 519). Narrative maybe 'defined as the representation of real or fictive 
events in a time sequence' (Rudrum, 2005: 195). According to these 
definitions, sequentiality (or time) is a fundamental constituent of narrative, but 
this on its own adds little to the above infonnant's statement, 'you're born, you 
grow up ... and then later you die', although, as a sequence of events familiar to 
all, much is implied. 
Sequentiality, or succession, as Todorov has it (1990: 28-38), is one of the two 
basic principles of narrative, the other being transfonnation. Succession - that 
one event follows another - implies the passage of time. It is worth noting that 
the passage of time, in narrative, is not necessarily a forward movement. 
Narratives may easily move back and forth in time. The second principle, 
transfonnation - that something changes significantly - suggests a shift in 
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intentionality, a change of direction, or of one narrative component 
transformed into another. These two principles, while equally necessary to the 
construction of narrative, co-exist in a relationship of tension as transformation 
alters the character of events: for example, one is healthy, something happens, 
and one becomes unhealthy. In the illness narrative, transformation is 
essential. Without transformation, the illness narrative would merely be 'an 
issueless re-enactment of the traumatic events it narrates (or fails to narrate)' 
(Rimmon-Kenan, 2002: 23): it would indeed be little different to a clinical 
description of the trajectory of disease. Indeed, some narratives are just that: 
issueless and pointless. 
These basic principles can further be elaborated. Todorov (1990: 29) identifies 
five obligatory elements of narrative: equilibrium, degradation of the situation, 
disequilibrium, quest and recovery, and re-establishment of the initial state of 
equilibrium. The illness narratives of the informants in this study broadly 
correspond with this, although theirs really begin with the second element, 
'degradation of the situation', as shown in chapter one. As Radley (1999a: 769) 
observes, 'disequilibrium' is a distinguishing feature of such narratives, which 
begin near or at the point of diagnosis, thus rendering the 'before' of illness 
unavailable to the reader. Furthermore, citing the old saw that one cannot step 
into the same river twice, I would question the possibility of a complete return 
to the initial state of equilibrium: 
"After the heart attack the doctor said my heart was permanently damaged. 
It's like part of the heart's dead. No amount of surgery can fix that. .. unless 
you have a transplant, and I'm not that bad. And the arteries are fixed, but the 
[rehabilitation] nurse said they could clog up again. [ ... ] It's worrying, yes, 




For Todorov (1990), however, the most interesting aspect of any narrative is its 
gnoseological (or epistemical) quality. By this he means that the events 
described in narratives are of less importance than the perception of them -
narratives should thus be evocative and productive of knowledge. Applied to 
the illness narrative, this is similar to Radley's (1999a: 791) observation that 
narrative, in fashioning a distinct world, 'lived as a totality ... exemplifies 
significant meaning about life and how one lives it'. The illness narrative, then, 
is not only a story about something; it is also, and more importantly, a way of 
'seeing as' (Radley, 1999a: 791). The illness narrative is not an account of, or a 
distortion of experience. It is an experience: 
Because it is a world, the world of the text necessarily collides with the real 
world in order to 'remake' it, either by confirming it or by denying it. 
However, even the most ironic relation between art and reality would be 
incomprehensible if art did not both disturb and rearrange our relation to 
reality. 
(Ricoeur, 1991: 6) 
The illness narrative is not only a portrayal of how to live with illness, and a 
transformation ofthe 'mundane world of disease' (Radley, 1999a: 779), but is 
an exemplification of an aesthetic act, or 'project', which, among other things, 
'allude[s] to qualities that figuratively capture the writer's spirit or outlook' 
(Radley, 1999a: 780). An aesthetic project, bearing some resemblance to, or 
drawing upon the same resources as fiction (Natanson, 1998; Ricoeur, 1991), 
the illness narrative is not a flight from reality. The recounted biography is a 
history, and therefore, is not unreal, but is, 'in the strict sense of the word, 
unverifiable' (Ricoeur, 1991: 7). Thus, narrative construction - narrativization 
- is of necessity then, an imaginative act. 
Paul Ricoeur, in discussion with Erik Nakjavani (1981: 1085), states that 'what 
is to be understood in a discourse is the quality of the world, the dimension of 
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the world ... which is opened up by communication'. By discourse he means 
'the messages we produce freely on the foundation and the structure of 
language' (Ricoeur, in Nakjavani, 1981: 1085). This 'production' entails a 
triangular relationship between the person who speaks, the person who listens 
and answers, and the world of things that are talked about. This would seem to 
suggest that it is not the literary qualities of a text that are of prime 
significance. Rather, it is the world which is evoked, the 'discovered reality 
which is made manifest by the dialogue' (Ricoeur, in Nakjavani, 1981: 1085). 
Eventually, the text frees itself from the limits of its production in speech: it 
survives the relationship that produces it, and therefore becomes autonomous, 
with 'a destiny distinct from that of its author' (Ricoeur, in Nakjavani, 1981: 
1085). This is the virtue of the text, for it opens up the possibility of a 
relationship that is greater, more comprehensive, than the dialogue that 
produced it. Consequently, the text also opens onto an unlimited audience -
anyone who can read may become a member of it. And the world that is 
revealed has 'an infinite horizon' (Ricoeur, in Nakjavani, 1981: 1086). Ifwe 
think of Fanny Burney's mastectomy letter, written close to two hundred years 
ago, the text, written in (imagined) dialogue with her friends and family, 
describes an experience that has long passed into history, yet her words 
resonate today, 'opening up' a world for the reader. 
Regarding narrative, Ricoeur's insight is to call attention to the 'work' that goes 
into the production of discourse (speech and text). This work is 'the activity 
through which we give form to matter'. From spoken, to written, to read, the 
text, as a 'kind of reality' which has made itself autonomous in relation to the 
initial situation in which it was produced, is amenable to 'a sort of 
appropriation which makes from something strange something appropriate and 
familiar' (Ricoeur, in Nakjavani, 1981: 1087). I will return to the issue of the 
'work' that goes into the construction of narratives later in this chapter, in a 
discussion of Atkinson's (1997) critique ofthe illness narrative. 
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Voice(s) 
The association of illness narratives with fiction is, for sociology at least, an 
unhappy one. This notion, that fiction exists in a sphere apart from 'real life', 
devalues such narratives, but what is of significance is that experience cannot 
be regarded as something distinct from the intersubjective acts of 
communication that produce it (Zaner, 2001: 138). Thus, the value of illness 
narratives resides in their communicative properties; in short, narratives not 
only provide a means by which people can talk to each other, but they also 
reveal a wealth of social and sociological detail that illuminates the grounds 
upon which such communication is made possible. 
[W]e can distinguish between writing's effort to master the 'voice' that it 
cannot be but without which it cannot exist, on the one hand, and the illegible 
returns of voices cutting across statements and moving like strangers through 
the house of language, like imagination. 
(De Certeau, 1988: 159) 
The sound of voices haunts the written word, its residue felt, for example, in 
the rhythms of prose (Salvaggio, 1999: 20), insinuated into the text as a mark; 
'an effect of metonymy ... a transitory fugitive, an indiscreet ghost ... a 
disturbing sound from a different tradition, and a pre-text for interminable 
interpretive productions' (De Certeau, 1988: 155). The written word, as an 
extension of, and to some extent a substitute for speech, never quite succeeds 
in capturing its 'phonic and oral' qualities (Cixous, in Salvaggio, 1999: 25), 
which is to say that text is less expressive than speech, it does not speak 'from 
the body'. In the same way, language cannot but fail to encompass that which 
it seeks to describe and explain: 
There can never be a complete utterance or language, encapsulating 
everything that can be said, for the simple reason that the ground of implicit 
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sense is always larger than the explicit signification of words. [ ... ] Speech is 
also fundamentally allusive or indirect, since every explicit signification 
makes reference to its horizon of possible senses, to say nothing of those 
layers of more primitive meaning which ground all linguistic meanings. 
[emphasis in original] 
(Spurling, 1977: 5) 
That language does not find identity with its referent is, in a Bakhtinian sense, 
its saving grace, for its very ambiguity ensures the struggle toward the creation 
of new meaning. I do not wish to ascribe a privileged status to speech, nor 
imply that speech is originary, because it always responds to another, 
preceding utterance, and consequently it is formed in the conflict between the 
'local need[ s] of a particular speaker to communicate a specific meaning, and 
the global requirements of language as a generalising system' (Holquist, 1990: 
60). Neither do I intend to oppose speech and text, to suggest that they are 
mutually exclusive; rather, I contend that there is always a gap between the 
telling of a story and its writing, and that telling (speech) is conditioned by the 
'generalising' structure of language. But, as language is itself the site of 
contestation, its systematising properties subject to 'interminable interpretive' 
revision, ordinary speech and formal language are 'taken up' - that is, in 
practice - dialectically, to produce new significations. 
Contrary to Cixous (in Salvaggio, 1999), Frank (1992: 167) writes that the 
student of the body cannot but gain an awareness of being a body, and that 'to 
write as a body is to express your embodiment in the text that your body is 
creating'. This points to a degree of reflexivity on the part of the 
researcher/narrator, and posits a demand that the unnameable aspects of 
embodied experience be addressed. 
Perhaps the greatest problem in writing other people's stories - or indeed one's 
own - is the inadequacy ofthe text to render a description ofthe richness of 
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expenence. Richardson (2002) notes that the imperatives of the discipline (in 
this case, sociology) determine the form of academic writing, and that this form 
shapes the content of that writing. However, this form is 'simply a literary 
technique and not the only legitimate carrier of social scientific knowledge' 
(Richardson, 2002: 414). Seeking 'alternative representations' that 'colour 
outside the lines' of the discipline, and conceding that they are not the only or 
best 'way to represent all social research knowledge', Richardson (2002: 414-
415) formulates a method of writing for both academic and non-academic 
readers. Acknowledging that language is a constitutive force, that it creates not 
a particular reality, but a particular view of reality, Richardson (2002: 415) 
states that writing is a form of ownership, and that 'no textual staging is ever 
innocent'. Given the impact of the 'cultural turn' upon the practice of social 
science, it seems unlikely that even the most determined positivist would 
imagine that hislher text was free of values, and personal and theoretical bias. 
However, the myth of the objectivity of authorial voice persists: indeed, 'silent 
authorship comes to mark mature scholarship ... [t]he proper voice is no voice 
at all' (Charmaz and Mitchell, 1997: 194). The difficulty with Richardson's 
(2002) position is that although in general she approves of alternative 
representations, and claims that no one text is ultimately authoritative, she yet 
privileges her chosen form of expression, the memoir. 
Richardson (2002: 417) claims that her memoir can be read as 'a crafted 
literary piece and as sociology', but the problem with this statement is that the 
intelligibility and impact of any text is dependent upon the reader's ability to 
find identity with or relevance in the text. How is the reader to know that the 
text is both scientific and literary? This position neglects the value of the 
reader to the construction of narrative. Narratives are not just stories told; they 
are stories shared. Richardson's (2002) writing is interesting and extremely 
personal- she asserts that 'the more concretely personal and detailed the text, 
the more its universality' (Richardson, 2002: 415) - but perhaps it is, in the 
end, only a literary text for sociologists rather than a sociological text for the 
literate. 
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The notion of scientific objectivity, that facts can somehow (be made to) reveal 
themselves, if only the scientist can find the correct distance from which to 
observe them, speaks not only of the privileging of vision - evidence of which 
is to be found in the increased reliance upon imaging devices in medical 
science - but is indeed the cornerstone of the (disembodied) scientific attitude. 
Ifnarrativization is an aesthetic project (Radley, 1999a), then it is the 
association of the aesthetic with the seemingly subjective that unsettles the 
scientific demand for objectivism, for as Hekman (1983: 104) observes, '[i]n 
the aesthetic experience the spectator is an intimate and inseparable part of the 
process of knowing [whereas] in the scientific model. .. the knower is defined 
as aloof from that which is known'. The position from which 'facts' can be 
observed - the Archimedean point - has been described as a view from 
nowhere (Harding, 1991), but scientific objectivity is hardly a voice from 
nowhere, because the language of science is quite distinct, for two reasons. 
First, it is a method that permits the complex interchange of ideas by way of a 
linguistically specific shorthand; second, it serves to render distinct the 
scientifically perceived world and the everyday world, for example, in the 
manner of Schutz's first and second order typifications. 
It is, however, the greatly valued anonymity of science that is, according to 
Franzosi (1998), its undoing. The absence of clues to the identity of the 
scientific narrator (Barthes, in Franzosi, 1998: 541), the emphasis on the 
referential function and the suppression of the emotive and connotative 
qualities of language undermines the reality of the stories that science tells. 
Franzosi (1998: 541-542) argues that if science purports to do more than tell 
stories, such that facts are to speak for themselves, then the scientific 'narrator', 
who is compelled to remain anonymous, is nothing more than the writer of 
fiction, who is also absent from the text. What makes this admittedly 
intriguing statement less than convincing is that science, as a social practice 
(Kuhn, 1970), is no less subject to the play of power and the structuring 
influences of, for example, patriarchal discourses, than any other forms of 
expression. The narrative voice of science is then (ideally) absent from the 
text, yet present (politically) as the master's voice: 
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Because social and political lives are built around the stories a people hear and 
tell each other, the question of discourse and mastery touches on the 
possibility of knowing how one is placed in the world. The alternative is not 
to adopt a discourse free of mastery, for no such discourse exists in our 
culture. 
(Foster, 1987: 135) 
The Trouble with Narratives 
[M]emory, experience, time, and biography are constituted through 
conventional acts of narrating [ ... ] the relationship between a life and a life 
history is far from simple. 
(Atkinson, 1997: 327) 
Taking issue with some illness narratives (for example, Frank, 1995; Kleinman, 
1988; Mishler, 1984; 1986), Atkinson (1997) and Atkinson and Silverman 
(1997) identify a 'stubbornly persistent Romantic impulse' toward a 
'confessional' revelation and privileging of personal experience; an impulse that 
finds its correlate in what they refer to as the 'interview society' (Atkinson and 
Silverman, 1997: 304). This impulse is Ubiquitous - from tabloid to 
broadsheet, on television and the Internet, and in health research and sociology 
- and, in its emphasis on the individual over the social, is founded upon an 
assumption of the existence and authenticity of an interior self, a self that is 
'anterior to external valuation [and which can be] rendered visible through 
dialogue' (Atkinson, 1997: 327). 
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In questioning whether narrative self-revelation is inherently more valid than 
other forms of social investigation and interpretation, Atkinson (1997: passim) 
argues that the privileging of one form of experience over another - for 
example, the patient's over the doctor's - neglects the social context in which 
narrative 'work' is accomplished. Regarding sociological interest in illness 
narratives, the expansion of qualitative research, and the attendant increase in 
the use of the in-depth interview as a research tool has reduced the range of 
possible data sources to the extent that 'methodological discussions ofthe 
analysis of qualitative data all too often tum out to be based on the analysis of 
interview transcripts' (Atkinson and Silverman, 1997: 307). The persistent 
belief that interviews reveal 'depth' or attain 'deep disclosure' presupposes both 
ease of access to the psychic interior of the individual and the adequacy of 
language to accurately describe the private life ofthe speaking subject. 
The trend toward confessional narrative, which 'place[s] the biographicaL .. 
narrated self at the heart of social inquiry' (Atkinson and Silverman, 1997: 
309), is representative of a 'revolt against monologic modes of authorship' that 
celebrates multivocality, and is expressive of a desire to 'empower otherwise 
muted groups' (Atkinson and Silverman, 1997: 308). However, the emphasis 
on subjectivity and 'lived experience' neglects the wealth of 'objective data' that 
is to be found in narratives (Atkinson and Silverman, 1997: 309), and is 
inevitably reductive in that the 'multiple modes of performance, of ordering, of 
remembering, of interacting' which comprise narrative construction are 
marginalized for the sake of realising a hyper-authentic self (Atkinson, 1997: 
343). 
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Discussing the discursive production of the self, albeit in tenns of machineries 
of State, Foucault (1983: 214) observes that the power exerted by institutions 
(such as medical science) is of 'an individualising and totalising fonn ... a fonn 
that cannot be fully exercised without knowing the insides of people's 
minds ... without making them reveal their innennost secrets'. The interview 
society to which Atkinson and Silvennan (1997) refer is surely, then, ofthe 
same order: 
The interview society thus affirms the speaking subject, with an authenticity 
guaranteed as the author of his or her life. The life is offered, in the interview, 
as something to be revealed or rehearsed rather than accomplished or 
constructed. 
(Atkinson and Silverman, 1997: 310) 
Radley (1997) too is critical of Frank (1995), arguing that it is not narratives 
that construct the world, but narrators. Narrativization is more than linguistic 
discourse that makes and unmakes body and world (Radley, 1997: 94); it is 'an 
enacted demonstration of a way of being that is "known in the doing", so to 
speak' (Radley, 1997: 96), an expressive activity rather than purely denotative. 
Narrative does not reveal an authentic life, but instead alludes to that which can 
be done. 
The coherence of the 'interview society' is made possible by the 'civilising' 
process of individuation, the technology of confession, and the emergence of a 
health care system directed toward the psychology of individuals. Indeed, May 
(1992), after Foucault (2003), has already described the emergence of a 
therapeutic discourse in medicine that is directed toward fixing the patient as 
an individual and penetrating his or her most intimate dispositions (May, 1992: 
591-600). The 'disassembly' and subsequent mystification ofthe patient during 
the process of medicalisation is redressed by way of a therapeutic strategy of 
talking, listening or counselling, the desired consequence of which is the 
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reinstatement ofa 'real' or 'authentic' self (May, 1992: 591). ill addition, 
Armstrong (1995) identifies the current object of medical attention as the 'risky 
self', the precarious normality of which must be perpetually monitored. Thus, 
the self that is revealed in therapeutic discourse is deemed to be somewhat 
fragile and must therefore be renewed through self-revealing interaction with 
appropriate clinical agencies. 
Atkinson (1997: 341) acknowledges that 'narrative formats ... are among the 
cultural resources that are available for the social construction of health and 
illness [but] the ubiquity of narrative and its centrality to everyday work are not 
license simply to privilege those forms'. While I agree that the ubiquity of 
narrative is not reason enough to accord it a special status, its prevalence in the 
arts and human sciences demands that social science (at least) question 
narrative on methodological grounds. The authors of illness narratives 
criticized by Atkinson (1997) and Atkinson and Silverman (1997) neglect to 
observe that stories are only part of a greater reality, that 'all writing exists in a 
larger world of writing' (Foster, 1987: 129), therefore interpretation of 
narrative can never be more than provisional, 'always contingent upon a wider 
horizon of writing [thus] the meaning ofa work cannot be found within its own 
boundaries' (Foster, 1987: 1). illtertextuality unsettles the integrity ofthe 
narrative, therefore narrative is limited to the evocation of a world, and not to 
the self-revelation of the narrator. A commitment to understanding narrative 
must be conditioned by an equal commitment to understanding forms of life 
(Atkinson, 1997: 332). To believe that narratives 'speak for themselves' is to 
adhere to a 'vulgar realism' (Atkinson, 1997: 327), which holds that the truth of 
the speaking subject can be elicited from a single vantage point. The task of 
the social researcher is to re-contextualise, that is, establish the speaking 
subject's social setting, and recognize how narratives 'grow' out of interaction. 
Referring to his earlier (1981) work on the clinical encounter, Atkinson (1997: 
328) notes that although the clinical setting de-contextualises - that is, 
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objectifies and translates the patient 'into a multiplicity of measurements and 
representations', the hospital is itself the site of 'orations, narrations and 
disputations', all of which goes to suggest that narratives (and narrators) do not 
exist in a vacuum: 
In the midst of a highly technologized, scientific profession, the anecdote is a 
clear reminder of the fundamental nature of medicine's 'raw material', the 
exigencies of the particular illness. [ ... ] Something so pervasive and so 
contrary to medicine's scientific ideal as the anecdote must have a function in 
the everyday business of medicine. 
(Hunter, 1991: 70) 
Thus far I have presented an image of medical science as an impersonal, 
monolithic (or mono logic ) structure of social control. I have omitted to state 
that medical practice is itselfnarrativized. What Hunter (1991) brings to this 
story is that the illness narrative cannot be properly understood without 
reference to its other, the medical narrative. Therefore, narratives cannot be 
properly analysed if they are conceived as individual productions. Rather, due 
attention must be given to the intertextual, situated nature ofnarrativization. It 
is thus vital that those who would endorse illness narratives take heed of the 
underlying structures that shape narratives, and the play of power that is their 
very foundation: 
[O]ur personal narrative is one contribution to the more broadly accepted 
narrative which is created by negotiation between the different participants in 
the setting and which is influenced by the power structure of the social 
context. 
(Stelter, 2000: 69). 
Morris (1998, 261-262) argues for a 'narrative bioethics', as 'a principle that 
respects - rather than a prejudice that automatically mistrusts or excludes - the 
evidence derived from human emotional experience'. Just as illness is an 
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emotional experience - indeed, it could be argued that all experience has an 
emotional content/context - so language is suffused with emotion. Language 
has a history, a social life that is already moral and emotional. Thus our words 
bear the traces of a previous usage: 
Every word gives off the scent of a profession, a genre, a current, a party, a 
particular work, a particular man, a generation, an era, a day, and an hour. 
Every word smells of the context and contexts in which it has lived its intense 
social life. 
(Bakhtin, in Morris, 1998: 263) 
To conclude this chapter, against the criticism that illness narratives are too 
particularistic, that in focusing upon the individual in his or her experience of a 
specific illness, the social context is lost, let me remind the reader of a dictum 
that is most often directed toward first year sociology students. A prime 
function of sociology is to find evidence of the general in the particular, to 
show that private troubles are indeed public issues, 'to find out what is going on 
in the world, and to understand what is happening in [ourselves] as minute 
points ofthe intersection of biography and history within society' (Mills, 1970: 
14). 
What Atkinson (1997) reveals most forcefully is that narratives are not 
'personal accounts'; that they are entirely social in nature. 
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Conclusion 
Perception is the experience of what actually presents itself, and it is 
unintelligible without reference to the fundamental bodily activities that seek, 
solicit, find, and entertain that presentation as their object. Perceptual objects 
are thus discerned by the percipient not merely in fact, but de jure, as objects 
custom-tailored by and for him, as objects of, by, and for the body-subject. In 
this way the body contributes a categorical structure to perceptual objects ... by 
providingfarms of actuality satisfied by the kind of object that distinctively 
presents itself as actually existing. Functioning in this way, the body 
progressively fleshes itself out, determining not merely things but also itself as 
a being together with them in a common world. [emphasis in original] 
(Todes, 2001: 265) 
This thesis has been concerned with writing about and, of course,from 
embodied experience. To adopt a perspective that takes full account of 
embodiment requires a conception ofthe body that, as a methodological figure, 
is non-dualistic. That is to say, body and mind must not be conceived as 
distinct, opposed, 'entities'. 
However, as indicated throughout, experience is so often characterised by 
disjunction. It would be more accurate to say that experience is not thought of 
as embodied. It is, rather, a sometimes detached experience of the body. That 
is, the body is experienced as an object, as something exterior to the 
immediately present self. But, because it is not, in actuality, external to the 
person, the body presents itself as a problem: it is something that is either not 
there for us, or is felt as a burdensome presence. For example, a pain in some 
body part might be felt as something belonging to the part alone. The body 
part is objectified, yet at the same time, as long as the pain is felt, it cannot 
appear exactly as an object, that is, similar to other objects that 'do not appear 
to be mine' (Todes, 2001: 59). Thus embodiment is felt, and acted out or lived, 
paradoxically. The body is both present and absent; both subject and object 
(and neither subject nor object). 
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It would seem that we readily identify ourselves with our thoughts. Thought is 
something that 'we do inside our heads' (Steinberg, 2005: 18); the objects of 
thought are things that exist 'out there'. Subjectivity is associated with the 
thought, not with the objects of thought. Therefore, the self identifies with the 
introspective subject. Regarding the infinite regression that is inherent to 
thinking the subject/object distinction, the following question arises: 
If we can be aware of our thinking processes themselves, it seems to follow 
that this thinking-about-thinking-about-stuff is somehow a higher or more 
central activity than just plain thinking. But if it is, what part of us is thinking 
about that? [emphasis in original] 
(Steinberg, 2005: 18) 
I have suggested that embodiment is a praxical orientation to and relationship 
with the world; that being and having a body is the condition of our being in 
the world. This world is already there-for-us; it is a social world prior to our 
entry into it. It does not need to be constituted in consciousness because its 
existence is the condition of our having a consciousness of it. There is, 
nevertheless, a tension, between the felt flow of experience as it is lived 
through, and reflection upon experience. In short, experience, for it to be 
understood as experience, must be accommodated and constituted 
meaningfully. The disruptive effects of serious illness heighten the tension 
between appearance and experience . 
., ., ., 
Social institutions and discursive practices cannot be understood apart from 
the real lived experiences and actions of embodied human beings across time 
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and space. Social theory must therefore be rooted in the problems of human 
embodiment. Only on this basis can we put minds back in bodies, bodies back 
in society, and society back into bodies. 
(Williams and Bendelow, 1998: 209) 
While the subject of medicine is, ostensibly if not in fact, the body, social 
science has only recently taken the body to its heart. For so long the exclusive 
property of medical science, the body is currently the site of social/political 
debate. This challenge to the authority of medicine marks a recognition of the 
foundational significance of the body - as the foundation for social action and 
social structure. The body is not only a medical(ised) object, but medicine 
provides an appropriate site in which to do battle for the recovery ofthe body, 
both in everyday life and, in the social sciences. 
Consequently, social science has taken up analysis of illness narratives as a 
method of bringing the body back in to social theory. This demands an 
attentiveness to the ways in which the body is constructed as an object, and to 
the expressivity of the 'lived body'. Writing about recovery from heart disease 
entails the recognition that something a/the body is recovered also. I have 
argued that narrativization is a fundamental, if not universal feature of social 
life. Narrativization is one way of constituting experience meaningfully and, 
importantly, of communicating and thus sharing experience. As a form, 
narrative provides a means of ordering and re-ordering the 'events' of which 
experience is comprised. As such, narrative is a means of thinking and 
enacting time, both past and present, and directed toward a future (Ricoeur, 
1991). Experience is thus temporally organized by narrative: 
[T]here is always the presence and persistence ofthe past in the present 
moment of awareness, which is also simultaneously oriented toward a future 
that is partially scaffolded upon these preceding mnemonic structures. 
(Throop, 2003: 232) 
184 
It could be said that while the informants ofthis study may not think oftheir 
lives as narratives, they nevertheless structure their experiences according to 
culturally sanctioned forms of storytelling. The experience of serious illness -
in this example, heart disease - is such that it demands interpretation (Leder, 
1990). I have commented upon the individualising effects of illness, in terms 
of social dislocation and affective isolation. Todorov's (1990) theory of 
narrative form, applied to the illness narrative, reveals that narrativization 
presents the sick person with the opportunity to organize their past and present 
in a linear fashion, from the disequilibrium felt at the onset of disease to the 
eventual recovery of relative good health and, thus, the re-establishment of 
social equilibrium. 
However, I argued that illness narratives generally stand in opposition to the 
larger, more powerful narratives of medical science. Medical narratives were 
written on the body in the sense that the body provided the foundation of 
medical scientific inquiry. As such, it could be said that medicine has 
appropriated the body, and sought to determine its experiential modes. 
The contemporary medicalised body is a readable text. However, the body, at 
times ignorant of or resistant to such typifications, insists upon writing its own 
stories. The memory of the body is such that our present mode of embodiment 
is founded upon a larger and older history of the body. That experience is 
articulated by way of the mnemonic capacity of the body. 
" " " 
Bauman (2002) observes that to question the social order, or indeed any aspect 
of the human world, is to be creative, and therefore questioning entails the 
breaking of rules. The writer of sociology (or anyone who questions) is thus a 
rule-breaker. Furthermore, the sociologist's job is to restore to view 'the lost 
link between objective affliction and subjective experience' (Bauman, 2002: 
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366). It is the 'suspension of self-questioning' (Bauman, 2002: 369) that, in this 
period of human history, bars human awareness of its own autonomy. 
I suggest that the intensity of the experiences described in this thesis has, for 
some at least, invoked a determination to assert or reassert the questioning 
attitude. 
"I think I'm a lot more ... determined now. I don't take as much nonsense off 
people as I used to. When you've been through that. .. being that ill, and then 
the whole process of getting over it, you think about your situation. I feel 
better than ever now, and I'm not going to do anything I really don't want to. 
I'm living more for myself now. [ ... J I'm not saying I don't care about anyone 
else. Just that I'm considering myself more. Thinking about what I want out 
of life. II 
(Wilma, 62) 
The emergence of the illness narrative as a form of resistance is a consequence 
of the lessening of the power of medical discourse (Bury, 2001) and, of the 
appearance ofthe reflexive consumer (Giddens, 1991). It could be said that 
medical science is spreading the burden of responsibility for health by 
publishing information in various forms; for example, television and the 
Internet. The question remains, however, of whether medical practitioners 
wish to recognize and engage with the knowledgeable patient, or if in fact such 
a patient is a myth. 
., ., ., 
Drawing a comparison between surgery and the interviews of this study, I 
suggest that both involve an opening up ofthe body to examination. Just as the 
medical gaze reveals the mysteries ofthe body, so the interview provides 
insights into being and having a body. And just as anatomists found 
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correspondence with the larger world, so we may find evidence of the general 
in the particularities of embodied experience. 
Regarding future research, sociology has to date only scratched the surface of 
the body. Greater attention to the various historical forms of embodiment 
would perhaps yield knowledge of why the body is experienced as it is today. 
To this end, a social-historical analysis ofthe relation between modes of 
production and the experience of the body is recommended. 
Further to this, it has been argued (for example, Martin, 1992) that our bodily 
dispositions are changing. Certainly, the body is not static; it is always in 
motion. The greatest accomplishment of medical science is that bodies now 
last longer. This study has shown that people in their sixties and seventies can 
survive that, which only thirty or forty years ago, would have proved fatal. 
Improvements in surgical techniques (for example, robot-assisted surgery), 
combined with technological developments such as prosthetic heart valves and, 
soon, reliable mechanical hearts, are effectively reshaping the human body. 
We may then ask, in wonder or concern: what is to become of the body? 
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Final Narrative: There's Something About Mary 
I first met Mary at a bus stop. We met there a few times but, aside from polite 
nods and smiles, we had never really spoken. But that day there was 
something about her that urged me to speak. At first I said something like: "It's 
a nice day, isn't it? Have you been waiting long?" And then I said - and I 
could hardly believe such words sprang from my tongue - "1 hope you don't 
mind my asking, but do you have a heart condition?" Mary looked surprised 
(and here I must stress that one should never surprise someone who has a 
heart condition) and said, "Yes, but how do you know?" I told her that her 
body gave her away, that her posture seemed imbalanced; that she was 
protecting her left side. I also said that her pallor was distinctly blue. Now, 
both of these signs could indicate something else, but I just happened to be 
right. Our bus arrived and, sitting together in the space reserved for the 
elderly and the infirm, Mary leaned close and told me her story. She had 
fainted at an airport. Wheeling her suitcase behind her it suddenly felt as if it 
were dragging her into the ground. That was the last thing she remembered 
before coming round in the medical treatment room. On returning home she 
went though the usual procedures and eventually she was put on a waiting list 
for bypass surgery. I asked her how she felt about that. She said that she was 
worried, but not too worried. Then she said, "it'll be a wee adventure", and I 
said, 'yes, you're adventure's already begun". It was time for me to get off the 
bus. I turned to Mary and said, "end of the line", and she replied, "notfor me". 
188 
References 
Amundsen, G. B. and D. W. Ferngren (1983) 'Evolution of the patient-physician 
relationship: Antiquity through the Renaissance', pp. 3-46 in E. E. Shelp (ed.) 
The Cilnical Encounter. Dordrecht: Reidl. 
Armstrong, D. (1983) The Political Anatomy of the Body: Medical Knowledge in 
Britain in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Armstrong, D. (1993) 'Public Health Spaces and the Fabrication ofIdentity', 
Sociology, vol. 27(3): 393-410. 
Armstrong, D. (1995) 'The rise of surveillance medicine', Sociology of Health and 
Illness, vol. 17(3): 393-404. 
Armstrong, D. (1999) 'Bodies ofknowledgelknowledge of bodies', pp. 17-27 in 
C. Jones and R. Porter (eds) Reassessing Foucault: Power, Medicine and the 
Body. London: Routledge. 
Aronowitz, R. A. (1998) Making Sense of Illness: Science, Society and Disease. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Asendorf, C. (1993) Batteries of Life: On the History of Things and Their Perception 
in Modernity. Berkeley, CAL: University of California Press. 
Atkinson, P. (1981) The Clinical Experience: The Construction and Reconstruction of 
Medical Reality. Westmead: Gower. 
Atkinson, P. (1991) The Ethnographic Imagination: Textual Constructions of Reality. 
London: Routledge. 
Atkinson, P. (1997) 'Narrative tum or blind alley?', Qualitative Health Research, 
vol. 7(3): 325-344. 
Atkinson, P. and D. Silverman (1997) 'Kundera's Immortality: the interview society 
and the invention of the self, Qualitative Inquiry, vol. 3(3): 304-317. 
Baron, R. J. (1985) 'An introduction to medical phenomenology: I can't hear you while 
I'm listening', Annals of Internal Medicine, vol. 103(4): 606-611. 
Barthes, R. (2000) Mythologies. London: Vintage. 
Bauman, Z. (2002) 'Afterthought: on writing; on writing sociology', 
Cultural Studies+-+Critical Methodologies, vol. 2(3): 259-370. 
Beaumont, J. (1953) 'Exchange work in the USA', The Almoner: A Journal of Medical 
Social Work, vol. 5(11): 473-477. 
189 
Becker, A. E. (2000) 'Nurturing and negligence: working on others' bodies in Fiji', pp. 
100-115 in T. J. Csordas (ed.) Embodiment and Experience: The Existential 
Ground of Culture and Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Birke, L. (1999) Feminism and the Biological Body. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
Bobbio, N. (2001) Old Age and Other Essays. Cambridge: Polity. 
Bochner, A. P. (2001) 'Narrative's virtues', Qualitative Inquiry, vol. 7(2): 131-157. 
Breakey, J. W. (1997) 'Body-image: the inner mirror', Journal of Prosthetics and 
Orthotics, vol. 9(3): 107-112. 
Burkitt, I (1999) Bodies of Thought: Embodiment, Identity and Modernity. 
London: Sage. 
Bury, M. (2001) 'lllness narrative: fact or fiction?', Sociology of Health and Illness, 
vol. 23(3): 263-285. 
Butler, J. (1993) Bodies that Matter. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Butler, J. (1998) 'Foreword', pp. ix-xvi in M. Natanson, The Erotic Bird: 
Phenomenology in Literature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Butt, T. and D. Langdridge (2003) 'The construction of self: the public reach into the 
private sphere', Sociology, vol. 37(3): 477-93. 
Callinicos, A. (1996) Against Postmodernism: A Marxist Critique. Cambridge: Polity. 
Cay, E. L. (1995) 'Goals of rehabilitation', pp. 31-53 in D. Jones and R. West (eds) 
Cardiac Rehabilitation. London: BMJ. 
Charmaz, K. (1983) 'Loss of self: a fundamental form of suffering in the chronically 
ill', Sociology of Health and Illness, vol. 5(2): 1268-12912. 
Charmaz, K. (2002) 'Stories and silences: disclosures and self in chronic illness', 
Qualitative Inquiry, vol. 8(3): 302-328. 
Charmaz, K. and R. G. Mitchell jr. (1997) 'The myth of silent authorship: self, 
substance, and style in ethnographic writing', pp. 193-215 in R. Hertz (ed.) 
Reflexivity and Voice. Thousand Oaks, CAL: Sage. 
Claessens, P., P. Moons, B. Dierckx de Casterle, N. Cannaerts, W. Budts, and M. 
Gewillig (2005) 'What does it mean to live with a congenital heart disease? A 
qualitative study on the lived experience of adult patients', European Journal 
of Cardiovascular Nursing, vol. 4: 3-10. 
Connell, R. W. (2002) Gender. Cambridge: Polity. 
190 
Connolly, M. (2001) 'Female embodiment and clinical practice', pp. 177-196 in S. K. 
Toombs (ed.) Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Conrad, P. (1992) 'Medicalization and Social Control', Annual Review of Sociology, 
vol. 18: 209-232. 
Crossley, N. (1996) Intersubjectivity: The Fabric of Social Becoming. London: Sage. 
Csordas, Thomas (2000) 'The body as representation and being-in-the-world', pp. 27-
47 in Thomas Csordas (ed.), Embodiment and Experience: The Existential 
Ground of Culture and Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cunningham, A. (1989) 'Thomas Sydenham: epidemics, experiment and the "Good 
Old Cause"', pp. 164-190 in R. French and A. Wear (eds) The Medical 
Revolution of the Seventeenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Davin, S. (2003) 'Healthy viewing: the reception of medical narratives', 
Sociology of Health and fllness, vol. 25(6): 662-679. 
De Certeau, M. (1985) 'Practices of Space', pp. 122-145 in M. Blonsky (ed.) On Signs. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
De Certeau, M. (1988) The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
De Man, P. (1979) 'Semiology and Rhetoric', pp. 121-140 in 1. V. Harari (ed.) 
Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Diprose, R. (2002) Corporeal Generosity: On Giving with Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty, 
and Levinas. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Dock, W. (1944) 'The evil sequelae of complete bed rest', Journal of the American 
Medical Association, vol. 125: 1083-1085. 
Douglas, K. (1972) Collected Poems. London: Faber and Faber. 
Drake, W. M., P. A. Broadhurst, and D. S. Dymond (1997) Cardiology Explained. 
London: Chapman and Hall. 
Elias, N. (1996) The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners and State Formation 
and Civilization. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Elkins, K. (2003) 'Middling memories and dreams of oblivion: configurations of a 
non-archival memory in Baudelaire and Proust', Discourse, vol. 24(3): 47-66. 
191 
Ellis, c., C. E. Kiesinger and L. M. Tillmann-Healy (1997) 'Interactive Interviewing: 
Talking About Emotional Experience', pp. 119-149 in Rosanna Hertz (ed.) 
Reflexivity and Voice. Thousand Oaks, CAL: Sage. 
Ellis, C. and A. P. Bochner (1999) 'Bringing emotion and personal narrative into 
medical social science', Health, vol. 3(2): 229-237. 
Emslie, c., K. Hunt and G. Watt (2001) 'Invisible women? The importance of gender 
in lay beliefs about heart problems', Sociology of Health and Illness, vol. 
23(2): 203-233. 
Epstein, J. L. (1986) 'Writing the unspeakable: Fanny Burney's mastectomy and 
the fictive body', Representations, vol. 16: 131-166. 
Eysenbach, G. (2000) 'Consumer health informatics', British Medical Journal, vol. 
320: 571-577. 
Farley, R. L., T. D. Wade, and L. Birchmore (2003) 'Factors influencing attendance at 
cardiac rehabilitation among coronary heart disease patients', European 
Journal of Cardiovascular Nursing, vol. 2: 205-212. 
Featherstone, M. and M. Hepworth (1982) 'Aging and inequality: consumer culture 
and the new middle age', pp. 97-126 in D. Robbins (ed.) Rethinking Social 
Inequality. Westmead: Gower. 
Featherstone, M. and M. Hepworth (1995) 'Images of positive aging: a case study of 
Retirement Choice magazine', pp. 29-47 in m. Featherstone and A. Wernick 
(eds) Images of Aging: Cultural representations of Later Life. 
London: Routledge. 
Featherstone, M. and M. Hepworth (1996) 'The mask of ageing and the postmodern 
life course', pp. 371-389 in M. Featherstone, M. Hepworth, and B. S. Turner 
(eds) The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory. London: Sage. 
Ferguson, H. (1997a) 'Me and my shadows: on the accumulation of body-images in 
Western society part one - the image and the image of the body in pre-modem 
society', Body and Society, vol. 3(3); 1-31. 
Ferguson, H. (1997b) 'Me and my shadows: on the accumulation of body-images in 
Western society part two - the corporeal forms of modernity', Body and 
Society, vol. 3(4): 1-31. 
Ferguson, T. (1997) 'Health online and the empowered medical consumer', Journal of 
Quality Improvement, vol. 23(5): 251-257. 
Finkelstein, J. (1997) 'Chic outrage and body politics', pp. 150-167 in K. Davis (ed) 
Feminist Perspectives on the Body. London: Sage. 
Foucault, M. (1980a) 'The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century', pp. 166-
192 
182 in Colin Gordon (ed.) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings, 1972-1977. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Foucault, M. (1980b) 'The confession of the flesh', pp. 194-228 in Colin Gordon 
(ed.) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. 
Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Foucault, M. (1983) 'The subject and power', pp. 208-226 in H. L. Dreyfus and 
P. Rabinow Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Foucault, M. (1991) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Foucault, M. (2003) The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical 
Perception. London: Routledge. 
Frank, A. W. (1995) The Wounded Storyteller. Body, Illness, and Ethics. 
Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. 
Frank, A. W. (1999) 'Relations of power and "informed choice": commentary on Rose 
Weitz's "Watching Brian die"', Health, vol. 3(2): 239-246. 
Frank, A. W. (2000) 'The standpoint of the storyteller', Qualitative Health Research, 
vol. 10(3): 354-365. 
Frank, A. W. (2001) 'Experiencing illness through storytelling', pp. 229-245 in 
S. K. Toombs (ed.) Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine. 
Dordrecht: K1uwer. 
Franzosi, R. (1998) 'Narrative analysis - or why (and how) sociologists should be 
interested in narrative', Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 24: 517-554. 
Fridlund, B. (2002) 'The role of the nurse in cardiac rehabilitation programmes', 
European Journal of Cardiovascular Nursing, vol. 1: 15-18. 
Fullagar, S. (2002) 'Governing the healthy body: discourses ofleisure and lifestyle 
within Australian health policy', Health, vol. 6(1): 69-84. 
Gallagher, S. (2001) 'Dimensions of Embodiment: Body Image and Body Schema in 
Medical Contexts', pp. 147-175 in S. K. Toombs (ed.) Handbook of 
Phenomenology and Medicine. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Gerhardt, U. (1987) 'Parsons, role theory, and health interaction', pp. 110-133 in 
G. Scamb1er (ed) Sociological Theory and Medical Sociology. 
London: Tavistock. 
193 
Geyer-Kordesch, J. (1989) 'Passions and the ghost in the machine: or what not to ask 
about science in seventeenth and eighteenth century Germany', pp. 145-163 in 
R. French and A Wear (eds) The Medical Revolution of the Seventeenth 
Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Giddens, A. (1991) Modernity and Self-Identity. Oxford: Polity. 
Gil, J. (1998) Metamorphoses of the Body. Minneapolis, MIN: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Gilman, S. L. (2001) Making the Body Beautiful: A Cultural History of Aesthetic 
Surgery. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Gioia, D. (2000) 'Warner Brothers "Fat Men"', pp. 203-212 in L. Sante and M. 
Holbrook (eds) o.K. You Mugs: Writers on Movie Actors. London: Granta. 
Goffman, E. (1990) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Goodman, H., E. Peters, R. Matthews, A. Geraghty, J. Godden, and C. Shu1dham 
(2003) 'A pilot study using a newly developed manual in a programme of 
education and support for patients waiting for coronary artery bypass surgery', 
European Journal of Cardiovascular Nursing, vol. 2: 27-37. 
Gothill, M. and D. Armstrong (1999) 'Dr. No-body: the construction of the 
doctor as an embodied subject in British general practice 1955-97', 
Sociology of Health and Illness, vol. 21(1): 1-12. 
Gray, S. (2005) The Smoking Diaries. London: Granta. 
Guillemin, M. (2004) 'Embodying heart disease through drawings', Health: An 
Interdisciplinary Journalfor the Social study of Health, Illness and Medicine, 
vol. 8(2): 223-239. 
Harding, S. (1991) Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinkingfrom 
Women's Lives. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
Heidegger, M. (1982) The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Bloomington, IND: 
Indiana University Press. 
Hekman, S. (1983) 'Beyond humanism: Gadamer, Althusser, and the methodology of 
the social sciences', Western Political Quarterly, vol. 36(1): 98-115. 
194 
Henwood, F., S. Wyatt, A. Hart, and J. Smith (2003) "'Ignorance is bliss sometimes": 
constraints on the emergence of the 'informed patient' in the changing 
landscapes of health information', Sociology of Health and fllness, vol. 25(6): 
589-607. 
Hepworth, M. (1998) 'Ageing and the emotions', pp. 173-189 in G. Bendelow and S. J. 
Williams (eds) Emotions in Social Life: Critical Themes and Contemporary 
Issues. London: Routledge. 
Herzlich, C. (1973) Health and fllness: A Social Psychological Analysis. London: 
Academic Press 
Hilbert, R. A. (1984) 'The acultural dimensions of chronic pain: flawed reality 
construction and the problem of meaning', Social Problems, 
vol. 312(4): 365-378. 
Hill, B. H. jr. (1965) 'The grain and the spirit in mediaeval anatomy', Speculum, 
vol. 40(1): 63-73. 
Hirschauer, S. (1998) 'Performing Sexes and Genders in Medical Practices', 
pp. 13-27 in M. Berg and A. Mol (eds) Differences in Medicine: Unravelling 
Practices, Techniques, and Bodies. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Hockey, J. and A. James (2003) Social Identities Across the Life Course. Houndmills: 
Pal grave Macmillan 
Holquist, M. (1990) Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World. London: Routledge. 
Holzner, B. (1974) 'Comments on Heap and Roth "On Phenomenological Sociology"', 
American SOCiological Review, vol. 39(2): 286-289. 
Horgan, J. and H. McGhee (1995) 'Cardiac rehabilitation: future directions', pp. 244-
257 in D. Jones and R. West (eds) Cardiac Rehabilitation. London: BMJ 
Howell, J. (1994) 'Concepts of heart-related diseases', pp. 99-101 in K. Kiple (ed.) 
The Cambridge World History of Human Disease. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Howson, A. and D. Inglis (2001) 'The body in sociology: tensions inside and outside 
sociological thought', The Sociological Review, vol. 49(3): 297-317. 
Hunter, K. M. (1991) Doctors I Stories: The Narrative Structure of Medical 
Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Husserl, E. (1999) 'Transcendental aesthetics: perception, spatiality, and the body', pp. 
163-185 in D. Welton (ed) The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in 
Transcendental Phenomenology. Bloomington, IND: Indiana University 
Press. 
Hyden, L. c. (1997) 'illness and Narrative', Sociology of Health and fllness, 
vol. 19(1): 48-69. 
Jager, E. (1996) 'The book of the heart: reading and writing the mediaeval subject', 
Speculum, vol. 71(1): 1-26. 
Jewson, N. D. (1976) 'The disappearance of the sick-man from medical cosmology, 
1770-1870', Sociology, vol. 10: 225-244. 
195 
Johnson, M. (1987) The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, 
and Reason. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Jolly, M. (2005) 'Speaking personally, academically', Feminist Theory, 
vol. 6(2): 213-220. 
Julian, D. G. (1995) 'Medical background to cardiac rehabilitation', pp. 4-30 in 
D. Jones and R. West (eds) Cardiac Rehabilitation. London: BMJ. 
Kavanagh, T. (1995) 'The role of exercise training in cardiac rehabilitation', pp. 54-82 
in D. Jones and R. West (eds) Cardiac Rehabilitation. London: BMJ. 
Kelly, M. P. and D. Field (1996) 'Medical sociology, chronic illness and the body', 
Sociology of Health and fllness, vol. 18(2): 241-257. 
Kelly, M. P. and D. Field (1997) 'Body image and sociology; a reply to Simon 
Williams', Sociology of Health and Illness, vol. 19(3): 359-366 
Kilby, J. (2002) 'Redeeming Memories: the Politics of Trauma and History', 
Feminist Theory, vol. 32(2): 201-210. 
Kirmayer, L. J. (1992) 'The body's insistence on meaning: metaphor as presentation 
and representation in illness experience', Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 
vol. 6(4): 323-346. 
Kleinman, A. (1988) The fllness Narratives: Suffering, Healing, and the Human 
Condition. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Komesaroff, P. (2001) 'The Many Faces of the Clinic: A Levinasian View', pp. 317-
330 in S. K. Toombs (ed.) Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Kotarba, J. A. (1977) 'The chronic pain experience, pp. 257-272 in J. D. Douglas and 
J. M. Johnson (eds) Existential Sociology. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kort,1. (1985) 'The Infarct', pp. 76-83 in M. Blonsky (ed.) On Signs. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Kort, J. (1992) The Memory of the Body: Essays on Theatre and Death. 
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Kuhn, T. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: Chicago 
University Press. 
Kusenbach, M. (2003) 'Street phenomenology: the go-along as an ethnographic 
research tool', Ethnography, vol. 4(3): 455-485. 
Laing, R. D. and D. G. Cooper (1971) Reason and Violence: A Decade of Sartre IS 
Philosophy 1950-1960. London: Tavistock. 
Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson (2003) Metaphors We Live By. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Laqueur, T. (1992) Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud. 
Cambridge, MASS: Harvard University Press. 
Lash, S. (1996) Sociology of Post modernism. London: Routledge. 
Lawton, J. (2002) 'Colonising the future: temporal perceptions and health-relevant 
behaviours across the adult Iifecourse', Sociology of Health and Illness, 
vol. 24(6): 714-733. 
Leder, D. (1984-85) 'Toward a phenomenology of pain', The Review of Existential 
Psychology and Psychiatry, vol. 19: 255-266. 
Leder, D. (1990) The Absent Body. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Leder, D. (1998) 'A tale of two bodies: the Cartesian corpse and the lived body', 
196 
pp. 117-129 in Donn Welton (ed.) Body and Flesh: A Philosophical Reader. 
Malden, MASS: Blackwell. 
Le Goff, J. (1989) 'Head or heart? The political use of body metaphors in the Middle 
Ages', pp. 12-27 in M. Feher, R. Naddaff, and N. Tazi (eds) Fragmentsfor a 
History of the Human Body. New York, NY: Zone .. 
Lewis, T. (1944) Diseases of the Heart. London: Macmillan. 
Longino, H. E. (2002) The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Lukkarinen, H. and H. Kyngas (2003) 'Experiences of the onset of coronary artery 
disease in a spouse', European Journal of cardiovascular Nursing, 
vol. 2: 189-194. 
Lyotard, J. F. (1997) The Postmodern Condition: a Report on Knowledge. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Mackenzie, C. (2001) 'On Bodily Autonomy', pp. 417-439 in S. K. Toombs (ed.) 
Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Mamet, D. (1997) True and False: Heresy and Common Sense for the Actor. 
London: Faber and Faber. 
Martin, E. (1987) The Woman in the Body: A Cultural Analysis of Reproduction. 
Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
Martin, E. (1991) 'The Egg and the Sperm: How Science has Constructed a 
Romance Based on Stereotypical Male-Female Roles', Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society, vol. 16(3): 485-50l. 
197 
Martin, E. (1992) 'The end of the body?', American Ethnologist, vol. 19(1): 121-140. 
Mauss, M. (1979) Sociology and Psychology: Essays. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul. 
May, C. (1992) 'Individual Care? Power and Subjectivity in Therapeutic 
Relationships', Sociology, vol. 26(4): 589-602. 
May, C. and C. Fleming (1997) 'The professional imagination: narrative and the 
symbolic boundaries between medicine and nursing', Journal of Advanced 
Nursing, vol. 25: 1094-1100. 
McDonald, C. and M. McIntyre (2001) 'Reinstating the marginalized body in nursing 
science: epistemological privilege and the lived life', Nursing Philosophy, 
vol. 2: 234-239. 
McNay, L. (2000) Gender and Agency: Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist and 
Social Theory. Cambridge: Polity. 
McWhinney, I. R. (2001) 'Focusing on Lived Experience; The Evolution of Clinical 
Method in WestemMedicine', pp. 331-350 in S. K. Toombs (ed.) Handbook 
of Phenomenology and Medicine. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Meerabeau, L. and S. Page (1998) 'Getting the job done: emotion management and 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation in nursing', pp. 295-312 in G. Bendelow and 
S. Williams (eds) Emotions in Social Life: Critical Themes and Contemporary 
Issues. London: Routledge. 
198 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2000) Phenomenology of Perception. London: Routledge. 
Middlebrook, C. (1996) Seeing the Crab: A Memoir of Dying. New York, NY: Basic 
Books. 
Miklaucich, M. (1998) 'Limitations on life: women's lived experiences of angina', 
Journal of Advanced Nursing, voL 28(6): 1207-1215. 
Mills, C. W. (1970) The Sociological Imagination. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Misztal, B. (2001) 'Normality and trust in Goffman's theory of interaction order', 
Sociological Theory, vol. 19(3): 312-324. 
Mol, A. and M. Berg (1998) 'Differences in medicine: an introduction', pp. 1-12 in M. 
Berg and A. Mol (eds.) Differences in Medicine: Unraveling Practices, 
Techniques, and Bodies. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Moons, P., S. De Geest, and W. Budts (2002) 'Comprehensive care for adults with 
congenital heart disease: expanding roles for nurses', European Journal of 
Cardiovacscular Nursing, vol. 1: 23-28. 
Morgan, D. and S. Scott (1993) 'Bodies in a Social Landscape', pp. 1-20 in S. Scott 
and D. Morgan (eds) Bodies That Matter. Brighton: Falmer Press. 
Morris, D. B. (1998) Illness and Culture in the Postmodern Age. Berkeley, CAL: 
University of California Press. 
Mulhall, A. (1997) 'Nursing research: our world not theirs?', Journal of Advanced 
Nursing, vol. 25: 969-976. 
Mulholland, A. (1997) 'Assimilating sociology: critical reflections on the "Sociology 
in nursing" debate', Journal of Advanced Nursing, vol. 25: 844-852. 
Nagler, A. M. (1952) A Source Book in Theatrical History. New York, NY: Dover. 
Nakjavani, E. (1981) 'Phenomenology and theory of literature: an interview with Paul 
Ricoeur', MLN, vol. 96(5): 1084-1090. 
Natanson, M. (1998) The Erotic Bird: Phenomenology in Literature. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Nietzsche, F. (1980) On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life. 
Indianapolis, IND: Hackett. 
Nietzsche, F. (2001) The Gay Science, With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an 
Appendix of Songs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Page, T., C. Lockwood, and T. Conroy-Hiller (2005) 'Effectiveness of nurse-led 
cardiac clinics in adult patients with a diagnosis of coronary heart disease', 
International Journal of Evidence Based Health, vol. 3: 2-26. 
Paley, J. (1997) 'Husserl, phenomenology and nursing: Heidegger, ontology and 
nursing research', Journal of Advanced Nursing, vol. 26: 187-193. 
Paley, J. (1998) 'Misinterpretive phenomenology: Heidegger, ontology and nursing 
research', journal of Advanced Nursing, vol. 27: 817-824. 
199 
Paley, J. (2000a) 'Body-Mind Expertise: Notes on the Polarization of Health Care 
Discourse', pp. 103-121 in Kathryn Ellis and Hartley Dean (eds) Social Policy 
and the Body: Transitions in Corporeal Discourse. 
Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Paley, J. (2000b) 'Against meaning', Nursing Philosophy, vol. 1: 109-120. 
Parsons, T. (1951) 'Illness and the role of the physician: a sociological perspective', 
pp. 609-617 in C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray (eds) Personality in Nature, 
Society, and Culture. London: Jonathan Cape. 
Parsons, T. (1952) The Social System. London: Tavistock. 
Pellegrino, E. D. (1983) 'The Healing Relationship: The Architectonics of Clinical 
Medicine', pp. 152-172 in E. E. Shelp (ed.) The Clinical Encounter. 
Dordrecht: Reidel. 
Pendleton, S. (1991) 'Curriculum planning in nursing education: towards the year 
2000', pp. 1-57 in S. Pendleton and A. Myles (eds) Curriculum Planning in 
Nurse Education. London: Edward Arnold 
Petersen, A. (1998) 'Sexing the body: representations of sex differences in Gray's 
Anatomy, 1858 to the present', Body and Society, vol. 4(1): 1-15. 
Pierson, W. (1999) 'Considering the nature of inter subjectivity within 
professional nursing', Journal of Advanced Nursing, vol. 30(2): 294-302. 
Pilardi, J. A. (1999) Simone de Beauvoir Writing the Self: Philosophy Becomes 
Autobiography. Westport, CONN: Praeger. 
Plochmann, G. K. (1963) 'William Harvey and his methods', Studies in the 
Renaissance, vol. 10: 192-210. 
Plummer, K. (2001) 'The Call of Life Stories in Ethnographic Research', pp. 395-406 
in P. Atkinson, A. Coffey, S. Delamont, J. Lofland and L. Lofland (eds) 
Handbook of Ethnography. London: Sage. 
Porter, R. (1985) 'The patient's view: doing medical history from below', Theory and 
Society, vol. 14(2): 175-198. 
Porter, R. (1997) The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: A Medical History of Humanity 
from Antiquity to the Present. London: Harper Collins. 
Pouchelle, M. C. (1990) The Body and Surgery in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
Prince, G. (2001) 'Recent concepts and variables ofNarratology', Narrative, 
vol. 9(2): 230-233. 
Rabinbach, A. (1992) The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of 
Modernity. Berkeley, CAL: University of California Press. 
200 
Radley, A. (1996) 'The critical moment: time, information and medical expertise in 
the experience of patients receiving coronary bypass surgery', pp. 118-138 in 
Simon J. Williams and Michael Calnan (eds) Modern Medicine: Lay 
Perspectives and Experiences. London: University College London Press. 
Radley, A. (1997) 'The triumph of narrative? A reply to Arthur Frank', Body and 
Society, vol. 3(3): 93-101. 
Radley, A. (1999a) 'The aesthetics of illness: narrative, horror and the sublime', 
Sociology of Health and Illness, vol. 21(6): 778-796. 
Radley, A. (1999b) 'Abhorrence, compassion and the social response to suffering' , 
Health, vol. 3(2): 167-187. 
Radley, A. (2002) Making Sense of Illness: The Social Psychology of Health and 
Disease. London: Sage. 
Radley, A. and Billig, M. (1996) 'Accounts of health and illness: dilemmas and 
representations', Sociology of Health and Illness, vol. 18(2): 220-240. 
Richardson, Laurel (2002) 'Writing sociology', Cultural Studies~Critical 
Methodologies, Vol. 2(3): 414-422. 
Ricoeur, P. (1991) From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II. 
London: The Athlone Press. 
Ricoeur, P. (1994) Oneself as Another. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Rimmon-Kenan, S. (2002) 'The story of "1": illness and narrative identity', 
Narrative, vol. 10(1): 9-27. 
Rombalski, J. J. (2003) 'A personal journey in understanding physical touch as a 
nursing intervention', Journal of Holistic Nursing, vol. 21(1): 73-80. 
Rothman, D. J., S. Marcus, and S. A. Kiceluk (eds.) Medicine and Western 
201 
Civilization. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
Rudebeck, Carl Edvard (2001) 'Grasping the Existential Anatomy: The Role of Bodily 
Empathy in Clinical Communication', pp 297-316 in S. K. Toombs (ed.) 
Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine. Dordrecht: K1uwer. 
Rudrum, D. (2005) 'From narrative representation to narrative use: towards the limits 
of definition', Narrative, vol. 13(2): 195-204. 
Sacks, O. (1991) A Leg to Stand On. London: Picador. 
Saka1ys, J. A. (2000) 'The political role of illness narratives', Journal of Advanced 
Nursing, vol. 31: 1469-1475. 
Sallis, John (1995) Delimitations: Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics. 
Bloomington, IND: Indiana University Press. 
Salvaggio, R. (1999) The Sounds of Feminist Theory. Albany, NY: State University 
of New York Press. 
Saunders, J. B. de C. M. and C. D. O'Malley (1973) The Illustrationsfrom the Works 
of Andreas Vesalius of Brussels. New York, NY: Dover. 
Sawchuck, K. A. (1995) 'From gloom to boom: age, identity and target marketing', 
pp. 173-187 in M. Featherstone and A. Wernick (eds) Images of Aging: 
Cultural Representations of Later Life. London: Routledge. 
Sawday, J. (1996) The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body in 
Renaissance Culture. London: Routledge. 
Scheper-Hughes, N. and M. Lock (1985) 'The mindful body: a prolegomenon to 
future work in medical anthropology, Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 
vol. 1 (1): 6-41. 
Schiebinger, L. (1986) 'Skeletons in the Closet: The First TIlustrations of the 
Female Skeleton in Eighteenth-Century Anatomy', 
Representations, vol. 14: 42-82. 
Schilder, P. (1950) The Image and Appearance of the Body. 
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (1994) The Roots of Power: Animate Form and Gendered 
Bodies. Chicago, IL: Open Court. 
Shi1drick, M. (2002) Embodying the Monster: Encounters with the Vulnerable Self 
London: Sage. 
Shi1drick, M. and J. Price (1994) 'Splitting the difference: adventures in the anatomy 
202 
and embodiment of women', pp. 151-179 in G. Griffin, M. Hester, S. Rai, and 
S. Rosenei1 (eds) Stirring It: Challenges for Feminism. London:Taylor and 
Francis. 
Shilling, C. (1996) The Body and Social Theory. London: Sage. 
Shusterman, R. (1991) 'Beneath Interpretation', pp. 102-127 in D. R. Hiley, J. F. 
Bohman, and R. Shusterman (eds) The Interpretive Turn: Philosophy, 
Science, Culture. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Shusterman, R. (1999) 'Somaesthetics: a disciplinary proposal', The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 57(3): 299-313. 
Silverman, D. (1997) Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text 
and Interaction. London: Sage. 
Siraisi, N. G. (1997) 'Vesalius and the reading of Galen's Teleology', Renaissance 
Quarterly, vol. 50(1): 1-37. 
Skultans, V. (2000) 'Narrative illness and identity', Anthropology and Medicine, 
vol. 7(1): 5-13. 
Smith, K. (2002) 'Increasing roles for nurses', European Journal of Cardiovascular 
Nursing, vol. 1: 19-21. 
Spiegelberg, H. (1976) The Phenomenological Movement: a Historical Introduction, 
vol. 2. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 
Spurling, L. (1977) Phenomenology and the Social World: The Philosophy of 
Merleau-Ponty and its Relation to the Social sciences. London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul. 
Stafford, B. M. (1997) Good Looking: Essays on the Virtue of Images. 
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Starobinski, J. (1983) 'The body's moment', Yale French Studies, vol. 64: 273-305. 
Steinberg, M. (2005) The Fiction of a Thinkable World. New York, NY: Monthly 
Review Press. 
Stelter, R. (2000) 'The Transformation of Body Experience into Language', Journal of 
Phenomenological Psychology, vol. 31(1): 63-77. 
Sternberg, M. (2001) 'How narrativity makes a difference', Narrative, 
vol. 9(2): 115-122. 
Stillman, R. (1995) 'Hobbes's Leviathan: monsters, metaphors, and magic', ELH, 
vol. 62(4): 791-815. 
Svenaeus, F. (2001) 'The Phenomenology of HeaIth and lllness', pp. 87-108 in 
S. K. Toombs (ed.) Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
203 
Synott, A. (1993) The Body Social: Symbolism, Self and Society. London: Routledge. 
Throop, C. J. (2003) 'Articulating experience', Anthropological Theory, 
vol. 3(2): 219-241. 
Todes, S. (2001) Body and World. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Todorov, T. (1990) Genres in Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Toombs, S. K. (2001) 'Phenomenology and medicine', pp. 1-26 in S. K. Toombs (ed.) 
Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Turner, B. S. (1990) 'The anatomy lesson: a note on the Merton thesis', 
The Sociological Review, vol. 38(1): 1-18. 
Turner, B. S. (1995a) 'Aging and Identity: Some Reflections on the Somatization 
of the Self, pp. 245-260 in Mike Featherstone and Andrew Wernick (eds) 
Images of Aging: Cultural Representations of Late Life. London: Routledge. 
Turner, B. S. with C. Samson (1995b) Medical Power and Social Knowledge. 
London: Sage. 
Turner, B. S. (1996a) 'Recent developments in the theory of the body', pp. 1-35 in 
M. Featherstone, M. Hepworth and B. S. Turner (eds) The Body: Social 
Process and Cultural Theory. London: Sage. 
Turner, B. S. (1996b) The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory. 
London: Sage. 
Van Manen, M. (2001) 'Professional practice and doing phenomenology', pp. 457-474 
in S. K. Toombs (ed.) Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Vigarello, G. (1990) 'The upward training of the body from the age of chivalry to 
courtly civility', pp. 148-199 in M. Feher, R. Naddaff, and N. Tazi (eds) 
Fragments for a History of the Human Body, Part Two. 
New York, NY: Zone. 
Wijngaard, M. van den (1991) Reinventing the Sexes: Feminism and Biomedical 
Construction of Femininity and Masculinity 1959-1985. Delft: Eburon. 
Wiklund, L., L. Lindholm, and U. Lindstrom (2002) 'Hermeneutics and narration: a 
way to deal with qualitative data', Nursing Inquiry, vol. 9(2): 114-125. 
Williams, G. (1984) 'The genesis of chronic illness: narrative re-construction', 
Sociology of Health and Illness, vol. 6(2): 175-200. 
204 
Williams, S. J. (1996) 'Medical sociology, chronic illness and the body: a rejoinder to 
Michael Kelly and David Field', Sociology of Health and Illness, 
vol. 18(5): 699-709. 
Wilson, L. (1987) 'William Harvey's Prelectiones: the performance of the body in the 
Renaissance theatre of anatomy', Representations, vol. 17: 62-95. 
Winters, C. A. (1997) 'Living with Chronic Heart Disease: A Pilot Study', 
The Qualitative Report, vol. 3(4): 1-23. 
Witz, A. (1992) Professions and Patriarchy. London: Routledge. 
Yingling, T. E. (1997) AIDS and the National Body. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press. 
Zalm, J. E. van der, and V. Bergum (2000) 'Hermeneutic-phenomenology: providing 
living knowledge for nursing practice', Journal of Advanced Nursing, vol. 31: 
211-218. 
Zaner, R. M. (1981) The Context of Self: A Phenomenological Inquiry Using Medicine 
as a Clue. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. 
Zaner, R. M. (2001) 'Thinking about Medicine', pp. 127-144 in S. K. Toombs (ed.) 
Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Zola, 1. K. (1991) 'Bringing Our Bodies and Ourselves Back in: Reflections on a Past, 
Present and Future "Medical Sociology"', Journal of Health and Social 
Behaviour, vol. 32(1): 1-16. 
